Engage North Korea : February 2022

North Korea: A Year in ReviewEverything that mattered in 2021

Every month, NK PRO conducts an in-depth analytic review of news on the Korean Peninsula. This Year In Review covers the period of January 1, 2021 to December 31, 2021.

In addition to an executive summary providing top-line findings, the following review includes detailed analysis on a wide range of other specialist focus areas.

For more news and analysis, contact us for a free trial at membership@nknews.org

Published by Korea Risk Group, the world’s premier resource for analysis, research

tools and data on North Korea (www.korearisk.com)

A YEAR IN REVIEW

Step back and take a look at 2021 to

help make sense of what’s next with

North Korea.

When U.S. President Joe Biden took office in Jan. 2021, few foresaw the surprising ways that North Korea would dominate headlines over the following months. From the country’s ongoing COVID-19 border controls to new U.S. sanctions against North Korean officials, Pyongyang’s ever-diversifying missile arsenal, a surge in cyberattacks and a severe food crisis, North Korea proved impossible to ignore once again.

To stay ahead of the news cycle and offer NK Pro members the most insightful analyses on the region, Korea Risk Group continued investing in its team and research tools. With improved access to high-resolution satellite imagery, refined monitoring capabilities for suspicious vessel movements and a growing pool of investigative reporters and expert analysts, we worked hard to stay at the top of our game. We also continued to expand our coverage of North Korean cyber warfare — a highly complex issue that we believe will benefit from the broad and deep expertise that NK Pro is known for.

Less than one month into 2022, it’s clear that North Korea will continue to have a major impact on regional and global security, with its sixth missile test in less than four weeks just as we finish this volume.

As tensions accelerate, it’s good to take a step back and get a broader perspective on where things will go on the peninsula in the weeks and months ahead. We hope that North Korea: A Year In Review will help you to do just that.

Chad O’Carroll

Founder & CEO

North Korea: A Year in Review 2021 3

Contents

05 JANUARY

37 FEBRUARY

68 MARCH

99 APRIL

130 MAY

161 JUNE

193 JULY

224 AUGUST

255 SEPTEMBER

286 OCTOBER

318 NOVEMBER

350 DECEMBER

4 North Korea: A Year in Review 2021

JANUARY 2021

North Korea: A Year in Review 2021 5

Contents

07 Executive Summary

10 Foreign Relations: North Korea calls the US its ‘principal enemy,’ Biden reviews DPRK policy, Xi Jinping congratulates Kim on party congress

13 Leadership: Kim takes father’s ‘eternal’ general secretary position, WPK strengthens disciplinary powers, large-scale party personnel changes

Human Security / Human Rights: COVID-19 outbreak in Chinese border province,

North Korea tightens pandemic restrictions, defectors arriving in South reach record low

19 Inter-Korean: Kim says South must change its attitude, Moon ready to meet Kim any time, Seoul nominates new foreign minister

Economy: North Korea announces new economic plan, foreign trade reaches

standstill amid border lockdown, value of dollar collapses against the North Korean won

Sanctions: US fines company $2.5 Million for sanctions violations, US hits DPRK 26

official and Chinese firms with sanctions, new Russian e-visa provides easier entry for North Koreans

29 Military: Another military parade, hopes that military drills don’t escalate tension, South Korea to spend $4.5 Million on border security system

32 WMD: Kim vows to continue nuke development, North Korea reveals new missile designs, Seoul says missile defense is airtight

35 DPRK State Media: New and Notable

6 North Korea: A Year in Review 2021

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Skiers in North Korea | Image: NK PRO

FOREIGN RELATIONS: NORTH KOREA CALLS THE US ITS ‘PRINCIPAL ENEMY,’ BIDEN REVIEWS DPRK POLICY, XI JINPING CONGRATULATES KIM ON PARTY CONGRESS

James Fretwell

Kim Jong Un called the U.S. North Korea’s “principal enemy” and vowed to continue developing his country’s long range nuclear strike capability in January. U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken said the Biden administration would review Washington’s “entire approach and policy toward North Korea,” including identifying ways to pressure Pyongyang into talks as well as “other diplomatic initiatives.” And Chinese President Xi Jinping congratulated Kim on the Eighth Party Congress and expressed his desire to develop PRC-DPRK relations.

RISK: With North Korea vowing to continue to improve its nuclear strike capability and the U.S. promising to ramp up sanctions pressure, it looks as if the stalemate between Washington and Pyongyang won’t be resolved in the short to medium term. If U.S.-DPRK relations return to the status quo under Biden, North Korea will only continue to develop its WMDs, raising the stakes of a potential nuclear catastrophe on the Korean Peninsula.

LEADERSHIP: KIM TAKES FATHER’S ‘ETERNAL’ GENERAL SECRETARY POSITION, WPK STRENGTHENS DISCIPLINARY POWERS, LARGE-SCALE PARTY PERSONNEL CHANGES

Martin Weiser

Kim Jong Un was promoted to general secretary of the ruling Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) at the Eighth Party Congress, an “eternal” position once held by his father, Kim Jong Il. The WPK also strengthened the powers of several oversight bodies at the Party Congress. And there was a significant overturn of officials in January, with mostly economy-related party members replacing those known for foreign policy.

RISK: The public reports on the Party Congress only mentioned foreign policy in passing. With reshuffles of officials, party reform and economic issues, the leadership’s current focus is on domestic issues. The leadership may conduct military exercises or missile tests to increase domestic legitimacy, but they might also respond

North Korea: A Year in Review 2021 7

especially sensitively to further economic or geopolitical pressure/criticism – motivating them to conduct such exercises or tests.

HUMAN SECURITY / HUMAN RIGHTS: COVID-19 OUTBREAK IN CHINESE BORDER PROVINCE, NORTH KOREA TIGHTENS PANDEMIC RESTRICTIONS, DEFECTORS ARRIVING IN SOUTH REACH RECORD LOW

James Fretwell

One year since the DPRK closed its borders to prevent the spread of COVID-19, Pyongyang continues to claim zero cases of the virus – although an outbreak in neighboring Jilin province in China threatens this. Despite North Korean claims that COVID-19 has not entered its borders, the country continues to tighten pandemic restrictions domestically. And the number of North Korean defectors arriving in South Korea dropped to a record low in 2020.

RISK: Even if North Korea really hasn’t had any cases of COVID-19, the medicine may ultimately prove worse than the disease: Pyongyang’s draconian COVID-19 prevention measures have decimated the country’s economy and have also likely exacerbated the suffering of ordinary North Koreans. Despite this, North Korea’s border lockdown is expected to last until the global pandemic – especially in China – has ended, due to fear that COVID-19 could enter the DPRK’s borders and wreak havoc on the country’s poorly-equipped healthcare system.

INTER-KOREAN: KIM SAYS SOUTH MUST CHANGE ITS ATTITUDE, MOON READY TO MEET KIM ANY TIME, SEOUL NOMINATES NEW FOREIGN MINISTER

James Fretwell

Speaking at the Eighth Party Congress, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un said that inter-Korean relations will depend on how Seoul responds to Pyongyang’s “just demands.” Days later, in his New Year’s address, South Korean President Moon Jae-in said that he was willing to meet with the North Korean leader “any time and any place.” South Korea’s presidential Blue House also announced it will nominate Chung Eui-yong, well-known for his role in facilitating the inter-Korean and U.S.-DPRK summitry of 2018 and 2019, as the country’s new foreign minister.

ECONOMY: NORTH KOREA ANNOUNCES NEW ECONOMIC PLAN, FOREIGN TRADE REACHES STANDSTILL AMID BORDER LOCKDOWN, VALUE OF DOLLAR COLLAPSES AGAINST THE NORTH KOREAN WON

Peter Ward

North Korea began January by announcing its next five-year economic plan, but few concrete details were actually released. Meanwhile, foreign trade and domestic construction projects appear to have reached an almost total standstill. And the collapse in the value of the U.S. dollar and Chinese RMB against the North Korean Won (KPW) in January suggests that the North Korean border will remain closed for a long time to come.

SANCTIONS: US FINES COMPANY $2.5 MILLION FOR SANCTIONS VIOLATIONS, US HITS DPRK OFFICIAL AND CHINESE FIRMS WITH SANCTIONS, NEW RUSSIAN E-VISA PROVIDES EASIER ENTRY FOR NORTH KOREANS

James Fretwell

The U.S. Justice and Treasury departments fined an Indonesian company a total of $2.5 million for illegally selling cigarette paper to North Korea. The U.S. enacted non-proliferation measures on a North Korean official under the Iran, North Korean and Syria Nonproliferation Act (INKSNA) for the first time since July 2016. And a new Russian e-visa system was launched, allowing DPRK citizens easier access to the country, sparking concern that North Koreans will continue to earn foreign currency for the regime despite U.N. sanctions.

8 North Korea: A Year in Review 2021

MILITARY: ANOTHER MILITARY PARADE, HOPES THAT MILITARY DRILLS DON’T ESCALATE TENSION, SOUTH KOREA TO SPEND $4.5 MILLION ON BORDER SECURITY SYSTEM

James Fretwell

North Korea celebrated the end of its Eighth Party Congress with a military parade in Pyongyang, although it was much smaller than the one on Oct. 10 to mark the 75th founding anniversary of the ruling party. South Korea’s unification minister also said he hopes joint U.S.-ROK military drills won’t escalate tensions between the two Koreas. And a South Korean military official announced that the country will spend approximately $4.5 million to improve its border security system.

WMD: KIM VOWS TO CONTINUE NUKE DEVELOPMENT, NORTH KOREA REVEALS NEW MISSILE DESIGNS, SEOUL SAYS MISSILE DEFENSE IS AIRTIGHT

James Fretwell

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un vowed to keep developing his country’s “long-range nuclear strike capability” at the Eighth Party Congress. The DPRK also revealed a new submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) and new short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) designs at a military parade marking the end of the Congress. Meanwhile, South Korea’s defense minister said his country’s missile defense system is “airtight” – except for a few “weak spots.”

North Korea: A Year in Review 2021 9

FOREIGN RELATIONS: NORTH KOREA CALLS THE US ITS ‘PRINCIPAL ENEMY,’ BIDEN REVIEWS DPRK POLICY, XI JINPING CONGRATULATES KIM ON PARTY CONGRESS

James Fretwell

Kim Jong Un speaking at the Eighth Party Congress | Image: Rodong Sinmun

Kim Jong Un called the U.S. North Korea’s “principal enemy” and vowed to continue developing his country’s long range nuclear strike capability in January. U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken said the Biden administration would review Washington’s“entire approach and policy toward North Korea,” including identifying ways to pressure Pyongyang into talks as well as “other diplomatic initiatives.” And Chinese President Xi Jinping congratulated Kim on the Eighth Party Congress and expressed his desire to develop PRC-DPRK relations.

North Korea calls the U.S. its “principal enemy,” vows to keep developing nukes

Kim Jong Un called the U.S. his “principal enemy” and vowed to continue developing his country’s long-range nuclear strike capability, state media reported on Jan. 9. Speaking at the Eighth Party Congress, only days before then-U.S. President Donald Trump was set to leave office, Kim added that he believed the U.S. would not change the “entity and the real intention” of its DPRK policy no matter who was in office. He also set the goal of “attaining an advanced capability for making a preemptive and retaliatory nuclear strike” by improving the precision of its missiles in order to “strike and annihilate any strategic targets within a range of 15,000 kilometres with pinpoint accuracy.”

Biden administration to conduct policy review toward North Korea

Amid uncertainty surrounding how newly-inaugurated U.S. President Joe Biden will approach North Korea, Secretary of State Antony Blinken said the administration intends to review Washington’s.’ “entire approach and policy toward North Korea” in his senate confirmation hearing on Jan. 26. However, he also explained that he would look for ways to use pressure to force North Korea into talks – as well as “other diplomatic initiatives.”

The Biden administration also announced and confirmed more U.S. officials that will deal with North Korea related issues throughout January. These officials have slightly varying positions on DPRK policy, but generally advocate for a mix of sanctions pressure and talks in order to convince Pyongyang to denuclearize. These

10 North Korea: A Year in Review 2021

foreign policy picks include William Burns as director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA); Kurt Campbell as coordinator for Indo-Pacific affairs on the National Security Council (NSC); Wendy Sherman as deputy secretary of state; Sung Kim as assistant secretary of state for the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs; and Jung H. Pak as deputy assistant secretary for East Asian and Pacific affairs.

Xi Jinping congratulates Kim Jong Un on new position

Chinese President Xi Jinping sent Kim Jong Un a congratulatory letter hours after the North Korean leader’s rise to general secretary of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK), according to China’s state-run Xinhua News Agency on Jan. 11. Xi reportedly offered Kim his “warm congratulations” and said the Chinese government has an “unswerving” policy to “preserve, consolidate and develop China-DPRK relations.” The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) also sent a congratulatory letter to the WPK on the first day of North Korea’s Eighth Party Congress, which the DPRK’s ruling party daily the Rodong Sinmun printed on its front page on Jan. 6. The letter said Kim and Xi will further develop relations and “ensure regional peace, stability, development and prosperity.” For its part, North Korea’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs condemned Western nations for creating a “human rights virus” following both then-U.S. Secertary of State and current Secretary of States Mike Pompeo and Antony Blinken’s accusations of China’s “genocide” of Muslim Uighurs in Xinjiang.

North Korea: A Year in Review 2021 11

FOREIGN RELATIONS: WHY IT MATTERS Government

January represented a crossroads, rather than a turning point, in terms of North Korea’s future foreign relations. And in some ways, Kim is right: what he referred to in his Party Congress speech as the “entity and the real intention” of the U.S.’ DPRK policy – North Korea’s denuclearization – will stay the same under Biden. But even though the Biden administration is still considering its DPRK policy, it’s almost certain that the U.S. will aim to rally its allies to ramp up sanctions pressure. And while administration officials certainly don’t discount diplomacy altogether, details of any summits or agreements between Washington and Pyongyang – if they happen at all – will be preceded by more in-depth working-level talks than under the Trump administration.

Overall, the Biden administration’s greatest challenge in increasing sanctions pressure on North Korea will be China. In order to truly implement maximum pressure, the U.S. has to convince China – which comprises the overwhelming majority of North Korea’s foreign trade

Business

Prospects for doing business in North Korea are extremely bleak for the short to medium term, even for firms from neighboring China and Russia. The Biden administration is currently reviewing its North Korea policy, but in the meantime, the sanctions regime is certainly here to stay. Sanctions, in place to combat

– that it’s the right approach toward North Korea’s denuclearization. However, Beijing has expressed doubts about the effectiveness of sanctions before and, according to Washington, ignores sanctions. Furthermore, in Dec. 2019 it combined with Russia to propose sanctions relief at the U.N. – a suggestion that the U.S.’ envoy quickly rejected. Aside from warming PRC-DPRK relations and growing friction between the U.S. and China, the Biden administration will ultimately have to deal with the reality that Beijing will be reluctant to pressure Pyongyang too much, lest it creates instability.

Additionally, North Korea’s self-imposed draconian COVID-19 border lockdown has hurt its economy more than 2017’s maximum pressure sanctions did. This demonstrates that North Korea is willing to undergo immense economic hardships in order to defend what it views as a national security threat, and raises the question of how effective sanctions could ever possibly be at convincing Pyongyang to denuclearize.

the DPRK’s nuclear program, are the fundamental hurdle to doing business with North Korea. And since Pyongyang shows no sign of denuclearizing any time soon, the best that businesses can hope for is that the U.S. and North Korea come to some kind of interim or step-by-step agreement over the next four years.

