Strengthening Understanding Through Dialogue
A Peacebuilding Approach to the Korean Peninsula Conflict
By Caroline Kearney · 2017
About this edition
Page count:85
Published:2017
Publisher:Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies
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"The aim of this paper is to provide an analysis of the Korean Peninsula Conflict.
In this paper, the 'Korean Peninsula Conflict' refers to the conflict between the governments of the United States (US) and the Republic of Korea (ROK) with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the People's Republic of China (PRC) that began with the split of Korea in 1945 and resulted in the Korean War in 1950.
The conflict has become protracted due to the inability of the governments to reach a peace agreement after the signing of a ceasefire agreement in 1953"
--Page 7
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Glossary.......................................................................................... 4
Acknowledgements ....................................................................... 5
Objective and Methodology ......................................................... 7
Overview........................................................................................ 9
The Conflict in Context............................................................... 13
Stakeholder Analysis: Key Conflict Actors & Interests .............. 21
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea....................................... 22
Republic of Korea................................................................. 23
United States....................................................................... 24
People’s Republic of China...................................................... 25
Key Driving Factors of Conflict................................................... 27
1. Punitive military and economic measures by the United States and
the Republic of Korea towards the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea........................................................................... 28
2. Weapons development and testing by the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea............................................................ 43
3. One-sided narratives subscribed to by parties to the conflict ........ 47
4. Economic and military competition between the United States and
the People’s Republic of China for influence in East Asia ............. 50
Leverage Points............................................................................ 59
ANNEX 1: Highlights of US - DPRK - ROK Relations: 1988 to 2016..72
ANNEX 2: United States’ Direct Threats or Implied Uses of
Nuclear Weapons against the Democratic People’s Republic
Korea: November 1950 – September 2016 .................................79
ANNEX 3: A review of interactions between the US and the
DPRK demonstrates a cycle of provocation: November 2015 to
December 2016............................................................................. 82
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3. One-sided narratives subscribed to by parties to the
conflict
As conflicts become protracted, narratives become increasingly simple.126
Over time, conflicting parties simplify narratives to justify their purpose and
to avoid any complexities or questions about their approach. This is equally
true in this conflict. Either due to issue fatigue, or simply because of its
protracted nature, narratives can settle and remain unchallenged, as they have
become around the Korean Peninsula Conflict.127
The story presented by the media in the US and the ROK is one of a “brutal,”
“paranoid” and “reclusive” North Korean regime led by an “erratic” leader
who starves and oppresses its people.128 The US government explains that
it intervened in the Korean War to save the people from communism. The
US must continue its military support to ensure the DPRK will not invade
the ROK and force it to reunify under its terms or reach the capacity to
send nuclear weapons to the US mainland.129 Media in the West and the
ROK routinely use two sets of images and videos when referring to the
DPRK and solely report on the country’s military actions and oppressive
nature of the government. The first type of image routinely circulated is of
Kim Jong Un surrounded by other military officials. The second is an eerily
empty Pyongyang with people walking briskly and uniformly to their next
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126 Sarah Cobb. A Narrative Perspective on Mediation: Toward the Materialization of the ‘Storytelling’ Metaphor. New
Directions in Mediation: Communication Research and Perspectives.(1994).
127 From the US government: ‘Paranoid’ North Korea won’t stop building nuclear weapons – US spy chief. The
Guardian. (26 October 2016). https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/26/paranoid-northkorea-wont-stop-building-nuclear-weapons-us-spy-chief
128 Brutal Killing Of N. Korea Military Chief Refects Kim Jong-Un’s Insecurity, High-Level Discontent. Forbes. (14
May 2015). https://www.forbes.com/sites/donaldkirk/2015/05/14/brutal-execution-of-n-koreamilitary-chief-reflects-kim-jong-uns-insecurity-high-level-discontent/#722dffa55c4a; ‘Paranoid’ North
Korea won’t stop building nuclear weapons – US spy chief. The Guardian. (26 October 2016).
