Nautilus Institute PFO 00-02: Engaging North Korea
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Engaging North Korea
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Recommended Citation"Nautilus Institute PFO 00-02:
NAPSNet Policy Forum
Recommended Citation"Nautilus Institute PFO 00-02:
Engaging North Korea", NAPSNet Policy Forum, April 12, 2000,
https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-policy-forum/nautilus-institute-pfo-00-02-engaging-north-korea-3/
PFO 00-02E: April 12, 2000
Discussion of “The What-If Question”
By Bradley Martin, Asia Times, Bangkok
Copyright (c) 2000 Nautilus of America/The Nautilus Institute
CONTENTS
I. Introduction
II. Comments on Essay by Bradley Martin1. Comments by Indong Oh
PFO 00-02E: April 12, 2000
Discussion of “The What-If Question”
By Bradley Martin, Asia Times, Bangkok
Copyright (c) 2000 Nautilus of America/The Nautilus Institute
CONTENTS
I. Introduction
II. Comments on Essay by Bradley Martin1. Comments by Indong Oh
March 15, 2000
I. Introduction
The following are two responses to Policy Forum Online 00-02C by Bradley Martin. The comments are by Dr. Indong Oh, MD, and Dr. Hwal-woong Lee of Korea-2000.
II. Comments on Essay by Bradley Martin
1. Comments by Indong Oh
From “The What-If Question” To What Is Better A Response to Bradley Martin’s Article
By Indong Oh, Korea-2000, Los Angeles
As an American observer of the current U.S. policy to both Koreas, I’d like to point out a couple of issues in Bradley Martin’s article. He correctly analyzed that “A South Korean move to oust the Americans seems, in the short term, less likely than a decision on the American side.”
That is the reason why I stressed the need for the U.S. to act, as it has always called the shots by itself according to changing American interest. Examples are the introduction and withdrawal of nuclear weapons in and out of South Korea, as well as the reversed decisions over the Nixon-Kissinger and Carter plans for U.S. troop withdrawal. Returning operational control of the South Korean military to the South Korean president would provide many options for a peace process in the Korean Peninsula. Once North Korea realizes that South Korea acts as its own boss, inter-Korean governmental dialogue can be promoted further, as the U.S. would like to see happen. It would also help pave the road for the implementation stage of the 1991 Basic Agreement between the North and South.
An ever-enlarging number of civic groups in various fields in South Korea are changing the mindset of South Koreans. When they awake from their illusions of North Korean invasion ingrained by 30-year long military dictators and by the U.S in recent years, they will realize who North Koreans are to them and the role of the U.S.
Mr. Martin’s comparison of the Korean problem to that of Taiwan and China is far from true. The U.S. did not fight directly against communist China for the nationalists as it did for S. Korea. The U.S. never invaded China as it did to North Korea to exterminate it. The U.S. has not deployed its troops directly against China as it has against North Korea and regularly carries out large-scale war exercises. Aspiration for unification of South and North Koreans is too great to be compared to that of China or Taiwan.
The “endgame” in the case of Korea started when the war ceased by armistice almost half a century ago. It simply has dragged on for too long. The U.S. can end the “endgame” without jeopardizing its interest in peace and stability in the North East Asia.
2. Comments by Hwal-Woong Lee
In Answer to “The What-If Question”
By Hwal-Woong Lee March 31, 2000
Asia Times’ Contributing Editor Bradley Martin’s article “The what-if question” represents a typical pro- USFSK (U.S. Forces in South Korea) theory which presupposes the following: 1) North Korea is a rogue regime and its leaders are villains; 2) Once U.S. troops are pulled out, the North will quickly attack the South; and 3) If attacked by the North, the South will not be able to sustain it.