LEADERSHIP: KIM TAKES FATHER’S ‘ETERNAL’ GENERAL SECRETARY POSITION, WPK STRENGTHENS DISCIPLINARY POWERS, LARGE-SCALE PARTY PERSONNEL CHANGES

Martin Weiser

Kim Jong Un speaking at the Eighth Party Congress | Image: Rodong Sinmun

Kim Jong Un becomes general secretary, but not generalissimo, at Party Congress

At the Eighth Party Congress, the ruling Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) changed the Executive Policy Council and the position of party chair back into the secretariat and the general secretary of the party on Jan. 9 through a change of its party regulations. Kim Jong Un’s adoption of the general secretary position came as a surprise, since his father, Kim Jong Il, was granted the title of “eternal” general secretary in 2012. The last time Kim Jong Un appropriated his father’s role like this was in 2016, when he replaced the National Defense Commission (NDC) – of which Kim Jong Il was the “eternal” chair – with the State Affairs Commission and made himself the head. However, Jan. 2020 marks the first time Kim Jong Un has simply taken away one of Kim Jong Il’s supposedly “eternal” positions. In contrast, Kim Jong Un was not promoted to the generalissimo, the country’s highest military rank and also held by his father and grandfather, as expected.

North Korea: A Year in Review 2021 13

WPK strengthens disciplinary powers at Eighth Party Congress

North Korea merged several oversight bodies into the Central Auditing Commission at the Eighth Party Congress, in order to strengthen party discipline and fight corruption. The Commission – which previously only dealt with party finances – adopted several functions of the inspection commission, which was abolished during the Party Congress. A discipline inspection department was created to act as the commission’s “executive body”

and its director also doubles as vice chair of the commission.

In contrast with previous inspection and auditing commission chiefs, the Commission’s new head, Jong Sang Hak, was appointed as a full member of the Politburo and the secretariat, putting him at the center of power. The list of Central Committee members also shows that he was previously a deputy director of the powerful Organizational Guidance Department (OGD).

The WPK has frequently discussed corruption and party discipline at party meetings in 2020. The creation of a legal department headed by Kim Hyong Sik in August likely was made with the same goal in mind as it will monitor state organs for corruption and other transgressions.

WPK reshuffles party leadership and department directors

The WPK reshuffled three fourths of party leadership and, at a subsequent parliamentary meeting, six new vice premiers and 23 ministers and heads of other top organizations were also turned over. Most of the new ministers will oversee economic issues.

The top appointment was the promotion of Jo Yong Won to the Standing Committee of the politburo, taking Pak Pong Ju’s seat, while the newly organized secretariat was filled with a smaller number of officials close to the leader. Except for Jong Sang Hak, members of the secretariat had all been in the top leadership before the congress in other positions. The department of most director appointments was revealed through their appointment to the Politburo, which was done along with additional announcements of the officials’ other positions.

The politburo was also reshuffled, now including the country’s five top military officials as full members. Two of them – the chief of the KPA General Political Bureau and minister of public security – are new appointments.

While economy-related officials were promoted, however, foreign policy-focused officials were generally demoted. This included the North Korean leader’s sister, Kim Yo Jong, who was removed from the Politburo and later demoted from first deputy to the normal deputy of a party department– although her demotion might not have reduced her influence. Choe Son Hui, last known to be first vice foreign minister, was moved from full to alternate Central Committee member, while the new head of the international department, Kim Song Nam, was now not even appointed an alternate member of the Politburo, contrasting with his predecessor.

14 North Korea: A Year in Review 2021

LEADERSHIP: WHY IT MATTERS

Government

Kim Jong Un’s authority has increased dramatically over the last two years. His name was written into the constitution in 2019 and was put on similar footing to his father and grandfather in North Korean state propaganda in 2020. Kim’s new general secretary title is a reflection of this. Honoring only Kim Jong Il as “eternal” general secretary was in itself already problematic, however, as Kim Il Sung had not received the same treatment. Generally speaking, a possible lowering of Kim Jong Il’s standing in propaganda is not yet visible.

The fight against corruption and transgression in party discipline are a central focus now, underlined by

Business

The large reshuffle of economic officials after the congress hints at a wave of new policies and measures to overcome the current downturn. This could focus mostly on domestic issues, but also might include engagement of foreign partners, especially China, once the border lockdown is lifted. In contrast to the stronger adherence to ideology, greater leeway might be given to economic officials to achieve targets with more freedom or benefits to investors

the group photo of the new party leadership. Instead of the two military officials standing directly behind the leader after the December 2019 plenum, this time the directors of the cadre and discipline inspection departments were in this spot.

The creation of the legal and discipline departments will likely lead to a stronger crackdown on power abuse and corruption, but as seen in legislation against foreign culture and a possible crackdown on markets this will also impact other aspects of society.

The creation of legal and discipline departments in the central committee will be followed by the creation of those departments in all local party committees. This might increase scrutiny of international contracts and foreign activity in the country, but they also should help to reduce the amount of bribes that need to be paid and prevent abuse of local cadres’ powers in projects and exchanges.

HUMAN SECURITY / HUMAN RIGHTS: COVID-19 OUTBREAK IN CHINESE BORDER PROVINCE, NORTH KOREA TIGHTENS PANDEMIC RESTRICTIONS, DEFECTORS ARRIVING IN SOUTH REACH RECORD LOW James Fretwell

A soldier stands near the North Korean border with China | Image: NK PROvv

North Korea claims zero COVID-19 cases, but an outbreak reported nearby in China

On Jan. 29, around one year after North Korea first closed its borders, the World Health Organization (WHO) reported that Pyongyang continued to claim that not a single case of the virus had been detected as of Jan. 21. WHO said that samples continued to be tested at 15 laboratories across North Korea, but did not provide total testing numbers or the total number of people in quarantine — information that once appeared regularly in past reports. Meanwhile, on Jan. 17, China’s Jilin province – which borders North Korea – reported that confirmed COVID-19 cases had jumped from 10 to 167 total, following months of zero cases. Jilin province’s current official case count is 473 as of Jan. 29, but a diplomatic source with knowledge of discussions in China told NK News that this number is rumored to actually be four or five times higher.

North Korea tightens pandemic restrictions before and after Party Congress

North Korean state media reported tighter COVID-19 pandemic measures during and following the Eighth Party Congress. On Jan. 4, just before the Congress, ruling party daily the Rodong Sinmun called for citizens to “tighten our shoe strings and stay awake with every one of us required to come forward for emergency antivirus campaign.” On Jan. 20, around a week after the Congress, the state-run Korean Central Broadcasting Station (KCBS) said that North Korea was “pushing ahead with efforts to tighten control on land, sea and air borders.” Congress delegates themselves, however, were shown in state media sat closely together and not wearing masks on all days – except on Jan. 11. This may have been because North Korea plans to mainly reuse footage on days that leader Kim Jong Un was present, and this footage would look better if delegates were not wearing their masks.

16 North Korea: A Year in Review 2021

North Korean defectors arriving in the South drop to record low in 2020

The number of North Korean defectors arriving in the South dropped to a record low in 2020, according to new numbers Seoul’s unification ministry released on Jan. 20. In total, 229 North Koreans settled in South Korea last year, a 78% decrease from the 1,047 defectors that arrived in 2019. It’s currently unclear how many of the 2020 arrivals actually left North Korea last year – they likely could have escaped before Pyongyang’s strict pandemic prevention border lockdown and left to the ROK from China, Southeast Asia or elsewhere. Indeed, pandemic lockdowns do appear to have affected the number of defections: The first quarter of 2020 saw 135 defectors come to South Korea, but this number dropped to 12 between April and June, 48 between July and September and 34 from October to December. During the Kim Jong Il era, South Korea consistently received over 2,000 defectors every year, though following the start of Kim Jong Un’s rule in 2011 these numbers continued to fall to just over 1,000 in 2019. The official total number of North Korean defectors in South Korea now stands at 33,752.

North Korea: A Year in Review 2021 17

HUMAN SECURITY / HUMAN RIGHTS: WHY IT MATTERSGovernment

North Korea’s ever-tightening COVID-19 prevention measures, even after the Party Congress, imply that domestic restrictions will not be lifted any time soon – and it’s very likely that ordinary North Koreans will suffer the most as a result.

In Oct. 2020, it seemed possible that the country would relax its most restrictive measures after the military parade to celebrate the ruling party’s 75th founding anniversary. Yet following the event, North Korea continued to keep significant border restrictions in place in the lead up to the Eighth Party Congress – another event where thousands would gather closely together in Pyongyang. Regardless of there being no upcoming events in North Korea as important as the ruling party’s 75th founding anniversary and the

Business

COVID-19 outbreaks in Chinese regions bordering North Korea will continue to prolong the harsh nature of entry/exit restrictions to the DPRK, relating to both goods and people. This is because the overwhelming majority of travel to North Korea before the pandemic happened via sea, rail and land routes departing from China. For this reason, even though the North Korean government will also consider the global pandemic

Party Congress, it appears that border lockdowns and regional movement restrictions continue to be justified in the minds of the leadership, in order to prevent the spread of COVID-19.

North Korea appears to be concerned that relaxing lockdowns, even after ruling party gatherings and military parades, could allow COVID-19 to spread into the country through virus-hotspots like neighboring Jilin province. This concern is likely more about saving face than concern for ordinary citizens in the provinces, however: The purported absence of COVID-19 in North Korea is a major point of pride for North Korea, and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un recently rejected South Korea’s proposals to cooperate on COVID-19 as “inessential.”

situation, the most important factor in Pyongyang’s decision on border entry will relate to the situation in China – and particularly in border areas such as Jilin province. While Pyongyang has said it won’t open its borders until the pandemic is over worldwide, prospects for any opening are especially bleak as long as there are outbursts of cases of COVID-19 in China.

INTER-KOREAN: KIM SAYS SOUTH MUST CHANGE ITS ATTITUDE, MOON READY TO MEET KIM ANY TIME, SEOUL NOMINATES NEW FOREIGN MINISTER

James Fretwell

South Korean President Moon Jae-in | Image: Blue House

Kim Jong Un says inter-Korean relations depend on change in the South’s attitude

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un said that inter-Korean relations will depend on Seoul’s response to Pyongyang’s “just demands,” official state media reported on Jan. 9. Speaking on day four of North Korea’s Eighth Party Congress, Kim said that inter-Korean relations had regressed to where they were before the 2018 Panmunjom Declaration. He derided South Korean proposals to cooperate in fighting COVID-19, humanitarianism and in restarting inter-Korean tourism as “inessential,” and pointed to the South’s military technology developments and joint U.S.-ROK military exercises as preventing reconciliation. However, the North Korean leader did say that inter-Korean relations could return to “a new starting point of peace and prosperity in the near future,” but implied this would be only if the South changed its policy toward the DPRK. North Korea, Kim said, no longer needs “to show goodwill to the south Korean authorities unilaterally as we did in the past.”

Moon ready to meet Kim “any time and any place”

Days after Kim Jong Un blasted the South for the current impasse in inter-Korean relations, President Moon Jae-in said he was willing to meet with the North Korean leader “any time and any place” in his New Year’s address on Jan. 11. Moon also said that South Korea will work with the Biden administration to strengthen the U.S.-ROK alliance and strive to make a breakthrough in stalled U.S.-DPRK talks and inter-Korean dialogue. Unlike in his last New Year’s address, where he proposed resuming operations at the Kaesong Industrial Complex and

North Korea: A Year in Review 2021 19

tourism at Mount Kumgang, Moon did not suggest any specific inter-Korean projects apart from cooperation in fighting COVID-19. The South Korean President also called for the two Koreas to fulfill all of the agreements they have made to date.

Seoul nominates well-known summit facilitator as new foreign minister

Chung Eui-yong, former director of the Blue House National Security Office, was nominated to replace Kang Kyung-wha as South Korea’s foreign minister, the presidential Blue House announced on Jan. 20. Chung is known for meeting with both North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and former U.S. President Donald Trump in order to facilitate what eventually became the inter-Korean and U.S.-DPRK summitry of 2018 and 2019. Chung Man-ho, a spokesperson at the Blue House, said that Chung would “strengthen the ROK-U.S. alliance” and “firmly establish and bring progress in the Moon administration’s Korean Peninsula peace process.”

20 North Korea: A Year in Review 2021

INTER-KOREAN: WHY IT MATTERSGovernment

On top of being at the end of his term in office and COVID-19 putting diplomacy on ice, Moon is now very unlikely to achieve his inter-Korean goals because he does not appear to be addressing what his counterpart is asking for. Only days after Kim explicitly said that COVID-19 cooperation is “inessential,” Moon again floated the idea of North and South working together to fight the virus. The North Korean leader argued that it was the South’s military technology developments and joint U.S.-ROK military exercises that were hindering progress, but Moon said that South Korea would work with the Joe Biden administration to strengthen the U.S.-ROK alliance. Far from lead to positive outcomes, it appears likely that, from Pyongyang’s perspective, the South Korean president’s policies will aggravate the North.

Though it wasn’t spelled out, Moon likely nominated Chung to replace Kang as foreign minister in part due to his track record in liaising with Washington and Pyongyang and organizing summits between the North, the U.S. and South Korea. Moon may have also

Business

Kim Jong Un’s description of inter-Korean tourism as “inessential” suggests that North Korea will not be opening its doors to South Korean travel agents any time soon. Kim’s comments are especially bad news for South Korean businesses that previously invested in the Mount Kumgang tourism resort: In December, North Korean state media once again reported on plans to redevelop the area for the first time since Kim ordered South Korean facilities be demolished in Oct. 2019. These trends suggest that North Korea may well push ahead with redeveloping the area regardless of the South’s protests.

However, North Korea has not actually done much with the area despite the leader himself calling for the area’s redevelopment over a year ago. Plans

chosen Chung as the next foreign minister because Kang had recently drawn the ire of Pyongyang: Speaking at an international event in Dec. 2020, she appeared to poke fun at North Korea’s COVID-19 response and doubted Pyongyang’s claims of having zero confirmed COVID-19 cases. A few days later, the North Korean leader’s sister, Kim Yo Jong, called

Kang’s comments “reckless” and accused her of wanting to “further chill the frozen relations between the north and south of Korea.” Moon’s push to provide COVID-19 aid, then, would have been a tougher sell to the North with Kang still in charge.

Nevertheless, pandemic lockdowns will make it almost impossible for Chung to arrange summits for Moon as he did in 2018, when he was jetting around the world and meeting directly with foreign leaders. Overall, even if he does make contact with Kim, Chung will encounter difficulties in persuading the North Korean leader to work with the South on “inessential” COVID-19 cooperation.

to demolish buildings were initially delayed to give South Korea a chance to remove assets, an offer which led to subsequent delays once COVID-19 broke out. Additionally, it should be acknowledged that North Korea has a history of publicly announcing construction plans that ultimately miss their deadlines or go unfinished. Given Pyongyang has closed its borders to tourists from all countries since Jan. 2020, it’s therefore possible Kim’s dismissal of inter-Korean tourism is simply designed to gain leverage in future talks with Seoul.

ECONOMY: NORTH KOREA ANNOUNCES NEW ECONOMIC PLAN, FOREIGN TRADE REACHES STANDSTILL AMID BORDER LOCKDOWN, VALUE OF DOLLAR COLLAPSES AGAINST THE NORTH KOREAN WON James Fretwell

A frozen Yalu River | Image: NK PRO

North Korea reveals new economic plan at Eighth Party Congress

North Korea announced its new five-year economic plan at the Eighth Party Congress, held between Jan. 5 and 12, but few concrete details were actually released. Based on what is available, the new economic plan stresses heavy industry development as well as continued central management of agriculture and the rehabilitation of state commerce – an indication of anti-market policies. The general emphasis on self-reliance and other references to sanctions suggests that the regime appears resigned to continued isolation from the international community. Editorials carried in the Rodong Sinmun on Jan. 29 and 30, calling to strengthen the power of the Cabinet in economic planning and in economic day-to-day management, also point to ongoing moves by the government to strengthen central control over the economy.