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/26/paranoid-north-korea-wont-stop-buildingnuclear-weapons-us-spy-chief; Will Ripley, Justin Robertson and Tim Schwarz.
Inside North Korea, the world’s most reclusive country. CNN. (21 February 2017).
http://edition.cnn.com/2017/02/15/asia/north-korea-photos-video/; Sam Kim. North Korea Turns
More Erratic as Kim’s Inner Circle Shrinks. Bloomberg News. (13 January 2016).
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-01-13/north-korea-turns-more-erratic-as-kim-sinner-circle-shrinks; Park calls N.K. decision-making system ‘irrational’. Yonhap News Agency. (24 August
2016). http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2016/08/24/85/0301000000AEN201608240045
53315F.html
129 Jack Kim and Lesley Wroughton. U.S. warns of ‘other’ options if North Korea continues nuclear, missile tests.
Reuters. (26 April 2016).
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-missile-idUSKCN0XN0QQ
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destination.130 The nature of these reports and images lead to speculation that
Kim Jong Un is irrational, the only leader making decisions for the country,
and that everyday life for all North Korean people is controlled and miserable.
It shrouds the country and people in mystery and instils fear in the general
public about the leader and life in the country. There are various images and
stories demonstrating a normal, daily life for some people in the DPRK, but
they are not often acknowledged.131
The primary North Korean voices broadcasted are interviews with people
speaking in communist rhetoric defending their government to reporters.132
This is partly due to the fact that minders from the government monitor
interviews with North Korean people. There are few examples of nonpolitical, non-controversial conversations with North Korean people in
Western media. These may allow for a more nuanced perspective of North
Korean people and their daily life.
The narrative that has been created only allows the North Korean people to
have one of two identities - as the oppressed or as the oppressor. The public in
the US and the ROK have largely accepted this perception and have approved
of their governments’ punitive approach towards the DPRK. Any other
narrative or opinion is met with repudiation and the individual who presents
it is assumed to be ignorant of the situation in the DPRK, and is labelled a
“sympathiser” for the DPRK regime.133
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130 North Korea country profile.BBC News. (8 March 2017). http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asiapacific-15256929; North Korean leader urges nuclear readiness. BBC News. (4 March 2016).
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-35723070; On orders from Kim Jong-un, North Korea
launches more missiles. The Hankyoreh. (19 March 2016). http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_
edition/e_northkorea/735811.html; Stephen Chung. Why North Korea’s capital is the ‘perfect science
fiction film set.’ CNN. (9 September 2016). http://edition.cnn.com/2016/08/14/architecture/
pyongyang-architecture/
131 Jae Young Kim. The Good Parts To Life In North Korea. NK News. (2 October 2012).
https://www.nknews.org/2012/10/the-good-parts-to-life-in-north-korea-2/;
https://www.nknews.org/2016/06/the-good-things-in-north-korea/; Fyodor Tertitskiy. The good
things in North Korea ( 6 June 2016). https://www.nknews.org/2016/06/the-good-things-in-northkorea/; See Pictures by Will Ripley. Inside North Korea, the world’s most reclusive country. CNN. (21 February
2017). http://edition.cnn.com/2017/02/15/asia/north-korea-photos-video/; Specific pictures here:
https://www.instagram.com/p/BQkwFuQlv9P/, https://www.instagram.com/p/BQkd-qUl34A/,
https://www.instagram.com/p/BQsPWJegNx1/?taken-by=willripleycnn; N. Korean leader watches
volleyball match photo preview. European Press Agency. (7 November 2012).
http://www.epa.eu/politics-photos/government-photos/n-korean-leader-watches-volleyball-matchphotos-50587907
132 North Korea keeps media at distance for Workers’ Party Congress. CBS This Morning.
https://www.youtube.com/user/CBSThisMorning
133 S. Sonya Gwak. Be(com)ing Korean in the United States. (2008). See, Involvement in Korean Peninsula
Issues.
