The war in Ukraine changes everything — including the future of North Korea
Russia's invasion is the latest event to increase chance Kim Jong Un regime survives and becomes more aggressive
Andrei Lankov April 4, 2022
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North Korean leader Kim Jong Un visits two frontline units of the Korean People's Army (KPA) in Nov. 2019 | Image: KCNA
An era has ended. The dramatic events of the last three to four years, most recently Russia’s month-old invasion of Ukraine, have demonstrated that the post-Cold War order of the last 30-odd years is gone. Much of what seemed certain has evaporated, and many old assumptions are no longer relevant — including with North Korea.
It is a good time to reconsider the DPRK’s future prospects. How will it change in the next 20 or 40 years? There are several factors to consider.
First and most important is the U.S.-China rivalry. This conflict is reminiscent of the Cold War but differs in important respects: It is far less ideological and unlikely to become truly global. Nonetheless, the rivalry is likely to determine everything for decades to come in East Asia.
Unlike in the Soviet Union, the Chinese economy is remarkably efficient, while a single ethnic group — Han Chinese — makes up the vast majority of the state. Ethnic nationalism, as the de facto ideology of modern China, produces greater cohesion than any ideology-based concepts like Soviet communism, presaging a long fight between the eagle and the dragon.
The second major change is the rise of state-controlled surveillance technology. For a while, it looked like digital technologies were assisting forces of change, democracy and revolution. But now, information technology appears to be on the side of surveillance. Face recognition, big data, smartphone apps and other achievements of Silicon Valley wizards allow repressive states to spy on their subjects and uproot dissent with hitherto unthinkable efficiency.
The third and most recent change is the end of the long peace. No matter how the war in Ukraine ends, it is now clear that an old-school, full-scale war between major developed states is not impossible in the 21st century, and might even work well as a tool of politics.
For the nearly 40 years I have studied the DPRK, I had assumed that at some point in my life I would gain access to North Korean archives when the country undergoes regime change or some other dramatic transformation. I always rejected the idea that the Kim dynasty, in spite of its gross economic inefficiency, would last for many more decades.
But now the world has changed, and the long-term survival of the system increasingly looks like the most likely scenario. Even more worrisome, the invasion of Ukraine has raised anew the possibility, distant though it may still be, that Pyongyang entertains similar designs on Seoul.
Competition between the U.S. and China ensures that Pyongyang will have a reliable benefactor in Beijing for years to come | Image: NARA & DVIDS Public Domain Archive (Feb. 21, 2014)SPONSORING PYONGYANG
Thanks to the U.S.-China rivalry, Pyongyang can count on Beijing’s support more or less unconditionally. Gone are the days when China was willing to sponsor and implement U.N. Security Council resolutions against the DPRK, or even talk to Washington about joint actions regarding North Korea.
Now, China’s main concern is to keep the DPRK stable and maintain a strategic buffer zone near its northeastern borders. This means it will provide North Korea with low-quality grain, fuel and perhaps CCTV cameras — free of charge and in quantities sufficient to avoid famine and maintain surveillance.
Of course, there are also disadvantages for Pyongyang. The North Korean leadership does not welcome excessive dependence on any foreign state, and China is no exception. But the inflow of Chinese aid guarantees the regime’s survival, so it is a good deal.
Technology transfers are likely to play a part in China’s support for North Korea, too. Surveillance networks, pioneered in China’s Xinjiang region, are increasingly easy to install and maintain. These allow authorities to locate and investigate suspicious activities and deviations from prescribed norms — at least in the major cities that are most important politically.
This will impact North Korea’s domestic politics as well. To put it simply, Kim Jong Un does not need economic reforms any more, and the reforms of 2012-2017 have already been curtailed and, in many respects, pushed back.
From the point of view of the Pyongyang leadership, this is a rational step. Chinese aid and surveillance technologies ensure stability absent reforms, and the country will continue to find the resources for nuclear warheads and ever more powerful ICBMs.
There is no point in engaging in difficult and politically risky reformist activities.
Chinese surveillance technologies will make it easier for the Kim regime to monitor suspicious activities and maintain control over the North Korean people, Andrei Lankov writes | Image: PixabayNUCLEAR INTIMIDATION
While North Korea will likely be frozen in time for a decade or two, it will still advance its nuclear and missile programs. These programs have three main purposes: to be a tool of blackmail diplomacy, an instrument of deterrence and self-defense and, finally, a domestic propaganda tool.
These programs have largely been defensive in orientation and reasonably harmless for the outside world — if we ignore their destructive impact on the nonproliferation regime, of course. But it’s likely they’re now acquiring a new and very dangerous significance.
By 2016-17, North Korea had acquired nuclear capabilities sufficient for diplomatic blackmail, deterrence and propaganda. But the regime has not stopped there, instead sharply accelerating weapons development and producing three types of intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of reaching the continental U.S. The DPRK is only the third country, after Russia and China, to acquire the capacity to theoretically strike any American city.
All this points to the North Korean nuclear and missile programs acquiring an offensive character. They increasingly exist not just to preserve Kim rule but to create conditions to finish the unfinished business of its 1950 invasion to reunify the peninsula.
The dream is not difficult to imagine: One day in the 2030s, or even 2050s, when the U.S. is overstretched, led by an isolationist leader or has suffered a major foreign policy debacle, Kim Jong Un or his successor orders an attack on the South. The North Korean leader warns Washington that Pyongyang will punish any intervention by transforming San Francisco into a pile of rubble. If necessary, it can deploy tactical nukes against the South, wiping out Seoul’s conventional military superiority and demonstrating that Kim means business.
Would the U.S. blink in such a scenario?
Ukrainian military forces conduct an anti-terrorist operation in the eastern part of the country on July 15, 2014. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine provides a model for how the DPRK might seek to demand South Korea’s demilitarization and exert control over its politics and economy, Andrei Lankov writes | Image: Ministry of Defense of UkraineFROM IMPOSSIBLE TO JUST UNLIKELY
Perhaps decision-makers in the DPRK understand that absorbing the rich and populous South is not politically feasible. Contact between North and South Koreans would have a devastating ideological impact on DPRK commoners. But conquest followed by occupation and long-term direct control is not the only option available.
Consider what Russia wanted to achieve in Ukraine when it first launched its invasion, before it went hopelessly wrong. Moscow’s initial demands included demilitarization (read: disbandment of armed forces), denazification (read: control over politics and education, as well as the right to disband political parties, veto appointments and censor publications) and territorial concessions.
The same formula can work in Korea. Instead of raising the DPRK flag over Seoul, the victorious North will just demand demilitarization and control over vital parts of domestic politics, as well as economic tribute.
I do not consider this a high-probability scenario. Most likely, we will see neither North Korean tanks on Seoul streets nor Hwasong-17 missiles splashing down off the California coast as a show of force. However, this scenario has moved from the realm of “impossible” to “relatively unlikely,” and this is a big change.
This does not mean we should discard the possibility of a slow evolution toward a milder Chinese-style authoritarianism, regime collapse followed by unification or failed revolution followed by the establishment of a pro-Beijing puppet state. But in the current situation, we should take seriously a scenario in which North Korea changes little, remains highly repressive and becomes increasingly dangerous.
Not good news, perhaps. But good news is in short supply these days. We should adjust to the world we live in.
Edited by Bryan Betts
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