The Supreme People’s Assembly session held soon after the Congress also announced the lowest level of budget growth in decades, further indicating that retrenchment extends to fiscal austerity amid the COVID-19 pandemic.

22 North Korea: A Year in Review 2021

North Korean trade and construction projects come to standstill

Korea International Trade Association (KITA) data published in January indicates North Korean trade with China in Dec. 2020 was down 98.7% compared to the same time last year. 2020 overall trade was down 80% on 2019. The near-blockade on cross-border trade is reported to have remained in place over the course of January as well.

North Korea’s general freeze on cross-border trade appears to be significantly impacting its economy. The Pyongyang General Hospital, one of the state’s key priorities, remains incomplete, in spite of the clear need for healthcare facilities in the midst of a pandemic. Experts believe that the economic situation is not yet dire enough to justify opening the borders. There are, however, contradictory signals from markets about when the border might reopen, and the impact of border closures on the North Korean people: On the one hand, the value of the dollar in the market is on the rise; on the other, the value of the dollar in exchange rates offered to diplomats by the regime has recently fallen.

Dollar and RMB market value collapses against KPW

The market value of the U.S. dollar and Chinese RMB has collapsed against the North Korean Won (KPW) in recent months. This is likely due to a number of factors including government clampdowns on the use of foreign currency, but also because of a loss of demand for foreign currency as a result of a collapse in the supply of imports. However, according to Daily NK and Asia Press data, the value of the dollar spiked over 10% toward the end of January. This was due to the anticipated reopening of the border, according to the Daily NK. Yet other exchange rates linked to the market but controlled by the regime have been adjusted downward, indicating that the regime believes the dollar will remain depressed against the won for the time being.

Food prices have moved in opposite directions: The cost of rice has fallen with the dollar, and remained within the normal price range in dollar terms, while becoming cheaper in KPW terms (the KPW value having appreciated). At the same time, the price of corn has shot up to record levels since December, indicating that the harvest for corn – the country’s main staple for most of the population – was not good.

Fuel prices were even more volatile, with petrol hitting $1.87 in early January before falling as low as $1.21, according to Asia Press data. Violent swings of over 30% indicate a volatile market with unreliable supply (or else sudden surges and contractions in demand). Swings in the price of diesel were slightly less impressive but still large, even in Daily NK data (which usually reflects more stable prices). This is a further sign that disruptions to import supply chains are wreaking havoc with what is both a crucial supply of fuel for households and firms.

Official and unofficial exchange rates

North Korea: A Year in Review 2021 23

Daily NK Market price data in context

24 North Korea: A Year in Review 2021

ECONOMY: WHY IT MATTERS

Government

North Korea’s economic situation appears to be very difficult. While there is only limited trade and market data, the North Korean government’s quarantine policies seem to have led to a near standstill in foreign trade that lasted for much of 2020 and continued into January. The exact consequences for the North Korean people are unclear, but given industry’s need for imported inputs, and households’ need for foreign produced consumer goods, they are likely suffering.

North Korean market price volatility, partially induced by foreign exchange volatility and likely also by fuel supply disruption, is also concerning. Most North Koreans are not wealthy, possess little cash and have little room for maneuver. Dramatic shifts in

Business

Businesses outside North Korea currently have few opportunities to trade with or invest in the country. North Korea remains under an all-but total self imposed trade embargo. The danger is that the North Korean government may draw the wrong lessons from the COVID-19 crisis and be more willing to impose tight trade restrictions in the future: Barriers to trade may become semi-permanent in some areas because of the power they give the North Korean government over the North Korean people. While this is unlikely to impact businesses right now, because North Korea is so isolated and sanctions, it should serve as a reminder

prices, especially for the main staple corn (which has dramatically risen in price in the last few months in price gains that have been sustained) will lead to hunger and growing poverty.

The North Korean government’s longer-term plans, outlined at the Eighth Party Congress, are unlikely to alleviate its people’s problems. The plans imply the re-centralization of the economy and self-reliance will be used to overcome issues caused by sanctions. This is unlikely to lead to economic development and prosperity for the North Korean people. This should worry governments who want to see progress on food security and generally for the welfare of the North Korean people.

to businesses the level to which the DPRK government is willing to implement measures unconducive to trade in order to strengthen national security.

Businesses should also not get too excited about references to external economic relations in North Korea’s new economic plan. This is because of Pyongyang’s overwhelming emphasis on self-reliance, the assumption that sanctions will not be relaxed any time soon and the re-centralization of the economy.

SANCTIONS: US FINES COMPANY $2.5 MILLION FOR SANCTIONS VIOLATIONS, US HITS DPRK OFFICIAL AND CHINESE FIRMS WITH SANCTIONS, NEW RUSSIAN E-VISA PROVIDES EASIER ENTRY FOR NORTH KOREANS

James Fretwell

A North Korean man smoking a cigarette | Image: NK PRO

U.S. fines Indonesian company $2.5 million for DPRK sanctions violations

The U.S. fined Indonesian company PT Bukit Muria Jaya (BMJ) a total of $2.5 million in January for selling cigarette paper to North Korea. On Jan. 14, the U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) announced that it was fining BMJ $1 million for directing the Chinese intermediary of a North Korean counterpart, Korea Daesong General Trading Corporation, to pay for the cigarette paper in 28 separate wires to BMJ’s U.S.-dollar bank account. Only three days later on Jan. 17, the U.S. Department of Justice stated that it was fining BMJ $1.5 million. In a Justice Department release on the fines, Acting U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia Michael R. Sherwin emphasized that “using front companies and fraudulent invoices will not protect you. We will find you and prosecute you.”

U.S. hits DPRK official and Chinese firms with non-proliferation measures

The U.S. enacted non-proliferation measures on a North Korean official and two Chinese companies on Jan. 13. The State Department’s Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation targeted Rim Ryong Nam, a North Korean Munitions Industry Department (MID) official living in China – the first time it has done so under the Iran, North Korean and Syria Nonproliferation Act (INKSNA) since July 2016 – according to a Federal Register announcement released on Jan. 22. The Chinese firms – Ningbo Zhongjun International Trade Co., Ltd and Ningbo Vert Energy Technology Co., Ltd – are both based in Ningbo, China’s second-largest container

26 North Korea: A Year in Review 2021

terminal port and the closest major city to a hotspot favored by North Korean coal smugglers. Employees from both companies denied the accusations to NK PRO.

New Russian e-visa system allows easier entry to North Koreans

As of Jan. 1, citizens from 52 countries including North Korea can apply for simplified Russian e-visas. This means that North Koreans can enter the country without a “formal invitation” from a Russian entity such as a person, company, school, tour group or hotel. The new e-visa costs $40 and allows the recipient to visit Russia for up to 16 days “for tourism, business, private visits or humanitarian purposes.” However, North Korean workers have been banned from working overseas and were ordered to return home by Dec. 2019, as stated in a sanctions resolution unanimously passed by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in Dec. 2017.

Although the DPRK and Russia’s ongoing COVID-19 border lockdown measures will also impact the number of North Korean workers until the global pandemic is over, the Daily NK reported on Jan. 12 that North Korea plans to begin sending thousands of workers to Russia from early February. Candidates reportedly have to pay around $500-700 to get selected, but many are apparently suspicious that this money will go to waste if the pandemic ultimately prevents them from going abroad after all.

North Korea: A Year in Review 2021 27

SANCTIONS: WHY IT MATTERS

Government

Recent developments show that the U.S. is continuing to enforce sanctions on the DPRK, regardless of the state of diplomacy and the lack of North Korean missile launches in recent months. January’s public sanctions designations should serve as reminders to governments that not enforcing sanctions could result in companies from their countries being

Business

January’s developments demonstrate once again the financial perils of doing illicit trade with the DPRK. BMJ’s $2.5 million fine is particularly large: Previously, the U.S. Treasury Department has fined E.L.F. Cosmetics

in Jan. 2019 for nearly $1 million and Essentra FZE in July 2020 for $333,000 for DPRK sanctions violations. In BMJ’s case, however, they were pursued by both the Treasury and Justice departments. The U.S.’s tough stance on sanctions implementation will continue

called out publicly through designations. Overall, Washington’s ongoing sanctions maintenance efforts are likely a hangover from the Trump administration’s policy toolkit. However, there is little to suggest that the sanctions regime will change under the Biden administration, meaning more such designations can be expected in the months ahead.

during the Joe Biden administration, too, based on what the President’s top foreign policy picks have said on North Korea policy. And amid escalating tensions between Washington and Beijing, it seems likely the U.S. will pursue more China-based North Koreans and Chinese companies suspected of trading with the DPRK going forward – especially if Pyongyang conducts more missile launches or nuclear tests.

MILITARY: ANOTHER MILITARY PARADE, HOPES THAT MILITARY DRILLS DON’T ESCALATE TENSION, SOUTH KOREA TO SPEND $4.5 MILLION ON BORDER SECURITY SYSTEM

James Fretwell

Kim Jong Un at January’s military parade | Image: Rodong Sinmun

North Korea marks end of Eighth Party Congress with military parade

North Korea celebrated the end of the Eighth Party Congress with another military parade in Pyongyang on Jan. 14 – the second since Oct. 10, 2020. Despite the usual pomp and pageantry, it was nowhere near the scale of the October parade to mark the 75th founding anniversary of the ruling Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK). In fact, most of what was displayed at the Jan. 14 parade had already been seen before, even down to individual vehicles and infantry units. Nevertheless, North Korea also used the parade to wheel out its new Pukguksong-5 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) and an unspecified new short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) capability, both of which are detailed in the WMD section of this Month in Review.

South Korean unification minister hopes joint drills don’t escalate tensions

South Korean unification minister Lee In-young said he hopes joint U.S.-ROK military drills won’t escalate military tensions on Jan. 25. At a press conference held in Seoul, Lee said he anticipates that South Korea and the U.S. “will find a solution in a wise and flexible manner so that it won’t lead to serious military tensions.” He added that the unification ministry “will also play an active and leading role in possible areas rather than waiting and seeing a change in situations.” The U.S. and South Korean militaries are expected to hold 2021 springtime drills around March.

North Korea: A Year in Review 2021 29

South Korea to spend $4.5 million on border security system

South Korea will spend approximately $4.5 million to improve its border security system, a ROK military official said on Jan. 26. The planned improvements reportedly include the installation of additional surveillance cameras and the replacement of decrepit sensor parts. South Korea will open a bid next month to select companies for the contract, with the work planned to be completed before the end of 2021, another official said. South Korea’s Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA) announced in December that it planned to install an “unmanned ground surveillance sensor,” following the defection of a North Korean man who was only detected by the South Korean military 14 hours after he had initially crossed the inter-Korean border in November. This event sparked concern over the South Korean military’s ability to properly monitor the demilitarized zone (DMZ), stimulating an interest in upgrades to border infrastructure.

30 North Korea: A Year in Review 2021

MILITARY: WHY IT MATTERS

Government

South Korean unification minister Lee’s comments about U.S.-ROK joint military exercises represent potential for the emergence of common ground between Seoul and Pyongyang – if they get support from the ROK MND and the U.S. In his day four speech at the Eighth Party Congress, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un blamed South Korea’s military exercises with the U.S. as one of the reasons that inter-Korean relations had regressed to before the 2018 Panmunjom Declaration. Since both Koreas are interested in limiting the scope of joint exercises, and Kim has rejected South Korea’s other offer of an inter-Korean response to COVID-19 as “inessential,” this may be Moon’s best route to achieving some level of inter-Korean reconciliation before his term in office ends in just over a year.

Business

South Korea’s $4.5 million spending on border security is a response to the problems the country has encountered trying to successfully monitor the DMZ. Naturally, it represents an imminent and short

term business opportunity for military vendors that have relationships with the ROK MND. But while such large-scale spending may help the ROK secure its land

However, the Joe Biden administration in Washington may be reluctant to reduce the scale of military exercises. In Feb. 2020, Biden said that the Trump administration’s North Korea policy of “pursuing photo ops with Kim Jong-un, reducing economic pressure, suspending military exercises and ignoring human rights” had “got very little in return.” And speaking before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Jan. 19, Secretary of State Antony Blinken said that the U.S. would review “what can be effective in terms of increasing pressure on North Korea to come to the negotiating table.” If this translates into inflexibility from Washington on joint military drills with Seoul, it could thwart what appears to be Moon’s best option for inter-Korean reconciliation.

border, South Korea also still needs to patrol its sea border – where various inter-Korean incidents have occurred over the past few years. Going forward, there may be opportunities for companies to help find ways to improve monitoring on the inter-Korean maritime border, too.

WMD: KIM VOWS TO CONTINUE NUKE DEVELOPMENT, NORTH KOREA REVEALS NEW MISSILE DESIGNS, SEOUL SAYS MISSILE DEFENSE IS AIRTIGHT

James Fretwell

North Korea’s new SLBMs on display at its January military parade | Image: Rodong Sinmun

Kim Jong Un will continue to develop “long-range nuclear strike capability”

DPRK leader Kim Jong Un vowed to keep developing his country’s “long-range nuclear strike capability” at the Eighth Party Congress, ruling party daily the Rodong Sinmun reported on Jan. 9. The article said North Korea “should heighten nuclear technology and improve nuclear weapons to be smaller and lighter … and continue producing super-large nuclear warheads.” Further, Kim said the country will also improve the accuracy of its weapons in “striking and annihilating strategic targets … within a 15,000-kilometer shooting range.” The distance between Pyongyang and Washington, D.C. – the capital of the country Kim referred to as his “biggest, main enemy” during his address – is roughly 11,000 kilometers.

North Korea reveals new SLBM and SRBMs at military parade

North Korea revealed a new submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) and new short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) at a military parade on Jan. 14 to celebrate the end of the country’s Eighth Party Congress. According to North Korea’s state-run Voice of Korea (VOK), the solid fuelled Pukguksong-5 SLBM is “the world’s strongest weapon.” While it appears to be remarkably similar to the Pukguksong-4, first revealed at the 75th anniversary of the founding of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) last October, the most significant difference is that the Pukguksong-5 possesses an elongated second stage, which implies a longer range. The new SRBMs also appear to be solid-fuelled, and their large designs imply that they can carry similar payload weights as the KN23 and KN24 – but over a greater range.

32 North Korea: A Year in Review 2021

South Korean missile defense “airtight,” defense minister says

On Jan. 27, South Korean defense minister Suh Wook said that his country’s “airtight” missile defense can counter North Korea’s tested and untested missiles. Suh did acknowledge that there are some “weak spots” in South Korea’s reconnaissance and strike capabilities, but insisted that this was “being taken care of.” The defense minister made the remarks at a conference while addressing concerns about the new ballistic missiles that North Korea revealed at its military parade on Jan. 14.

North Korea: A Year in Review 2021 33

WMD: WHY IT MATTERS

Government

Kim Jong Un’s promise to improve the DPRK’s long range nuclear strike capability is controversial but logical: North Korea’s weapons development will not only allow the country to strike the mainland U.S. with more precision, but also increase Pyongyang’s leverage in future negotiations with Washington and its allies. As the DPRK develops stronger weapons, it stands to reason that the U.S. will have to offer greater incentives in order to convince North Korea to denuclearize. This adds a greater sense of urgency to the Biden administration’s review of “the entire approach and policy toward North Korea.”