For an equitable assessment of what North Korea and its leaders are about, a brief account of how Korea was divided and why the North initiated the Korean War may be in order. During the thirty-five years following the colonization by Japan in 1910, some Koreans collaborated with the Japanese. But most Koreans refused the Japanese rule and tried to overthrow it in one way or another. These patriotic movements were split into two factions: one resorted to armed resistance and the other favored diplomatic approach. The former group, with the help of Chinese and Soviet communists, kept fighting strenuously against the Japanese until the end of World War II, whereas the latter, with some minor exceptions, gradually succumbed to, and even collaborated with, the Japanese.
With the end of World War II, the U.S. divided the peninsula and proclaimed an anticommunist military government in the southern half. It then helped the coalition of right wing elements and pro-Japanese collaborators to establish the Seoul government. Unable to secure a political foothold in Seoul, the left wing elements, many of them by then sworn communists, set up the Pyongyang government with Soviet blessing. Thus, one Korea became two Koreas: one run by anti-Japanese and the other by pro-Japanese forces.
To North Korean leaders who had fought fiercely against the Japanese, their revolution was not over yet until the pro-Japanese collaborators in the Seoul government were eliminated. The Korean civil war thus erupted in 1950. To call North Korean leaders villains or thugs because they initiated the Korean War is, therefore, historically inapt. They certainly are enforcing dictatorship and harsh rules on their people. They certainly are engaged in weapons of mass destruction (WMD) projects while their people are starving. But how could they do otherwise if they are to defend themselves from the continuous menace of the U.S., the world’s strongest country that had once invaded their soil with the clear purpose of exterminating them from the earth? Under such circumstances, how long could they survive if they adopted a western style democracy?
Will North Korea attack the South as soon as the USFSK pulls out from the South? And will South Korea inexorably collapse when attacked by the North if the USFSK is not there? I don’t think so. But I know that there are people who think so, including some negatively brainwashed South Koreans. I, therefore, admit that it is important to devise some adequate means to ease such fear in order to bring about an actual withdrawal of the USFSK.
My proposal is two pronged. The first is that the withdrawal of the USFSK should be carried out simultaneously and in line with the mutual non- aggression pledges by the two Koreas and the U.S., accompanied by the substantial and verifiable arms reductions in the Korean peninsula, including North Korea’s renunciation of its WMD projects. This will preclude the possibility of both the recurrence of conflicts in the peninsula and the escalation of an arms race between the North and South. The second is that the peace and security in the post-USFSK Korean peninsula should be safeguarded and guaranteed by a regional security organization. Such an organization should be composed of the two Koreas, the U.S., China, Japan and Russia with a mission to oversee and guarantee, in a multilateral setting, the peace and security not only in the Korean peninsula but also in the region as a whole.
It is fallacious to think that there is peace maintained in the Korean peninsula thanks to the presence of USFSK. The truth is rather opposite. Most of all, the presence of USFSK is very much a factor contributing to the plight of the North Korean people. It also serves as the hotbed for South Korea’s political turmoil, social injustice and general corruption. Furthermore, it is the decisive factor that obstructs the opportunities for the Korean people to explore the possibility of peaceful reunification. The mere likelihood of U.S military intervention in case of China’s use of force has been effectively discouraging the chance of talks between Beijing and Taipei. Needless to say, the actual U.S. military presence in the Korean peninsula could in no way act as a contributing factor to Korean reunification.
It is unrealistic to expect a sustainable peace in Korea without realizing the reunification of the country. And, it is impossible to envision a permanent peace in East Asia without a sustainable peace in Korea. The U.S. policy to serve as a guarantor of peace in East Asia, therefore, should not be implemented in a fashion counteractive to the cause of Koreans long-held aspiration for reunification. A planned and phased pull out of the USFSK, accompanied by simultaneous and verifiable non-aggression pledges and arms reductions, will open the way for “Koreans themselves to traverse to the road of peace and reunification,” as former Secretary of State James A. Baker III once put it. This will not necessarily deprive the U.S. of its opportunity to play a role of guarantor of peace in East Asia. By sponsoring a regional conference of peace and security, the U.S. will be able to secure appropriate means of re-deploying its forces as a guarantor of regional security in some part of Asia, including Korea, with the consent of the countries of the region concerned.