Business

Kim’s vow to continue developing DPRK nuclear capabilities reinforces the already clear reality that sanctions won’t be lifted for the foreseeable future. While North Korea may eventually become interested in an interim nuclear freeze deal with the Biden administration, Kim’s remarks at the Congress suggest the U.S.’ ongoing DPRK policy review is unlikely to motivate the White House to relax sanctions pressure.

It remains to be seen whether North Korea will test the new weapons paraded in January – in fact, it is still yet to test its Hwasong-16 or Pukguksong-4 missiles, first revealed at the massive military parade on Oct. 10. Pyongyang may not want to provoke Washington too much, as the new Biden administration has not categorically ruled out the possibility of talks in the future. However, with a self-imposed COVID-19 border lockdown wreaking havoc on its economy, North Korea may eventually find reason to increase tensions in order to leverage some much-needed sanctions relief from the U.S.

Naturally, this has significant consequences for all those in the business community who have been holding out hope for engagement to support new frontier-style opportunities. It also means that the stage is set for potential geopolitical turbulence in Northeast Asia, which could be caused if North Korea goes ahead and tests new long-range missile capabilities and the U.S. responds in a forceful manner.

DPRK STATE MEDIA: NEW AND NOTABLE

James Fretwell

North Koreans look at a portrait of leader Kim Jong Un in a military uniform | Image: KCTV

In this section, NK PRO highlights a number of noteworthy stories from the month of January:

= Kim Jong Un skips News Year’s speech again, opts for short letter instead – North Korean leader Kim Jong Un wrote a handwritten letter to his people “greeting the hope-filled new year,” state media reported on Jan. 1, marking the second year in a row he has not delivered his traditional New Year’s Address. From 2013 until 2019, Kim’s speech had served as an opportunity to officially review the past year while outlining the country’s key policies for the coming one. In contrast, this year’s letter was short and lacking in substantial detail. The fact that Kim has not given a New Year’s Address for two years in a row now may mean that Kim has abandoned the tradition – started by his grandfather and North Korea’s first ruler, Kim Il Sung, in 1946 – altogether. However, he may have not delivered a New Year’s speech this year because of the then-upcoming Eighth Party Congress, which was reported by state media only days later on Jan. 6. If Kim did give an address on Jan. 1, its message may have bled intoy important policy decisions scheduled to be made at the Party Congress.

= North Korea rings in 2021 with large concert in Pyongyang – North Korea rang in the new year with a large concert in Pyongyang, one of the only countries in the world to do so amid the global COVID-19 pandemic. The country had still not recorded any cases of the virus before the event, and it’s likely the celebrations were intended to highlight the DPRK’s purported success in dealing with the pandemic. Nevertheless, proceedings were scaled down compared to previous years: There was no midnight countdown or drone light shows, and a solemn flag-raising ceremony and a ten-minute fireworks display after midnight replaced the usual additional performances. Finally, even though thousands formed heavily-packed crowds reminiscent of pre-pandemic times, attendees were all wearing masks, reflecting the seriousness with which North Korea still regards COVID-19.

North Korea: A Year in Review 2021 35

= North Korea releases new portrait of Kim Jong Un in white military uniform – North Korea state media showed a new portrait of Kim Jong Un wearing a white military uniform on Jan. 6, one of the only photos of the leader in military garb. The portrait, which shows Kim sitting at a desk with a rifle and a pair of binoculars in front of him, was on display at the Eighth Party Congress venue next to another photo of him riding a white horse. This is the first time that North Korean externally-facing media has shown pictures of Kim in military uniform (a documentary distributed only to top officials soon after Kim was confirmed as the next in line to the leadership also showed him in a military uniform). Based on state TV images, the North Korean leader still appears to be ranked as marshal and not the DPRK military’s highest rank, generalissimo – only Kim’s father and grandfather, Kim Jong Il and Kim Il Sung, have held this position thus far. Kim Jong Un’s new portrait may be a sign of his growing role in military affairs going forward.

= North Korea acknowledges Biden election victory for first time – North Korea’s DPRK Today indirectly acknowledged Joe Biden’s victory over Donald Trump in the U.S. presidential elections for the first time on Jan. 23. Citing Jajusibo, a “pro-Pyongyang outlet” based in South Korea, DPRK Today reported on the storming of the U.S. Capitol building and mentioned that the U.S. Congress confirmed Biden’s election shortly after the event. North Korea’s main media outlets, such as the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) and ruling party daily the Rodong Sinmun, however, are yet to report on the November election or Biden’s inauguration. State media did report on Barack Obama and Donald Trump’s wins shortly after their respective elections. However, the ongoing absence of direct reporting on Biden’s victory could be because Pyongyang has not yet decided how to portray its relationship with the U.S. to its citizens going forward.

= North Korea releases three new propaganda posters – In a long-standing New Year’s tradition, North Korea released three new propaganda posters promoting the top-line slogans and ideals for 2021 on Jan. 19, according to the Korean Central New Agency (KCNA). North Korean leader Kim Jong Un introduced the slogans during his closing speech at the Eighth Party Congress, stating that he chose the phrases for their simplicity as opposed to “putting up some kind of flashy slogan.” One poster calls on citizens to carry out the decisions made at the Eighth Party Congress and features the top “three ideals” for this year: “The people are God,” “single-hearted unity” and “self-reliance.” Another encourages North Koreans to “focus all our energy on carrying out the five-year plan for national economic development!” and the last of the posters shows rows of small apartment blocks – likely a reference to recent reconstruction efforts following typhoons and flooding this summer. Instead of including pictures of anti-epidemic fighters or the still-unfinished Pyongyang General Hospital, as the DPRK’s propagandists had done recently, the country has chosen relatively generic messages by North Korean standards this year.

36 North Korea: A Year in Review 2021

FEBRUARY 2021

North Korea: A Year in Review 2021 37

Contents

39 Executive Summary

42 Human Security / Human Rights: North Korea to receive COVID-19 vaccine, border disinfection complexes under construction, WFP may suspend operations in 2021

45 Foreign Relations: US reaffirms ROK-Japan trilateral cooperation, DOJ charges North Koreans for hacking scheme and North Korea appoints new Amb. to PRC

48 Military: Defector crosses DMZ, Kim Jong Un orders ‘moral discipline’ in military and North Korea threatens to punish countries that provoke it

51 Economy: Kim Jong Un calls for legal economic control, food prices spike and North Korea prepares to slowly open border

54 Leadership: Kim Jong Un becomes ‘president,’ WPK CC replaces key economic official and North Korea promotes and appoints foreign policy officials

57 Sanctions: New DPRK fuel conversion rate, North Korea improved evasion tactics in 2020 and POE unable to review evidence in film

60 WMD: US missile defense focused on North Korea, DPRK assisted Iranian missile development in 2020 and Yongbyon Uranium Enrichment Plant continues operations

63 Inter-Korean: Seoul calls to resume dialogue, ex-minister says Kaesong should include foreign firms, new DPRK cyberattack information bill

66 DPRK State Media: New and Notable

38 North Korea: A Year in Review 2021

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

North Korean ski resort | Image: NK PRO (file photo)

HUMAN SECURITY / HUMAN RIGHTS: NORTH KOREA TO RECEIVE COVID-19 VACCINE, BORDER DISINFECTION COMPLEXES UNDER CONSTRUCTION, WFP MAY SUSPEND OPERATIONS IN 2021

James Fretwell

North Korea is expected to receive nearly 2 million doses of the COVID-19 vaccine, according to the international initiative COVAX. The DPRK is also building “large disinfection complexes” at border crossing points, Russian Ambassador to the DPRK Alexander Matsegora said in a February interview. Meanwhile, the United Nations (U.N.) World Food Programme (WFP) stated that it may temporarily halt its operations in North Korea this year, amid difficulties due to pandemic-related restrictions.

RISK: Vaccine aid will likely do little to alleviate the root cause of what North Koreans have really been suffering from this past year: the DPRK’s strict border lockdown. Even if North Korea’s closed border strategy has kept COVID-19 out of the country, it has had a drastic impact on the DPRK’s economy. However, Pyongyang is unlikely to reopen the country soon, since 2 million COVID-19 doses will only be enough to cover around 4% of its total population.

FOREIGN RELATIONS: US REAFFIRMS ROK-JAPAN TRILATERAL COOPERATION, DOJ CHARGES NORTH KOREANS FOR HACKING SCHEME AND NORTH KOREA APPOINTS NEW AMB. TO PRC

James Fretwell

Top officials representing the U.S., Japan and South Korea reaffirmed the importance of closely cooperating on North Korea policy in February. The U.S. Department of Justice charged three North Koreans for conspiring to steal more than $1.3 billion in cryptocurrency and cash from companies and financial institutions. And North Korea appointed an experienced foreign trade specialist as its new ambassador to China.

North Korea: A Year in Review 2021 39

RISK: The U.S. will face difficulties reconciling its policy priorities with South Korea and Japan. The Biden White House appears to favor a mix of diplomatic initiatives and sanctions pressure to force the DPRK to denuclearization talks, whereas the Moon Jae-in administration has consistently advocated for the continuation of high-level negotiations like in 2018 and 2019. Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga has expressed his desire to normalize ties with North Korea and meet with leader Kim Jong Un, but the issue of Japanese abductees in the DPRK is likely to continue to block progress between the two countries. The U.S. risks another four years of little progress on the North Korea issue if it insists on working with its allies but fails to reach a consensus on policy with them.

MILITARY: DEFECTOR CROSSES DMZ, KIM JONG UN ORDERS ‘MORAL DISCIPLINE’ IN MILITARY AND NORTH KOREA THREATENS TO PUNISH COUNTRIES THAT PROVOKE IT

James Fretwell

The South Korean military belatedly apprehended a North Korean defector that crossed the inter-Korean border after swimming southward in the East Sea. North Korean leader Kim Jong Un ordered top military officials to establish better “moral discipline” at his first publicly recorded meeting of the year. And North Korea’s ruling party daily stated that the DPRK will preemptively mobilize its forces and “thoroughly punish” countries that provoke it “even just a little bit.”

RISK: The recent defector border crossing adds to concerns that, if a supposedly ordinary North Korean can cross the border into South Korea, trained DPRK spies could also penetrate the DMZ. South Korea’s ruling Democratic Party will likely continue to face criticism domestically as a result of incidents in February and similar belatedly-detected defections last year. Despite investing millions of dollars in sensor detection systems in the DMZ, the ROK military’s equipment still appears to be insufficient, especially in cold weather. These technological insufficiencies are compounded by the fact that the number of South Korean military personnel is set to shrink along with the country’s declining birth rate over the coming years, making it even more difficult to adequately monitor the border.

ECONOMY: KIM JONG UN CALLS FOR LEGAL ECONOMIC CONTROL, FOOD PRICES SPIKE AND NORTH KOREA PREPARES TO SLOWLY OPEN BORDER

Peter Ward

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un demanded greater legal control of the economy, more ambitious targets for certain sectors and the scaling back of unrealistic targets in others. Meanwhile, the prices of key North Korean food staples spiked dramatically. And North Korea is reportedly making preparations in order to gradually reopen its borders, according to various reports in February.

LEADERSHIP: KIM JONG UN BECOMES ‘PRESIDENT,’ WPK CC REPLACES KEY ECONOMIC OFFICIAL AND NORTH KOREA PROMOTES AND APPOINTS FOREIGN POLICY OFFICIALS

Martin Weiser

North Korea has changed leader Kim Jong Un’s official English title from “Chairman of the State Affairs Commission” to “President of the State Affairs,” various sources stated in February. Meanwhile, North Korea’s ruling Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) Central Committee (CC) replaced its economic affairs department director. North Korea’s WPK CC and foreign ministry also promoted and appointed top foreign affairs officials.

SANCTIONS: NEW DPRK FUEL CONVERSION RATE, NORTH KOREA IMPROVED EVASION TACTICS IN 2020 AND POE UNABLE TO REVIEW EVIDENCE IN FILM

James Fretwell

In February, the United Nations (U.N.) announced official conversion rates for petroleum products exported to the DPRK. An unpublished draft report from the U.N. Panel of Experts (PoE) stated that North Korea used increasingly sophisticated tactics to illegally smuggle fuel into the country last year. And the PoE has been unable to see evidence of North Korean sanctions violations from the 2020 documentary “The Mole,” the same draft report added.

40 North Korea: A Year in Review 2021

WMD: US MISSILE DEFENSE FOCUSED ON NORTH KOREA, DPRK ASSISTED IRANIAN MISSILE DEVELOPMENT IN 2020 AND YONGBYON URANIUM ENRICHMENT PLANT CONTINUES OPERATIONS

James Fretwell

U.S. missile defense is “clearly focused” on North Korea, a top U.S. military official said in February. Meanwhile, DPRK specialists provided Iran with “support and assistance” for a space launch vehicle in 2020, according to an unpublished United Nations (U.N.) Panel of Experts (PoE) report. And North Korea appears to have continued operations at its uranium enrichment plant in Yongbyon over January and February, commercial satellite imagery analysis from 38 North shows.

INTER-KOREAN: SEOUL CALLS TO RESUME DIALOGUE, EX-MINISTER SAYS KAESONG SHOULD INCLUDE FOREIGN FIRMS, NEW DPRK CYBERATTACK INFORMATION BILL

James Fretwell

South Korea asked the North to respond to its “call for the resumption of dialogue,” according to a top ROK official. A former South Korean unification minister said that the two Koreas should include foreign companies if they reopen the Kaesong Industrial Complex. And conservative South Korean lawmakers proposed a new bill that would force the country’s National Intelligence Service (NIS) to share more information related to North Korean cyberattacks with government agencies and the public.

North Korea: A Year in Review 2021 41

HUMAN SECURITY / HUMAN RIGHTS: NORTH KOREA TO RECEIVE COVID-19 VACCINE, BORDER DISINFECTION COMPLEXES UNDER CONSTRUCTION, WFP MAY SUSPEND OPERATIONS IN 2021 James Fretwell

Mask-clad North Koreans attending a rally | Image: DPRK Today

North Korea to receive two million doses of COVID-19 vaccine over coming months

North Korea is expected to receive nearly 2 million doses of COVID-19 vaccine, COVAX – an initiative by the vaccine alliance Gavi and the World Health Organization (WHO) – announced on Feb. 4. The organization will start delivering 1,992,000 doses of the AstraZeneca (AZ) vaccine to North Korea by the end of February, COVAX said, adding that distribution will depend on WHO’s authorization of its global emergency use and North Korea’s readiness to comply with vaccine handling requirements. According to the initiative’s interim report, COVAX plans to have 35-40% of doses ready for distribution by March and prepare the rest by June. The roughly two million doses will be used to vaccinate nearly a million people, approximately 4% of North Korea’s total population.

North Korea is building border disinfection complexes, Russian ambassador says

North Korea is building “large disinfection complexes” at border crossing points, Russian Ambassador to the DPRK Alexander Matsegora said in a Feb. 8 interview. Speaking to Interfax News Agency, Matsegora said the disinfection complexes are being built “to ensure the safe entry of imported goods” after North Korea implemented strict border measures in response to the global COVID-19 pandemic. The Russian ambassador said that the border shutdown has damaged North Korea’s economy and worsened living conditions, and that the country is lacking medicine. Nevertheless, according to Matsegora, it will be “difficult” to increase

42 North Korea: A Year in Review 2021

humanitarian assistance to North Korea this year, “at least until its borders are opened.” Matsegora did not comment on whether Moscow and Pyongyang are talking about sharing the “Sputnik V” vaccine, and said that North Korean claims of zero confirmed COVID-19 cases “are true.”

WFP says it may halt operations in North Korea this year

The United Nations (U.N.) World Food Programme (WFP) may temporarily halt its operations in North Korea this year, according to a document posted on its website on Feb. 23. “Pandemic-related restrictions do not ease and food imports, international staff deployments and physical monitoring access remain curtailed for a prolonged period,” the “Country Strategic Plan Revision” states. The WFP added that it will “opportunistically use windows in which food imports are allowed,” but stressed the risk that “operations will cease in 2021” if food imports are not possible.

North Korea: A Year in Review 2021 43

HUMAN SECURITY / HUMAN RIGHTS: WHY IT MATTERS Government

Vaccine aid is unlikely to alleviate the difficulties ordinary North Koreans have faced over the past year, since these hardships appear to be the result of COVID-19 prevention lockdowns, not COVID-19 itself. North Korea, extremely cautious about preventing the spread of the virus, has endured massive economic difficulties as a result of its border closures. However, the country will not be able to achieve anything close to herd immunity by vaccinating only 4% of its population. It stands to reason, then, that North Korea will maintain its border lockdown for the foreseeable future.

Help is not on the horizon, though. If North Korea does maintain its strict border lockdown for the foreseeable

Business

The construction of border-crossing point disinfection complexes implies that North Korea plans to allow more goods to come through into the country while the COVID-19 pandemic is still ongoing. But it remains to be seen when North Korea will complete construction and how efficiently the complexes will be

future, it seems likely the WFP will suspend – or at least drastically scale back – its operations in the country in 2021. The DPRK’s current COVID-19 measures will have a ripple effect on humanitarian work in the country even after it opens its borders, too: The prolonged suspension of humanitarian activity risks irrepably disrupting former projects and contacts between foreigners and North Koreans. U.N. agencies and NGOs will also have to address when it is appropriate or even realistic to restart operations in North Korea, as donors will be reluctant to provide support to projects if there are no on-the-ground eyes to properly monitor the distribution of aid.

able to disinfect goods and send them through into the DPRK. Matsegora’s concerns that it will be “difficult” to increase humanitarian assistance to the DPRK in 2021 suggests that Pyongyang is erecting too few of them, building them too slowly or that the complexes will be incapable of facilitating large amounts of goods.

FOREIGN RELATIONS: US REAFFIRMS ROK-JAPAN TRILATERAL COOPERATION, DOJ CHARGES NORTH KOREANS FOR HACKING SCHEME AND NORTH KOREA APPOINTS NEW AMB. TO PRCJames Fretwell

Top U.S. State Department officials Antony Blinken and Sung Kim | Image: U.S. Department of State (file photo)

US reaffirms cooperation with Japan and South Korea on DPRK policy

The U.S., Japan and South Korea reaffirmed the importance of closely cooperating on North Korea policy, according to a U.S. State Department press release on Feb. 18. Representatives from the three countries reportedly held a videoconference and “discussed the ongoing U.S. DPRK policy review and stressed the importance of continued close cooperation and coordination.” On Feb. 9, State Department Press Secretary Ned Price also said that the U.S. will confer with its allies regarding “ongoing pressure options and [the] potential for future diplomacy” with the DPRK. He added that the Biden administration will adopt a “new approach” that focuses on reducing the North Korean threat.

US charges three North Koreans for $1.3 billion hacking scheme

The U.S. Department of Justice charged three North Koreans for conspiring to steal more than $1.3 billion in cryptocurrency and cash from companies and financial institutions, according to a government indictment notice released on Feb. 17. The men – 31-year-old Jon Chang Hyok, 27-year-old Kim Il and 36-year-old Park Jin Hyok – were members of a North Korean military intelligence agency called the Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB), according to the Justice Department’s indictment notice. The Justice Department also stated that a Canadian-American citizen, 37-year-old Ghaleb Alaumary, pleaded guilty to helping the hackers launder money.

North Korea: A Year in Review 2021 45

Shortly after the Justice Department released the indictment notice, U.S. State Department spokesperson Ned Price said that the U.S.’s ongoing North Korea policy review will also address the DPRK’s cyber threat. “Of course, most frequently we speak of North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile program, but, of course, its malicious cyber activity is something we are carefully evaluating and looking at as well,” Price told a daily press briefing.

North Korea appoints foreign trade specialist as ambassador to China

Experienced trade specialist Ri Ryong Nam will become North Korea’s next ambassador to China, the DPRK foreign ministry announced on Feb. 19. Ri will replace Ji Jae Ryong, who has served as ambassador to China since Oct. 2010. Before his appointment, Ri oversaw trade policy as a vice premier in North Korea’s Cabinet between June 2016 and Jan. 2021, and served as trade minister between 2008 and 2016, according to the NK PRO Leadership Tracker. He was also an economic affairs secretary at the DPRK’s Embassy in Singapore in 1994, NK PRO records show.

Ri’s wife, Sogwang Media CEO Jon Kyong Hui, is the daughter of former DPRK ambassador to China Jon Myong Su and has previously worked on foreign trade promotion, according to diplomatic records and multiple informed sources who spoke with NK News. One of her brothers, Jon Sung Hun, was president of Korea Pugang Corporation and has extensive experience with China and Singapore, an informed source said.

46 North Korea: A Year in Review 2021

FOREIGN RELATIONS: WHY IT MATTERSGovernment

A U.S.-Japan-South Korea trilateral approach to North Korea will be stronger than divided unilateral policies, but the Biden administration will face difficulties reconciling the three countries’ differing priorities. The Biden White House, while still reviewing its North Korea policy, appears to favor tightening the sanctions regime

to force Pyongyang to the nuclear negotiating table. South Korea’s Moon Jae-in administration, on the other hand, has consistently expressed its will to increase inter-Korean cooperation and continue the leadership

level summitry of 2018 and 2019. Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga has expressed his desire to normalize ties with North Korea and meet leader Kim Jong Un at the Tokyo Olympics this summer “without preconditions,” but the issue of Japanese abductees in the DPRK is likely to continue to block progress

between the two countries. The COVID-19 pandemic, improving North Korea-China relations and the upcoming March 2022 presidential election in South Korea will also complicate organizing a coordinated DPRK policy. If the Biden administration fails to reach a consensus with Japan and South Korea, the U.S. and its allies risk another four years of deadlock with the

Business

Pyongyang’s appointment of an experienced trade specialist as the next DPRK ambassador to the PRC signals that North Korea plans to push economic exchange in relations with China going forward. However, the DPRK is still under strict U.N. and U.S. sanctions, and the Biden administration appears

DPRK – and all the while, Pyongyang will only continue to improve its nuclear-armed missile capabilities.

Meanwhile, the Department of Justice’s charges against the three North Koreans demonstrate that the U.S. is continuing to take the DPRK’s cyber threat seriously. North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs often dominate the headlines, but the country’s hackers are thought to steal millions every year to fund, among other things, WMD development. As a result of strict sanctions and a struggling economy amid the COVID-19 pandemic, North Korea will likely continue to invest in cultivating cyber talent as a means to obtain foreign currency going forward.

However, the Department of Justice’s indictment notice is highly unlikely to have any immediate practical effect: North Korea does not extradite its citizens to the U.S. to face charges. The charges probably won’t deter North Korea from hacking in the future either, since the heavily-sanctioned pariah state has little to lose from continuing to engage in cybercrime.

determined to crack down on sanctions violations. While stronger North Korea-China relations imply potential business opportunities for Chinese companies in the future, a lot of trade with the DPRK will remain illegal, at least until the country strikes some kind of denuclearization deal with the U.S.

MILITARY: DEFECTOR CROSSES DMZ, KIM JONG UN ORDERS ‘MORAL DISCIPLINE’ IN MILITARY AND NORTH KOREA THREATENS TO PUNISH COUNTRIES THAT PROVOKE IT

James Fretwell

A North Korean soldier standing beside a map of the Korean Peninsula | Image: NK PRO (file photo)

North Korean defector crosses heavily monitored inter-Korean border

A North Korean defector crossed the inter-Korean border after swimming southward in the East Sea on Feb. 16, according to South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). Over various statements, the JCS has said that the man was detected by coastal cameras five times and by fence cameras three times starting at 1:05 am. Human surveillance units then reported the defector when security cameras spotted him for a ninth and 10th time between 4:16 and 4:18 a.m. Roughly three hours later, the South Korean military took him into custody around five kilometers (3.1 miles) from the barbed wire he is thought to have gone under.

Even though the military’s monitoring device detected the defector “several times,” an “appropriate measure was not taken,” the JCS stated on Feb. 17. It added that the facility blocking the drainpipe he was believed to have passed through after the barbed wire “was inadequate.” On the same day, defense minister Suh Wook explained that South Korea had initially judged that “survival in waters of such conditions was not possible” on the day of the defection. However, “we learned later that he layered clothes and then tightly wore a waterproof

type suit to keep himself from getting soaked,” he said.

Kim Jong Un orders top military officials to establish ‘moral discipline’

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un ordered top military officials to establish better “moral discipline” at his first publicly recorded meeting of the year on Feb. 24, the country’s ruling party daily reported the following

48 North Korea: A Year in Review 2021

day. According to the Rodong Sinmun, the Eighth Central Military Commission of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) dealt with “a series of shortcomings revealed in the military and political activities and moral life of the commanding officers” of the Korean People’s Army (KPA), and emphasized the establishment of a thorough “command system” of the ruling party’s Central Committee over the military. Kim also stressed the need to strengthen education and control over the “moral point of view” of the “new generation” of military officials.

A number of leadership reshuffles were reportedly made at the meeting, as well. Two unnamed military commanders were replaced, and the country’s defense minister Kim Jong Gwan and director of the KPA General Political Bureau Kwon Yong Jin were promoted to the rank of Vice-Marshal. Additionally, Kim Song Gil became commander of the Korean People’s Army Navy and was promoted to Vice-Admiral, while Kim Chung Il became the new commander for the “Air and Anti-Aircraft Force” of the KPA and was promoted to Lieutenant General.

North Korea threatens to ‘thoroughly punish’ any country that provokes it

North Korea will preemptively mobilize its forces and “thoroughly punish” countries that provoke it “even just a little bit,” the ruling party daily stated on Feb. 8, the country’s military foundation day. In an editorial on its front page, the Rodong Sinmun also hailed North Korea’s recent Oct. 2020 and Jan. 2021 for showing the world that the DPRK’s “combative power soared to the heights of the world’s strongest.” North Korea revealed a number of new weapons systems at these parades, including the world’s largest road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missile (IBCM) as well as two new submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs).

North Korea: A Year in Review 2021 49

MILITARY: WHY IT MATTERS

Government

The recent defector border crossing adds to concerns that, if a supposedly ordinary North Korean can cross the border into South Korea, trained DPRK spies could also penetrate the DMZ. This is not the first time the South Korean military has belatedly detected a defector crossing the inter-Korean border, either: In July 2020, a “redefector” was able to return to North Korea by going through a South Korean storm drain and swimming across a river dividing the two Koreas. Last November, the same military division involved in the incident this February only caught a defector 10 hours after he had crossed the border in Goseong County.

Business

The latest embarrassing border crossing incident once again highlights the possibility of more opportunities for private companies to develop monitoring technology for the South Korean military. Despite some arguing that the problem is the lack of military manpower, there are concerns that the budget for DMZ surveillance devices is still too low, too. In particular, current surveillance devices are at risk of

South Korea’s ruling Democratic Party will likely continue to face criticism domestically as a result of the incidents in February and last year. Along with the discovery of 2018 documents concerning the potential for a South Korean-built nuclear power plant in the North, conservative parties will probably use the defector crossings to accuse the Moon Jae in administration of being unable to properly protect the border and ensure South Korea’s national security. For example, Ahn Cheol-soo, a leading conservative candidate in the Seoul mayoral race, has already blasted the Moon administration for February’s incident on Twitter.

malfunctioning in winter, when temperatures at the border can drop to as low as minus 20 degrees. Since South Korea’s shrinking population will mean fewer soldiers, and because the country has continued to noticeably increase military spending over the past few years, Seoul may announce more funding for border technology development in the near future.

ECONOMY: KIM JONG UN CALLS FOR LEGAL ECONOMIC CONTROL, FOOD PRICES SPIKE AND NORTH KOREA PREPARES TO SLOWLY OPEN BORDER

Peter Ward

North Koreans cycling in North Hamgyong province | Image: NK PRO (file photo)

Kim Jong Un demands greater legal control of economy, more ambitious targets

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un demanded greater legal control of the economy, more ambitious targets for certain sectors and the scaling back of unrealistic targets in others, state media reported on Feb. 11. Speaking at a plenary meeting to discuss the country’s new five-year economic plan, Kim called for greater central government control of the economy, thus implying that power should be taken away from state firms. Kim also fired the ruling party’s top economic official, a move interpreted as punishment for those who had made ‘mistakes’ in the writing of the five-year plan that Kim criticized. These ‘mistakes’ included excessively ambitious plans for agriculture and excessively pessimistic plans for housing construction and light industry.

On Feb. 25, North Korea’s Cabinet called upon firms to act “proactively and autonomously” and to “display their creativity.” Such language is generally associated with reforms put in place in the 2013-15 period that granted enterprises unparalleled autonomy. However, since a number of editorials in the ruling party daily the Rodong Sinmun expressed a variety of opinions on enterprise management following the Eighth Party Congress in January, it’s unclear if the regime has yet confirmed its exact policy going forward.

Prices of key North Korean food staples rise dramatically

As of Feb. 23, the price of corn – the main staple of most North Korean households – had hit almost 3,200 won a kilo (an average of prices across Pyongyang, Sinuiju and Hyesan). The won price is about 40% more than the

North Korea: A Year in Review 2021 51

previous peaks of nearly 2,500 won in late 2017 and mid-2015. Other data sources also indicate dramatic rises in the price of corn.

The dollar price of corn had risen from around $0.20 a kilo in mid-November to as high as $0.47 in February. This is over 50% higher than previous dollar price peaks in Oct.-Nov. 2017 (data is only available from May 2015 onward). Dollar prices have increased by almost 150% since November, and almost 140% in won terms.

Corn has never been more expensive in absolute terms. It’s also more expensive relative to rice than it has ever been: While rice generally costs between two and three times more than corn, rice prices were only 1.5 times higher as of Feb. 23. Lower-income households are likely suffering more as a result.

North Korea reportedly preparing to gradually reopen its northern border

North Korea is making preparations in order to gradually reopen its borders, according to various reports in February. In an interview posted online on Feb. 8, Russian Ambassador to the DPRK Alexander Matsegora described measures North Korea is taking to ensure that imported goods do not serve as a vector for the spread of COVID-19. He did not, however, provide a specific expected reopening date. On Feb. 26, Asia Press

reported rumors that the border will reopen in March, and that prices in Rason have already started to rise in anticipation. For North Koreans reliant on markets, prices of fuel and forex remain far more volatile than they usually are, and this reflects the unpredictable effects of changing trade policies.

Official and unofficial exchange rates

Daily NK Market price data in context

52 North Korea: A Year in Review 2021

ECONOMY: WHY IT MATTERS

Government

Pyongyang appeared to be disunited, or at least uncertain, on economic policy in February. Appearances may be deceiving, but it’s possible that Kim Jong Un’s views on economic matters are at odds with some of his more senior subordinates – perhaps resulting in the dismissal of a top Party official in charge of economic affairs only one month after they took office. Contradictory signals from Party events, Rodong Sinmun editorials and Cabinet meetings also point to disagreement on how the country should address its current economic predicaments.

Regarding food prices, recent spikes in corn prices are cause for concern because it is the staple food for poorer North Koreans, many of whom are food insecure and often malnourished. North Korea does

Business

Volatile North Korean markets and food price surges create the potential for tail risks like a famine. While famine still appears to be unlikely, it would likely lead to social instability in the country. Pyongyang, in response, would probably take extreme foreign policy decisions in order to distract from domestic policy failures and extract aid.