III. Nautilus Invites Your Responses
The Northeast Asia Peace and Security Network invites your responses to this essay. Please send responses to: napsnet-reply@nautilus.org . Responses will be considered for redistribution to the network only if they include the author’s name, affiliation, and explicit consent.
Produced by The Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainable Development
Northeast Asia Peace and Security Project ( napsnet-reply@nautilus.org )
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FO 00-02C: March 15, 2000
The What-If Question
By Bradley Martin, Asia Times, Bangkok
Copyright (c) 2000 Nautilus of America/The Nautilus Institute
CONTENTS
I. Introduction
II. Essay by Bradley Martin
III. Nautilus Invites Your Responses
Discussion
Go to essay by Joel Wit
March 1, 2000
Go to essay by Indong Oh
March 2, 2000
Go to essay by James Cotton
March 29, 2000
I. Introduction
The following article is by Bradley Martin, Contributing Editor, Asia Times Online, Bangkok. Mr. Martin is currently working on a history of the DPRK. This article appeared on Asia Times Online .
Martin discusses the question of what would happen if the US were to withdraw its troops from the ROK. He warns that doing so would likely lead to an ROK arms buildup that could spark a regional arms race. He also argues that without the automatic intervention promised by US troop presence, the DPRK may decide to launch an invasion if it sees the US occupied elsewhere on the globe.
II. Essay by Bradley Martin
The what-if question By Bradley Martin
South Korea’s Defense Ministry for the first time has urged officially that the country prepare for a possible pullout of US troops by undertaking a military buildup – and, of course, by increasing the defense budget to finance such a buildup.
The proposal came in a report, “National Defense in the 21st Century and the Defense Budget,” posted on the ministry’s website.
The warnings, or urgings, of US troop withdrawal had been left to civilians previously, as The Korea Herald noted last week in a brief report on the ministry’s proposal. South Korean civilians used to do most of the warning, terrified as many of them were by the prospect of being abandoned by the United States. Advocacy of withdrawal was left largely to Americans leery of a costly commitment that they feared might lead their country into another Asian war.
Whether or not more South Korean civilians have been switching into the pro-withdrawal camp, those who are in the camp do seem more vocal lately. Two who are affiliated with the Los Angeles-based Korea 2000 reunification think tank, Lee Hwal-woong, a former South Korean diplomat, and Oh Indong, a physician, have recently published pro-withdrawal reports through the Nautilus Institute’s Northeast Asia Peace and Security Network. [Ed. note: See ” A Regional Approach to Korean Peninsula Security ” by Hwal-Woong Lee and ” Make South Korea the Real Party to North Korea ” by Indong Oh.]
Lee argued that the US troops’ continued presence in South Korea “prevents a comprehensive settlement of Korean Peninsula security issues.” He found it “absurd that South Korea, with twice the population and more than ten times the economic strength of the North, could not take care of its own security problems by itself and had to keep security forces on its soil for so long”.
In Oh’s view North Korea considers the South a US puppet and won’t negotiate seriously with Seoul until the US troops are gone. Like Lee, Oh believes that “it may not be necessary for the US to continue carrying South Korea, which has now become the twelfth largest economic power in the world”.
Oh said South Korea’s annual military budget of about $17 billion “is almost the same as North Korea’s entire GDP [gross domestic product]. Yet this $17 billion is only about 3 percent of South Korea’s GDP.” There are estimates that the North spends 28 percent of its GDP on the military, “yet the total is less than one-third of the South’s.”
No doubt many South Koreans chafe at having foreign troops on their soil. However, there appears as yet little evidence that their discomfort outweighs the sense of security South Koreans get from the frontline presence of the Americans. The GIs are a “tripwire” that would automatically bring American participation in any second Korean war launched by the North, and thus act as a powerful deterrent to invasion.