Businesses should also pay close attention to signs of disagreement over economic policy among the

not produce enough food, even at the best of times, to ensure that poorer North Koreans can eat a varied and calorie-rich diet. Sanctions and North Korea’s self-imposed border lockdown is likely to have hit household incomes, meaning food price increases may lead to an unknown but significant portion of the population having to cut back on their daily food intake.

If North Korea were to reopen its borders to trade and humanitarian assistance in the coming months, the country’s economic situation would almost certainly significantly improve. However, this would still require the DPRK to take drastic steps to renormalizing foreign trade.

North Korean leadership. Even though there’s little chance North Korea will have much interaction with international firms in the short term, the economic policies the regime decides on now may have long

lasting effects that impact potential future interaction with the DPRK.

LEADERSHIP: KIM JONG UN BECOMES ‘PRESIDENT,’ WPK CC REPLACES KEY ECONOMIC OFFICIAL AND NORTH KOREA PROMOTES AND APPOINTS FOREIGN POLICY OFFICIALS Martin Weiser

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un | Image: Rodong Sinmun

North Korea changes Kim Jong Un’s official English title to ‘president’

North Korea changed leader Kim Jong Un’s official English title from “Chairman of the State Affairs Commission” to “President of the State Affairs,” various sources stated in February. South Korea’s National Intelligence Service briefed lawmakers about the switch on Feb. 16, and an anonymous unification ministry official confirmed the change on Feb. 18. The DPRK Ministry of Foreign Affairs started referring to Kim as president from Jan. 29. North Korea has also reflected the title change in its constitution.

Ruling party Central Committee replaces key economic official

The Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) Central Committee (CC) replaced its economic affairs department director on Feb. 11. On the last day of February’s party plenum, O Su Yong took over Kim Tu Il’s director position, despite Kim only having held the position for around a month, as well as his seat in the party secretariat. The leadership shuffle followed Kim Jong Un’s criticism of “passivism and self-protection” and accusations of improper annual goals in several sectors on the same day. A subsequent Cabinet meeting on Feb. 25 also reviewed “passive and self-protective tendencies” in Cabinet and state organizations, and took measures to “ensure economic conditions and legal environment for enterprises to independently and proactively conduct production and management activities.”

54 North Korea: A Year in Review 2021

North Korea promotes and appoints top foreign policy officials

North Korea promoted and appointed a number of top foreign policy officials in February. On Feb. 11, the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) Central Committee (CC) promoted foreign minister Ri Son Gwon to a full member of the CC, and Kim Song Nam, the director of the party’s foreign affairs department, to an alternate member of the Politburo. Also, Ri Ryong Nam, the former vice premier overseeing trade, was appointed as the new DPRK ambassador to China, the country’s foreign ministry announced on Feb. 19. Ri replaces Ji Jae Ryong, who served in the position for over a decade.

North Korea: A Year in Review 2021 55

LEADERSHIP: WHY IT MATTERS

Government

Kim Jong Un’s official English title change, which follows his acquisition of the general secretary title at the Party Congress in January, appears to be part of a plan to increase propaganda elevating the leader that started in 2020. The difference in Kim’s current title and his official title as specified in the constitution in Korean, however, suggests an upcoming constitutional revision to formally make Kim Jong Un president. In line with the smaller number of officials in the party’s secretariat compared to its predecessor, the Executive Policy Council, a formal presidency could mean that Kim Jong Un will allow more independence in policy decisions to other actors, while still formally overseeing state policy and foreign affairs in general. In 1990, Kim Il Sung stated that the reason he created and adopted the DPRK presidency was to allow himself more time for actual state affairs, while tasking his son, Kim Jong Il, with overseeing party affairs. Jo Yong Won appears

Business

The replacement of North Korea’s top economic official will likely be followed by further lower-level reshuffles, underlined by the specific criticism of certain economic sectors. This might also affect trade officials and, with the large overturn visible at the Congress in January, push out those officials with longer experience and familiarity with foreign business culture and exchanges. The appointment of a top trade official as DPRK ambassador to China underscores that Beijing will continue to dominate North Korean trade, and that its presence in the country’s economy may strengthen and diversify following the end of the COVID-19 lockdown.

to have taken on a role similar to Kim Jong Il’s during that time.

North Korea’s promotions of foreign policy officials in February, including the appointment of a new DPRK ambassador to China, suggests a change towards a stronger emphasis on foreign relations and trade going forward. A similar pattern was already visible when the CC removed major foreign policy officials with close ties to Kim Jong Un at the meeting in Dec. 2019, but then the new foreign minister Ri Son Gwon and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un’s sister Kim Yo Jong were promoted to the Politburo at the session in April 2020. The CC’s smaller size may have made it possible for Kim Jong Un to push for the appointments of his political allies only a month after the Congress in Jan. 2021.

The Central Committee and the Cabinet meeting further underscored a dual approach to the economy visible during the Congress of calls for increased state control and legal monitoring, but also concern to increase flexibility and independent decision making for economic entities. This should allow for additional opportunities once North Korea resumes trade with the outside world.

SANCTIONS: NEW DPRK FUEL CONVERSION RATE, NORTH KOREA IMPROVED EVASION TACTICS IN 2020 AND POE UNABLE TO REVIEW EVIDENCE IN FILM

James Fretwell

A Pyongyang parking lot in 2019 | Image: NK PRO (file photo)

UN announces fuel conversion rate for legal exports to North Korea

The U.N. announced official conversion rates for petroleum products exported to North Korea on Feb. 17. The U.N. 1718 Sanctions Committee’s new conversion rates include five types of petroleum products and a special “product basket” rate for when the type of fuel is unspecified. The U.N. first announced the 500,000 barrel yearly fuel cap in 2017, which was designed to allow North Korea to import a minimal amount of fuel while hindering its flow to the country’s military. However, since the U.N. fuel cap took effect in 2018, China and Russia – the only countries that have reported fuel exports to the DPRK – have reported their figures in tons, leading to confusion over how much fuel North Korea could legally import. In Dec. 2020, Christoph Heusgen, the parting chair of the U.N.’s 1718 Sanctions Committee, stated that China and Russia had effectively “consistently circumvented the resolution they have agreed to” by reporting their figures in tons and not barrels.

North Korea improved sanctions evasion tactics in 2020, UN report draft says

North Korea used increasingly sophisticated tactics to illegally smuggle fuel into the country last year, according to a new and unpublished U.N. report seen by NK PRO. The report, written by the U.N. PoE, lists various cases of North Korean ships assuming the Automatic Identification System (AIS) identifiers of other ships: For example, the Ming Zhou 6 – a formerly Chinese-owned vessel that North Korea bought in May 2019 – now shows up in AIS data as a Togolese ship called the Enterprise. The report added that DPRK-linked ships used tactics like “throwaway” MMSI numbers and self-identifying as smaller fishing boats to disguise their large coal and fuel smuggling operations.

North Korea: A Year in Review 2021 57

The unpublished PoE report also added that North Korean vessels illegally exported coal overseas and returned with unspecified “humanitarian aid cargo” on at least 11 occasions in 2020. This further underscored the lack of sanctions enforcement or surveillance in Chinese port areas last year.

UN PoE unable to review DPRK sanctions violations evidence from documentary

The U.N. PoE has been unable to see evidence of North Korean sanctions violations from the documentary “The Mole,” according to an unpublished 2020 PoE report seen by NK PRO in February. The documentary’s director, Mads Brügger, said last October that he had begun talks with the U.N. to share the evidence, but told NK PRO on Feb. 10 that the two sides have been unable to agree on how to proceed. Brügger said that the material needs to be sent in-person, not electronically, because the PoE “has been prone to hacking and leaking.” He added that “identifying some of the material they asked for involves some expenses for us, because the material is vast.” In its unpublished 2020 report, the PoE stated that it would “welcome the cooperation of the director and producers” and that it continues to “investigate the claims made in the film.”

58 North Korea: A Year in Review 2021

SANCTIONS: WHY IT MATTERS

Government

The new U.N. petroleum products conversion rate will do little to prevent North Korea’s access to oil. This is because the DPRK imports the vast majority of its fuel illegally anyway: Last year, North Korea had the ability to surpass the annual 500,000-barrel cap in just one month through maritime smuggling, according to a previous U.N. PoE midterm report in 2020. North Korea is only improving its ability to evade sanctions and, already burdened by U.S. and international sanctions, has little to lose from continuing to illegally import its oil.

The PoE’s apparent inability to see evidence from “The Mole” will hinder efforts to ascertain the veracity of the information provided in the documentary. This

Business

The clearer guidelines outlined in the new U.N. fuel conversion rate will help Chinese and Russian businesses facilitating the legal transfer of fuel from implicating themselves in sanctions violations. However, 500,000 barrels of oil is an incredibly low annual consumption rate: For example, South Korea

is important because, even though the filmmakers and North Korea dispute the claims made in the documentary, they both ultimately appear to want the U.N. to view the footage. As Brügger said, he wants to send the relevant material, but he wants to do it in person. If he is able to do this, and the documentary’s claims are legitimate, the footage could shine more light concerning the types of weapon systems North Korea is supposedly proliferating. On the other hand, North Korean officials have said that “The Mole” is “absolutely against the truth” and “nonsense.” If a PoE review of the footage determines this is the case, it will lead government and outside officials alike away from drawing false conclusions about North Korean weapons proliferation from the film.

consumed 2.5 million barrels of petroleum and other liquids every day in 2019, according to the U.S. Energy Information Administration. It stands to reason, then, that North Korea will not be a particularly lucrative market for legal petroleum exports for the foreseeable future.

WMD: US MISSILE DEFENSE FOCUSED ON NORTH KOREA, DPRK ASSISTED IRANIAN MISSILE DEVELOPMENT IN 2020 AND YONGBYON URANIUM ENRICHMENT PLANT CONTINUES OPERATIONS James Fretwell

North Korea’s Hwasong-16 ICBM | Image: Rodong Sinmun

US missile defense focussed on North Korea, top military official says

U.S. missile defense is “clearly focused” on North Korea, not on China, Russia or Iran, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff vice chairman Gen. John Hyten said on Feb. 23. Speaking in a webinar hosted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Hyten said that the U.S. has to continue to improve its missile defense to combat the growing North Korean threat, urging the development of a “next generation interceptor.” He added that “there’s a chance they would actually fire [a long-range missile] at us,” pointing to when tensions were high between the U.S. and North Korea in 2017: “I would challenge anybody that lived through 2017 to look at that problem and not realize that was a real possibility that Kim Jong Un and North Korea would actually use a ballistic missile,” Hyten said.

North Korea assisted Iranian missile development in 2020: PoE

North Korean missile specialists provided Iran’s Shahid Haj Ali Movahed Research Center with “support and assistance” for a space launch vehicle in 2020, according to an unpublished U.N. PoE report seen by news organizations in February. North Korea also transferred “critical parts” to Iran, the report added, but it is not clear what exactly was in these shipments or how significant the cooperation was for either country. Iran denied the accusations in the PoE report in a Dec. 21 reply, however, stating that “preliminary review of the information provided to us by the (experts) indicates that false information and fabricated data may have been used in investigations and analyses.”

60 North Korea: A Year in Review 2021

Yongbyon uranium enrichment plant continued operations in winter

North Korea appears to have continued operations at its uranium enrichment plant in Yongbyon over January and February, according to 38 North analysis of commercial satellite imagery on Feb. 19. 38 North cited the arrival and departure of three uniquely-configured, specialized railcars as evidence of continuing activity at the facility. They arrive two or three times a year and stay for approximately four weeks while they transfer their content, 38 North said. The website added that the four-canister railcar is separated from the two five-canister railcars, suggested that the specialized cars are delivering chemical reagents which, if mixed with the others, could cause an unwanted reaction or explosion during the transfer process.

In contrast, analysis of Yongbyon’s 5 MWe Reactor, Experimental Light Water Reactor and Radiochemical Laboratory showed no signs of renewed activity. North Korea appears to be near finishing construction at the Main Research and Administrative Headquarters Area and continues to stabilize and manage water flows at the main overflow dam.

North Korea: A Year in Review 2021 61

WMD: WHY IT MATTERS

Government

Gen. Hyten’s comments show how seriously the U.S. regards North Korea’s emerging missile capabilities, even in comparison to the threat from China, Russia and Iran. His remarks also follow the U.S. Missile Defense Agency (MDA) and the U.S. Navy’s successful interception of an ICBM-like target during a “milestone” test in Nov. 2020, reflecting the U.S.’ advancing missile defense capabilities.

However, U.S. missile defense development risks not only facilitating an arms race with North Korea, but China and Russia, as well. Despite Gen. Hyten stating that American missile defense is “clearly focused” on North Korea, U.S. technological advancements

Business

Gen. Hyten’s comments reflect backing in the U.S. to invest in missile defense, indicating that there will likely be opportunities for businesses to work on this development in the future. Yet even though the U.S. MDA and the U.S. Navy successfully intercepted and destroyed an ICBM-like target during a “milestone” test

in Nov. 2020, there are concerns that the test did not

could weaken China and Russia’s nuclear deterrent and thus be seen as a step toward an American first-strike capability. It stands to reason, then, that U.S. missile development could encourage other countries to continue to advance their own missile programs in response. This in turn will only increase the potential for catastrophe should an enemy missile breach U.S. missile defenses. Ultimately, a diplomatic solution appears to be the only means to mitigate the overall North Korea nuclear missile threat. But the development of U.S. missile defense capabilities will be seen in Washington as an inevitable necessity to protect for if and when the situation has moved beyond the point of diplomatic resolution.

adequately replicate the conditions of an actual North Korean ICBM launch. And North Korea shows little sign of slowing down its own missile development, having recently revealed the world’s largest road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) at its military parade in Oct. 2020 – which is as yet still untested.

INTER-KOREAN: SEOUL CALLS TO RESUME DIALOGUE, EX-MINISTER SAYS KAESONG SHOULD INCLUDE FOREIGN FIRMS, NEW DPRK CYBERATTACK INFORMATION BILL

James Fretwell

Kaesong, North Korea, in 2019 | Image: NK PRO (file photo)

South Korea calls on North to respond to its call to resume dialogue

South Korea asked the North to “respond to our call for the resumption of dialogue,” Seoul’s First Vice Foreign Minister Choi Jong-Kun said at a high-level U.N. event on Feb. 23. Speaking virtually at the United Nations Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, Choi asked for the “unwavering support” of other countries in restarting talks. Choi also said that South Korea “will continue to work with our friends and partners to achieve our shared goal of complete denuclearization through peaceful means” by “building upon the hard-won momentum thus far.” South Korea, he added, has “chosen this route not because we want to, but because we have to.”

Kaesong complex should include foreign companies, ex-unification minister says

North and South Korea should include foreign companies if they reopen the inter-Korean Kaesong Industrial Complex, Seoul’s former unification minister and current executive vice chairperson of the presidential National Unification Advisory Council said on Feb. 18. During a virtual seminar, Jeong Se-hyun said that the presence of foreign companies at Kaesong would prevent North Korea or the South Korean government from “pulling out abruptly as it did during the Park Geun-hye administration.” Jeong also said South Korea needs to “explore ways to avoid U.N. sanctions” and “come up with ideas that are appealing to North Korea.”

Meanwhile, marking the five-year anniversary of Kaesong’s closure, the unification ministry on Feb. 9 expressed its hope that it can soon discuss reopening the complex “with inter-Korean relations being improved.” North and

North Korea: A Year in Review 2021 63

South Korean leaders Kim Jong Un and Moon Jae-in had agreed to “normalize” the Kaesong Industrial Complex “as conditions mature” in Sept. 2018.

New South Korean bill calls for more public info on North Korean cyberattacks

South Korean lawmakers proposed a new bill that would force the country’s National Intelligence Service (NIS) to share more information related to North Korean cyberattacks with government agencies and the public on Feb. 18. The purpose of the “North Korean hacking information sharing law,” backed by 15 lawmakers from the conservative Peoples Power Party, is to “hold the NIS responsible for informing South Koreans about [North Korean hacking attacks], as we do for voice phishing crimes,” according to an aide to lawmaker Ha Tae

keung. Ha cited North Korea’s recent alleged hacking attacks on domestic pharmaceutical and cryptocurrency companies as his inspiration for the proposal.

64 North Korea: A Year in Review 2021

INTER-KOREAN: WHY IT MATTERSGovernment

Seoul continued to express its desire to resume dialogue with Pyongyang in February, but developments over the last month suggest that progress in inter-Korean relations is unlikely for the foreseeable future. The clock is ticking on South Korean President Moon Jae

in’s remaining time in office, but North Korea’s strict COVID-19 border lockdown is severely restricting diplomatic contact, potentially reducing any inter Korean contact to video conferencing. On top of this, the newly-inaugurated Biden administration is still conducting its North Korea policy review. While Washington has vowed to closely coordinate on North Korea issues with its allies in Seoul and Tokyo, it is still unclear how the Biden administration will balance “pressure” and “diplomatic initiatives” in its approach toward Pyongyang.

Business

Even though involving foreign companies in Kaesong would make it more difficult for North and South Korea to suspend operations again, various factors mean that the complex is unlikely to reopen any time soon. North Korea has nearly totally closed its borders in order to prevent the spread of COVID-19, and there is currently no end in sight for the pandemic. Also, while the Moon Jae-in administration has consistently advocated for inter-Korean engagement, the upcoming March 2022 elections in South Korea could result in a new president far less sympathetic toward working with the North. Even if South Korea elects another president that advocates for similar inter-Korean policies to the Moon administration, the Biden administration in the U.S. is unlikely to support reopening Kaesong unless

Even if COVID-19 and the U.S.’ policy review weren’t a factor, however, North Korea doesn’t appear particularly interested in the South’s current inter Korean proposals anyway. In a speech during the country’s Eighth Party Congress in January, Kim Jong Un referred to cooperation on the pandemic, humanitarianism and inter-Korean tourism as “inessential issues.” According to Kim, it’s South Korean military modernization and joint drills with the U.S. that are preventing the two Koreas from improving their relations. The Moon administration, however, continues to increase its defense budget and is set to conduct annual springtime joint military exercises.

it is part of reciprocal North Korean steps toward denuclearization.

Concerning the proposed bill to force the NIS to publicly share more information about North Korean cyberattacks: More information could help prevent North Korean cyberattacks – which private companies are often the victim of – by facilitating more cooperation between the public and private sectors. However, there is the risk that releasing certain information would prompt North Korean cyber attackers to change their tactics, frustrating efforts that have already been made to hinder existing DPRK hacker strategies.

DPRK STATE MEDIA: NEW AND NOTABLE

James Fretwell

Kim Jong Un attends a Feb. 11 Lunar New Year performance | Image: Rodong Sinmun

In this section, NK PRO highlights a number of noteworthy stories from the month of February:

= Kim Jong Un attends a crowded, maskless Lunar New Year performance – Kim Jong Un attended a Lunar New Year (Seollal) performance on Feb. 11, ruling party daily the Rodong Sinmun reported, but photos show that neither performers nor the audience were social distancing or wearing masks despite North Korea’s strict COVID-19 measures. Photos also showed more conservatively-dressed performers compared to the beginning of Kim’s rule, suggesting that a more traditional style is returning to official DPRK culture. North Koreans in Pyongyang also visited the statues of former leaders Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il and enjoyed traditional dishes at restaurants, according to various state media outlets. Additionally, Chosun, a state-run magazine, marked the occasion by featuring traditional Korean hanbok in its Feb. 2021 edition, and the Chosun Ryori website shared photos of traditional Lunar New Year food.

= New North Korean propaganda blames ‘apathetic’ citizens for its economic issues – North Korea released new propaganda posters on Feb. 14 blaming “apathetic” and “self-protecting” citizens for its economic problems, using motifs previously reserved to denounce foreign pressure and sanctions. The five posters were designed to inspire North Koreans to follow the decisions made at the country’s party plenum a few days earlier, according to the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA). One poster calls for “categorically removing the ideological maladies obstructive to the progress” of the country, KCNA reported, showing the words “apathy” and “self-protectionism” in block letters being broken up in a molten furnace. Citizens should instead now “fulfill the five-year plan through fresh innovation, bold creation and uninterrupted advance,” KCNA stated.

66 North Korea: A Year in Review 2021

= North Korea to hold Youth League 10th Congress for April – North Korea will hold the 10th Congress of what is now called the Kimilsungist-Kimjongilist Youth League in “early April,” DPRK state media reported on Feb. 4. North Korea scheduled the event at a plenary meeting on the league’s central committee on Feb. 3, where officials also “reviewed the faults latent in the work of the youth league and their causes and lessons,” according to ruling party daily the Rodong Sinmun. The newspaper reported that speakers at the plenary meeting “stressed the need to energetically wage an ideological offensive for equipping all officials and members of the youth league with the line and policies set forth by the Party Congress,” adding that the organization needs to “continuously improve the contents, forms and methods” of ideological education. DPRK leader Kim Jong Un may attend the upcoming event, since he delivered a lengthy speech at the two-day Ninth Congress in Aug. 2016.

= Mask-clad North Koreans celebrate former leader Kim Jong Il’s birthday – Mask-clad North Koreans celebrated former leader Kim Jong Il’s birthday on Feb. 16 with socially-distanced events, according to photos published in state media. This contrasted with a concert marking the “Day of the Shining Star” attended by Kim Jong Un and his wife Ri Sol Ju, in which neither the North Korean leader nor anyone else in attendance appeared to be observing COVID-19 prevention guidelines. North Koreans visited the Kumsusan Palace of the Sun – where Kim Jong Il and his father and the DPRK’s first leader Kim Il Sung lie in state – and the statues of the former leaders on Mansu Hill, the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) reported. There were also photo exhibitions, performances at theaters and electric light decorations in the streets, KCNA added.

Even though this February marked 80 years since Kim Jong Il was born, and North Korea tends to hold larger events for round-number anniversaries, expect far bigger celebrations next year. This is because, although Soviet sources suggest he was born near Khabarovsk in 1941, North Korea maintains he was actually born on Mount Paektu in 1942. North Korean historians were likely attempting to link Kim Jong Il to Kim Il Sung – whose anti-Japanese guerrilla base during World War II was supposedly on the mountain – and Korea’s mythical founder, Dangun, in order to cement Kim Jong Il’s legitimacy as ruler. The 1942 birth year also allows for a nice 30-year gap between the births of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il.

= North Korea reportedly discovers 130 million-year-old bird fossil – North Korea recently discovered a roughly 130 million-year-old Mesozoic bird fossil in the Paektho-dong, Sinuiju area, the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) reported on Feb. 19. The paleontology research group from the Geology Faculty of Kim Il Sung University also found one piece of dinosaur tooth fossil, one primitive mammal fossil, 60-

odd pieces of fish fossil, more than 210 entomolites, 40-odd pieces of shellfish and mud-snail fossil and other rare fossils, according to KCNA. The discovery is of “great significance” to research on Mesozoic era Cretaceous biota, the state-run outlet stated, adding that the finding “shows that Korea is a native place of mankind as well as a cradle of birds.” North Korean leader Kim Jong Un approved the naming of the bird fossil as “Paekthosae,” KCNA reported.

North Korea: A Year in Review 2021 67

MARCH 2021

68 North Korea: A Year in Review 2021

Contents

70 Executive Summary

73 WMD: First missile tests since Biden took office, USFK commander doubts new North Korean missile ability and activity at DPRK nuclear sites

76 Foreign Relations: Meetings between top foreign policy officials, Xi promises to work with Kim and North Korea severs ties with Malaysia

Human Rights / Human Security: New import disinfection law, DPRK to

receive fewer COVID-19 vaccines and Blinken supports new human rights envoy

82 Military: Kim Yo Jong blasts US-ROK drill, US and South Korea agree on cost-sharing deal and Moon highlights ROK military strength in speech

85 Leadership: Kim Jong Un guides party short course, construction of 10,000 apartments announced and Kim Yo Jong threatens ROK and US

88 Economy: North Korea makes moves on construction projects, ruling party cements economic control and border may reopen next month

91 Sanctions: Extradited North Korean stands trial in US, no new UN sanctions for missile test and DPRK buys smuggled taiwanese oil

94 Inter-Korean: Kim Yo Jong blasts South for missile hypocrisy, Seoul proposes joint Olympics train ride and a new English analysis website

97 DPRK State Media: New and Notable

North Korea: A Year in Review 2021 69

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Cherry blossoms in North Korea | Image: NK PRO (file photo)

WMD: FIRST MISSILE TESTS SINCE BIDEN TOOK OFFICE, USFK COMMANDER DOUBTS NEW NORTH KOREAN MISSILE ABILITY AND ACTIVITY AT DPRK NUCLEAR SITES

James Fretwell

North Korea conducted its first-known missile launches – ballistic missile and cruise missile tests – since U.S. President Joe Biden took office. General Robert Abrams expressed doubt on North Korea’s recently-paraded weapons delivery systems. And various outlets reported on activity at North Korean nuclear sites throughout March, based on commercial satellite imagery.

RISK: North Korea likely timed the launches in March in order to increase its leverage in potential future talks as the Biden administration comes to the end of its policy review. However, the lack of substantive international reaction to the tests means North Korea may conclude that it can conduct these launches with relative impunity. This risks essentially allowing North Korea to continue advancing its weapons systems, strengthening its position in negotiations and increasing the damage it can do in the event of a conflict.

FOREIGN RELATIONS: MEETINGS BETWEEN TOP FOREIGN POLICY OFFICIALS, XI PROMISES TO WORK WITH KIM AND NORTH KOREA SEVERS TIES WITH MALAYSIA

James Fretwell

Top foreign policy officials from key countries in North Korea-related affairs held a series of meetings throughout March. Chinese President Xi Jinping also promised North Korean leader Kim Jong Un to work with him to “preserve peace and stability.” And North Korea severed diplomatic relations with Malaysia after the country decided to extradite a DPRK citizen to the U.S. for alleged sanctions violations.

RISK: The U.S. Secretaries of State and Defense’s various meetings in Japan and South Korea will inform the Biden administration’s upcoming DPRK policy review, and suggest tight coordination between the U.S. and its allies going forward. However, while joint statements cordially emphasized that the U.S. and its allies would cooperate

70 North Korea: A Year in Review 2021

closely going forward, there were likely strong disagreements on DPRK policy behind the scenes, particularly in meetings in Seoul. Meanwhile, fiery words between China and the U.S. in Alaska and friendly messages between Xi and Kim soon after don’t bode well for the Secretary of State’s hope that Beijing and Washington can work together on DPRK denuclearization.

HUMAN RIGHTS / HUMAN SECURITY: NEW IMPORT DISINFECTION LAW, DPRK TO RECEIVE FEWER COVID-19 VACCINES AND BLINKEN SUPPORTS NEW HUMAN RIGHTS ENVOY

James Fretwell

North Korea adopted a new import disinfection law amid an ongoing COVID-19 prevention border lockdown that has hindered aid deliveries. COVAX announced that North Korea will receive 1.7 million doses of COVID-19 vaccine between February and May, around 300,000 fewer than originally planned in February. And U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken expressed his strong support for re-appointing a special envoy for North Korea human rights.

RISK: Import disinfection policies and vaccines are better than nothing, but developments in March are unlikely to go far in facilitating a return to normal. While the new disinfection law should facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid as well as consumer goods into the DPRK, it remains to be seen how efficiently the country will be able to disinfect incoming items. Also, Pyongyang is incredibly unlikely to reopen the border much if it only has enough vaccines for around 3.3% of its population. North Korea probably won’t return to normal levels of trade and openness until the pandemic has subsided globally.

MILITARY: KIM YO JONG BLASTS US-ROK DRILL, US AND SOUTH KOREA AGREE ON COST SHARING DEAL AND MOON HIGHLIGHTS ROK MILITARY STRENGTH IN SPEECH

James Fretwell

Kim Yo Jong threatened retaliation over the U.S.-ROK springtime joint military drill. South Korean President Moon Jae-in highlighted his country’s military strength. And South Korea agreed to pay 13.9% more in its financial contribution to U.S. military presence on the peninsula than in 2020.

LEADERSHIP: KIM JONG UN GUIDES PARTY SHORT COURSE, CONSTRUCTION OF 10,000 APARTMENTS ANNOUNCED AND KIM YO JONG THREATENS ROK AND US

Martin Weiser

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un made appearances at four events in March: two at construction projects, one at a multi-day short course for city and county party chiefs and another inspecting prototypes for new buses. Meanwhile, his sister, Kim Yo Jong, issued two statements, blasting South Korea for criticizing the North’s recent ballistic missiles launch and bashing the springtime U.S.-ROK joint military exercise at the beginning of March.

ECONOMY: NORTH KOREA MAKES MOVES ON CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS, RULING PARTY CEMENTS ECONOMIC CONTROL AND BORDER MAY REOPEN NEXT MONTH

Peter Ward

The Wonsan-Kalma Tourism Zone, which was originally scheduled to open in 2018, is approaching completion – externally, at least – according to NK PRO satellite imagery analysis. During a four-day “short course” for local and regional officials starting on March 3, Kim Jong Un called for the eradication of anti-socialist behavior and “bluffing” in the agricultural sector. And Nikkei Asia reported that North Korea’s self-imposed COVID-19 trade blockade could end in mid-April.

SANCTIONS: EXTRADITED NORTH KOREAN STANDS TRIAL IN US, NO NEW UN SANCTIONS FOR MISSILE TEST AND DPRK BUYS SMUGGLED TAIWANESE OIL

James Fretwell

For the first time ever, a North Korean accused of sanctions violations and extradited by Malaysia stood trial in the U.S. in March. Meanwhile, North Korea conducted ballistic missile tests on March 25, but the U.N. did not announce any new sanctions. Also in March, an investigative report detailed how North Korea bypassed a U.N. fuel cap by buying smuggled Taiwanese oil.

North Korea: A Year in Review 2021 71

INTER-KOREAN: KIM YO JONG BLASTS SOUTH FOR MISSILE HYPOCRISY, SEOUL PROPOSES JOINT OLYMPICS TRAIN RIDE AND A NEW ENGLISH ANALYSIS WEBSITE

James Fretwell

Kim Yo Jong, Kim Jong Un’s sister, blasted South Korean President Moon Jae-in on March 30 for criticizing the DPRK’s recent missile testing while continuing to develop his own country’s missiles. On the same day, South Korea’s unification minister proposed sending an inter-Korean team to the 2022 Beijing Winter Olympics on a train that would pass through the DPRK. And on March 5, South Korea’s unification ministry announced it will invest nearly $500,000 to develop an English-language website focused on North Korea-related issues.

72 North Korea: A Year in Review 2021

WMD: FIRST MISSILE TESTS SINCE BIDEN TOOK OFFICE, USFK COMMANDER DOUBTS NEW NORTH KOREAN MISSILE ABILITY AND ACTIVITY AT DPRK NUCLEAR SITES

James Fretwell

North Korea tested new ballistic missiles in March | Image: Rodong Sinmun

North Korea conducted its first-known missile launches – ballistic missile and cruise missile tests – since U.S. President Joe Biden took office in March. General Robert Abrams expressed doubts on North Korea’s recently paraded weapons delivery systems. And various outlets reported on activity at North Korean nuclear sites throughout March, based on commercial satellite imagery.