A South Korean move to oust the Americans thus seems, in the short term, less likely than a decision on the American side, such as former President Jimmy Carter made in 1977 and started to enforce before he was convinced of the error of his ways. Certainly today there are vocal American critics of the present US policy. See, for example, ” If the DPRK didn’t exist, it would be necessary to invent it ,” by Tim Savage of the Nautilus Institute.
The Clinton-Gore Administration is committed to the policies laid out in a report by William Perry, former defense secretary. Those policies contemplate keeping the troops in Korea for the time being. And on the Republican side, Governor George W Bush, who seems to have his party’s nomination locked up, is considered if anything more hawkish than Clinton-Gore.
Still, you never can tell when American opinion – or, for that matter, South Korean opinion – will start to shift decisively in the opposite direction. Thus we need to ask the what-if question: If the US did pull out, if the South Koreans did end up with all the responsibility for their own defense, who if anyone would be better off?
To frame the question a bit more solidly, let’s suppose Washington issued an ultimatum: “OK, South Korea, you build up so you can defend yourself alone. Do it within X number of years, and we’ll plan to leave at that point – that’s your deadline.”
It seems a reasonable assumption that South Korea could handle the economic costs of the military buildup that would ensue at that point. But the social costs might be more difficult. A big problem is that many of South Korea’s youngsters are not ready to fight – at least they are not ready to fight fanatically, as their brainwashed North Korean counterparts, according to many reports, are. North Korean military men who defected to the South have remarked on the softness they find in Southern youth.
A solution that involved essentially brainwashing the Southern youngsters to make them just as ferocious as their adversaries probably would be unpalatable in the relatively open society that has evolved in the South.
South Korean policymakers would be attracted to the view that the only way to be sure of beating North Korea would be to have cutting-edge, high-tech weaponry: missiles, maybe even biochemical weapons and nukes to cancel out the weapons of mass destruction that the North is believed to have. Make it a high-tech war if war ever comes, so that victory goes to the rich and technologically advanced side. Such an approach would have many adherents, now that NATO in Kosovo has shown the way to no-body-bags warfare.
South Korea to get to that point would have to become a major power, which in turn would have resounding implications for the regional situation. How would Japan react? China? Russia? Or North Korea itself, for that matter? Fear of a regional arms race would not be unreasonable.
How about Americans, across the Pacific? How would they be affected? Well, simply removing the troops would not exempt the US from being subjected to the threat of North Korea’s increasingly long-range missiles and the weapons of mass destruction that might eventually be affixed to them.
That’s because even with no troops in country the US-South Korean relationship almost surely would be like today’s US-Taiwan relationship. Many American friends of South Korea would be busy pressuring Washington – with considerable success – to help the longtime client resist communist aggression. Both on that account and because the US is a convenient bogeyman for use in keeping its domestic population under control, North Korea would continue in a basically hostile attitude.
The main difference would be that US intervention in a war would no longer be 100 percent inevitable and automatic. So North Korea, as long as it had some elements of military superiority, could harbor the hope that the time might come when the US would be occupied elsewhere and thus the chances of success in a southern invasion would be greater.
Would the removal of the US troops help to reconcile North and South, as Dr Oh hopes? There have been no US troops in Taiwan all these years. Are Taiwan and the mainland reconciled or about to be?
Donald Gregg, when he was American ambassador to South Korea a few years ago, advised against such a drastic change of strategy as troop withdrawal during what, in chess, is called the “endgame.” The endgame is still in progress and the ambassador’s advice still seems sound.
III. Nautilus Invites Your Responses
The Northeast Asia Peace and Security Network invites your responses to this essay. Please send responses to: napsnet-reply@nautilus.org . Responses will be considered for redistribution to the network only if they include the author’s name, affiliation, and explicit consent.
Produced by The Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainable Development
Northeast Asia Peace and Security Project ( napsnet-reply@nautilus.org )
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