North Korea conducts first missile tests since Biden took office

North Korea test-fired two short-range ballistic missiles on March 25, the DPRK’s first-known ballistic missile launch since U.S. President Joe Biden took office. The news came a day after media outlets reported on March 24 that North Korea had tested two short-range cruise missiles on March 21, North Korea’s first-known missile launch since Biden took office. DPRK state media did not mention the cruise missile tests, but did report on March 25’s “newly-developed tactical guided missiles” a day after. Outlets stated that the country’s new weapons system “improved the weight of its warhead to 2.5 tons,” confirmed the “reliability of the improved solid-fuel motor” and reconfirmed “irregular orbit characteristics of the low-altitude gliding and skipping flight mode.”

While the U.S. played down North Korea’s cruise missile launches – which didn’t violate U.N. sanctions – Biden said that his administration will “respond accordingly” if North Korea chooses to escalate following the ballistic missile tests on March 25. On the same day, Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga said that “we strongly protest and denounce” the ballistic missile launch. On March 26, South Korean President Moon Jae-in called the test a day prior “undesirable,” but emphasized his country’s own “world-class missile capabilities.”

USFK Commander doubts North Korea’s ability to use recently paraded weapons

General Robert Abrams, Commander of U.S. Forces Korea (USFK), expressed doubt on North Korea’s recently paraded weapons delivery systems on March 10. In a written statement to the U.S. House Armed Services

North Korea: A Year in Review 2021 73

Committee, Abrams said that “there has been no reporting to indicate that North Korea has exhibited a platform capable of delivering the weapons we were shown.” As a result, he said, there is a “significant gap” between North Korea’s claim it possesses the “most powerful weapon” and “certifying they possess not only the actual weapons but also a platform capable of successfully delivering it.” However, Abrams wrote that North Korea’s Pukguksong-5 – revealed at a military parade in January – could represent an “intermediate step” towards the country eventually obtaining solid-fuel propellant intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). North Korea’s current ICBMs use liquid fuel, which take longer to prepare in the event of a conflict.

Meanwhile, in a written statement to the Senate Armed Services Committee on March 16, U.S. Air Force General Glen VanHerck said that North Korea may begin testing an “improved” ICBM design in the “near future.” North Korea revealed the world’s largest road-mobile ballistic missile at a military parade celebrating the 75th founding anniversary of the ruling Workers’ Party of Korea on Oct. 10 last year that is yet to be tested.

Activity spotted at North Korean nuclear sites

Activity at North Korean nuclear sites was reported by various outlets throughout March.

= On March 2, CNN reported on satellite imagery analyzed by experts at the Middlebury Institute that showed North Korea built new structures at its Yongdoktong site in 2020. According to experts, the structures are likely hiding a pair of underground tunnel entrances that lead to a facility where North Korea stores nuclear weapons, CNN said.

= On March 3, 38 North reported that recent commercial satellite imagery indicated that the coal-fired thermal plant that serves the Yongbyon Radiochemical Laboratory is in operation again after two years. This followed up on comments made by IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi on March 1, who stated that there were “recent indications of operation of the steam plant.”

= 38 North on March 12 again reported on signs of continued operation at the Yongbyon Radiochemical Laboratory thermal plant and on new activity at the Uranium Enrichment Plant Complex, based on commercial satellite imagery.

= On March 26, Beyond Parallel, a product of the Center for International and Strategic Studies (CSIS), reported that commercial satellite imagery suggesting recent activity at the Pyongsan Uranium Concentrate Plant.

= Beyond Parallel also reported on activity at the Yongbyon Radiochemical Laboratory’s thermal plant based on a March 30 satellite image.

74 North Korea: A Year in Review 2021

WMD: WHY IT MATTERS

Government

While North Korea always has the incentive to test missiles in order to continue to develop its weaponry, Pyongyang likely deliberately timed the March 25 ballistic missile launch just ahead of Biden’s first press conference of the same day and South Korean President Moon’s speech on the 11th anniversary of the ROKS Cheonan sinking.

Ahead of Washington’s upcoming DPRK policy review, it was in North Korea’s interest to increase its leverage in potential future negotiations by demonstrating the growing sophistication of its weapons systems. However, the response to the March 21 cruise missile tests was underwhelming – Biden himself described it as “business as usual.” And senior Biden administration officials said that analysts “rightly recognized” the cruise missile launch as an incident “on the low end” of the threat spectrum.

On the other hand, the March 25 launches were sure to get more attention because, as ballistic missiles,

Business

North Korean missile launches in March increase tensions on the peninsula, making any light at the end of the tunnel for business opportunities even fainter. If precedent is anything to go by, North Korea may conduct more short and intermediate-range missile tests in the near future. The most businesses seeking peninsula stability or DPRK-related opportunities can now hope for is that the Moon administration

they violated U.N. sanctions. And by violating U.N. sanctions, North Korea signaled to the U.S. that it’s not desperate for sanctions relief – despite currently undergoing immense economic hardship because of its self-imposed draconian COVID-19 border lockdown.

A short-range ballistic missile was also an appropriate means to garner attention from the new U.S. administration. Even though North Korea could have got more attention by conducting another nuclear test or long-range missile test, it may have wanted to avoid outrage in Moscow and Beijing, who both supported crushing UNSC sanctions in 2017 after similar tests. However, even a short-range ballistic missile test will also make it more difficult for the Moon administration to argue its case for a softer approach toward the DPRK. Going forward, the lack of substantive consequences for North Korea’s short-range ballistic missile test – aside from condemnations from some world leaders – means the country may have concluded these launches are relatively safe to conduct.

convinced the U.S. Secretaries of State and Defense visiting Seoul in March to consider a step-by-step, denuclearization-for-sanctions relief deal with the DPRK. While such an arrangement would depend on North Korean moves toward denuclearization, something the country hasn’t recently demonstrated it is willing to do, it could pave the way for an extended period of détente.

FOREIGN RELATIONS: MEETINGS BETWEEN TOP FOREIGN POLICY OFFICIALS, XI PROMISES TO WORK WITH KIM AND NORTH KOREA SEVERS TIES WITH MALAYSIA

James Fretwell and Chad O’Carroll

Top U.S. and South Korean foreign policy officials meet in Seoul | Image: ROK MOFA Twitter

Top foreign policy officials from key countries meet throughout March

Top foreign policy officials from key countries interested in North Korea-related affairs held a series of meetings in a variety of combinations during March.

= On March 16, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin issued a joint statement with their Japanese counterparts in Tokyo. The allies “reaffirmed their commitment to the complete denuclearization of North Korea” and “confirmed the necessity of immediate resolution of the abductions issue.”

= On March 18, the U.S. secretaries issued a joint statement with their South Korean counterparts in Seoul. They emphasized that North Korean nuclear and ballistic missile issues are a priority for the allies and committed to maintaining high-level consultations on the U.S.’ DPRK policy review. However, in remarks during the visit, there was confusion over terminology: Blinken had said that Washington’s goal was the “denuclearization of North Korea,” whereas South Korean foreign minister Chung Eui-yong said that the phrase “denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” was more “appropriate.” North Korea prefers this term because it leaves room to pressure the U.S. to remove its nuclear capabilities from the area, too.

= Blinken then flew to Alaska, where he and U.S. National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan met their Chinese counterparts. On March 19, Blinken acknowledged that there are a number of areas where the two countries are “fundamentally at odds,” but that their “interests intersect” on North Korea.

76 North Korea: A Year in Review 2021

= On March 25, Russian and South Korean foreign ministers Sergey Lavrov and Chung Eui-yong met in Seoul, hours after North Korea fired two short-range ballistic missiles into the East Sea. Lavrov called for “all concerned countries” to “renounce the arms race” and “boosting all kinds of military activity.”

= Meanwhile, on March 31, South Korea’s foreign ministry announced working-level talks with Japan in Tokyo the following day and upcoming talks between Chinese and South Korean foreign ministers Wang Yi and Chung Eui-yong.

= Also on March 31, the White House stated that Sullivan will hold trilateral talks with his South Korean and Japanese counterparts on April 2.

= Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga will also become the first foreign leader to meet U.S. President Joe Biden in Washington on April 9, according to government sources.

Xi Jinping promises to work with Kim Jong Un to ‘preserve peace’

Chinese President Xi Jinping promised North Korean leader Kim Jong Un to work with him to “preserve peace and stability,” according to Chinese state media on March 22. The following day, North Korean state media reported that Kim also sent Xi a message stating that their two countries should work together to “cope with the hostile forces’ all-round challenges and obstructive moves.” Both “verbal messages” were exchanged between Song Tao, the minister of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee’s International Department, and Ri Ryong Nam, the new DPRK ambassador to China, during a meeting in Beijing on Monday, Xinhua News Agency said.

North Korea severs diplomatic relations with Malaysia

North Korea severed diplomatic relations with Malaysia after the country decided to extradite a DPRK citizen to the U.S. for alleged sanctions violations, North Korea’s foreign ministry announced on March 19. The statement accused Malaysia of committing a “super-large hostile act against the DPRK in subservience to the U.S. pressure” and even negotiating a “free delivery” of weapons from the U.S. in exchange for the extradition. It added that Malaysia will “bear full responsibility” for its actions and that the U.S. will be “made to pay a due price.” North Korean diplomatic staff left the DPRK Embassy in Kuala Lumpur on March 21 after Malaysia ordered them to leave the country within 48 hours.

The extradited DPRK citizen, Mun Chul Myong, was sent to the U.S. on March 16 and stood trial in a federal court in the District of Columbia on March 22. This incident, the first-ever time a North Korean had been extradited to the U.S. for sanctions violations, is covered in more detail in the “Sanctions” section of this Month In Review.

North Korea: A Year in Review 2021 77

FOREIGN RELATIONS: WHY IT MATTERSGovernment

The U.S. Secretaries of State and Defense’s various meetings in Japan and South Korea – and also with Chinese officials in Alaska – will inform the Biden administration’s upcoming DPRK policy review, and suggest tight coordination between the U.S. and its allies going forward.

However, while joint statements cordially emphasized that the U.S. and its allies would cooperate closely going forward, the U.S. and South Korea’s confusion over whether to use the term “denuclearization of North Korea” or “denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” reflects potential differing opinions in how to approach the DPRK nuclear issue. There were also likely strong disagreements on DPRK policy behind the scenes at meetings in Seoul. While the Moon Jae-in administration has consistently advocated for a softer approach toward North Korea, the U.S. Secretary of State bashed Pyongyang for its human rights record – soon after a top DPRK official had promised her country would return “power for power and goodwill for goodwill.” The lack of “goodwill” between North Korea and the U.S. during Blinken’s Asia trip won’t have helped Moon’s goal of continuing dialogue with Pyongyang at the highest levels.

Meanwhile, fiery words between China and the U.S. in Alaska and friendly messages between Xi and Kim soon after don’t bode well for Blinken’s hope that Beijing and Washington can work together on DPRK

Business

The DPRK’s severance of diplomatic relations with Malaysia, and Kuala Lumpur’s subsequent expulsion of over 30 North Korean diplomats and family members is likely to have major ramifications for Pyongyang’s future business activities in Southeast Asia.

On the one hand, Malaysia has long been considered a relative safe-haven for overseas North Korean businesspeople and laborers, who were able to access the region from the country on a visa-free basis until Feb. 2017. Though growing sanctions had

denuclearization. China has previously expressed its concerns over the current approach toward North Korea, and so is unlikely to provide the U.S. with the harsh sanctions enforcement it ideally wants.

Concerning the DPRK’s break in ties with Malaysia: Pyongyang is likely concerned that Mun, who allegedly worked in North Korea’s sanctions evasion network for years, could reveal valuable information to the U.S. as part of a plea deal. But even though the news of the break was surprising, especially since North Korea and Malaysia were relatively friendly in the past, relations have soured in recent years. In Feb. 2017, two women acting on instructions from North Korean agents smeared deadly VX nerve agent on the face of Kim Jong Nam, the half-brother and potential rival to DPRK leader Kim Jong Un. Following the attack, which took place in a Kuala Lumpur airport, Malaysia canceled visa-free travel for North Koreans and expelled the DPRK ambassador. A few days later, North Korea expelled the Malaysian ambassador, and the two countries have not hosted each other’s ambassadors since.

Nevertheless, North Korea and Malaysia may re establish relations in the coming years. Malaysia gained status for facilitating talks between the U.S. and the DPRK in the past, and the country used to be a relatively open avenue for North Koreans to access the wider world.

complicated their activities in recent years, the DPRK’s full severance of ties with Malaysia means they now have no ability to work legally or illegally from Malaysia for the foreseeable future. On the other hand, the DPRK’s sudden severance of diplomatic relations is unlikely to win support from other foreign ministries in the Southeast Asia region. Pyongyang’s decision makes the value of other countries maintaining cordial diplomatic relations with the DPRK even lower than it already was, which means North Korean entrepreneurs may find other doors shutting in the future.

HUMAN RIGHTS / HUMAN SECURITY: NEW IMPORT DISINFECTION LAW, DPRK TO RECEIVE FEWER COVID-19 VACCINES AND BLINKEN SUPPORTS NEW HUMAN RIGHTS ENVOY

James Fretwell

North Koreans in anti-COVID-19 protection outfits | Image: NK News (file photo)

North Korea adopts import disinfection law amid ongoing border shutdown

North Korea’s Supreme People’s Assembly adopted a new import disinfection law on March 3, DPRK state media reported the following day, amid an ongoing COVID-19 prevention border lockdown that has hindered aid deliveries. The “Law on Disinfection of Imports” will establish a “system and order of disinfecting imports at border-passing spots,” according to the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA). This system may be what Russian Ambassador to the DPRK Alexander Matsergora referred to in February as “large disinfection complexes”

under construction at border crossing points “to ensure the safe entry of imported goods.” North Korea’s border restrictions have caused trade with China to plummet over the last few months, and the U.N. Human Rights Council (UNHRC) on March 23 issued a resolution urging North Korea to reopen its borders “for the delivery of urgently required humanitarian goods” such as food, medicine and agricultural supplies. The resolution also called on the DPRK to allow foreign humanitarian workers – including U.N. staff, the last of whom left North Korea on March 18 – to enter and leave the country more freely.

North Korea to receive 0.3 million fewer vaccines than previously expected

North Korea will receive 1.7 million doses of COVID-19 vaccine between February and May, COVAX stated on March 2, roughly 300,000 fewer than the joint initiative announced the country would receive in February. This will be enough to vaccinate around 850,000 North Koreans – around 3.3% of the DPRK’s population – since each person should receive two shots of the AstraZeneca vaccine. COVAX has yet to detail when exactly North

North Korea: A Year in Review 2021 79

Korea will receive the aid, but “further allocation rounds for vaccines in the COVAX portfolio will be announced in due course,” according to Gavi.

North Korea continues to claim zero COVID-19 cases, according to a World Health Organization (WHO) report on March 11.

Blinken feels ‘strongly’ about re-appointing a North Korea human rights envoy

U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken feels “strongly” about re-appointing a special envoy for North Korea human rights, he said at a House Foreign Relations Committee hearing on March 10. Blinken said that he agreed with Rep. Young Kim, a Republican representative from California, who called on the Secretary of State to fill the position “as quickly as possible.” Ambassador Robery King, the last special envoy, assumed the role between Nov. 2009 and Jan. 2017 during the Obama administration.

80 North Korea: A Year in Review 2021

Monday, February 28, 2022

North Korea: A Year in Review 2021