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Similarly, the DPRK government releases most of its statements in Cold
War-era communist rhetoric. In the DPRK’s depiction of the Korean War,
the US government rejected the desire of the Korean people to unify their
nation under a popularly elected communist government in the North.
The US military proceeded to invade the North and block unification of
the Koreas.134 The DPRK government describes the US government as evil
with the purpose to destroy the DPRK.135 The DPRK media has also used
ridicule and stereotypes to describe American and South Korean government
leaders.136 The DPRK media often refers to the ROK government as a weak,
puppet nation of the US government.137 The lack of a free press in the DPRK
means that these narratives remain unchallenged.138
On each side of the conflict, the governments identify themselves as the
only party making the moral and rational decisions, describing the other
as cruel, irrational and destructive. The rhetoric has become so hateful and
deeply rooted in the US, DPRK, and ROK that there is little space for any
other perspectives. However, conflicts, countries and the lives of people
are complex and are composed of many overlapping stories.139 Engaging
with a person, country, or conflict without engaging with the many stories
that comprise them will always lead to a one-sided understanding. People,
countries, and conflicts are more complex than a single story, and to fully
understand and properly analyse it is important to listen to and engage with
many perspectives, rather than adhere to a single narrative.
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134 Founding of the DPRK. Official Website of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.
http://www.korea-dpr.com/founding_dprk.html
135 Choe Sang-hun. North Korean Leader Assails American ‘Aggressors’. The New York Times. (25 November
2014).
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/26/world/asia/north-korean-leader-assails-americanaggressors.html
136 North Korea Insults Obama, Blames U.S. For Internet Outages. NBC News. (27 December 2014).
http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/sony-hack/north-korea-insults-obama-blames-u-s-internetoutages-n275401
137 DPRK calls South Korean security report “fg leaf ” to cover up inferiority. (4 April 2017). Xinhua News.
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-04/04/c_136182065.htm
138 North Korea Freedom of the Press 2016. Freedom House. (2017).
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2016/north-korea
139 Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie. The danger of a single story. TED Conferences. (July 2009).
https://www.ted.com/talks/chimamanda_adichie_the_danger_of_a_single_story?language=en
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4. Economic and military competition between the United
States and the People’s Republic of China for influence in
East Asia
The first three driving factors describe the current cycle of provocation.
However, the protracted nature of the conflict has yet to be addressed. There
is a clear power imbalance between the US – ROK alliance and the DPRK. The
US has demonstrated that it can act if it perceives an end to a conflict to be in
its best interest. On the one hand, the US has reversed decades-long policies
to normalise relations with Cuba, Myanmar, and Iran. On the other hand,
the US has resorted to military intervention to overthrow regimes, such as in
Libya and Iraq. Therefore, it is worth asking why the US has not yet been able
to resolve the Korean Peninsula Conflict. Whether calculated or unintentional,
the conflict with the DPRK is affected by US interests, in particular, US
competition with the PRC for power and influence in Northeast Asia.
Economic Dynamics
In 2010, the PRC became the world’s second-largest economy, with a growing
military to match. The PRC’s economic growth has brought it into a new
and complex relationship with the US, where the two countries both overtly
compete and cooperate economically while each side covertly competes for
strategic military advantage over the other.140
In response to the PRC’s economic and military growth, the US implemented
a policy described as a “rebalance” or “pivot” to Asia in 2011, in order to
strengthen American political, military and economic influence in the
region by seeking new trade deals with countries in the region as well as
by transferring military equipment and personnel from the Middle East to
East Asia.141 In 2014, Daniel Russel, US Assistant Secretary of State for East
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140 Jennifer M. Harris. America’s Fatal Flaw in its Competition With China Is Thinking Militarily, Not Economically.
Council of Foreign Relations. (18 April 2016). http://www.cfr.org/china/americas-fatal-flaw-itscompetition-china-thinking-militarily-not-economically/p37781; Matthew P. Goodman. Cooperate and
Compete: Getting the Most out of U.S.-China Economic Relations. Center for Strategic & International Studies.
(5 February 2013). https://www.csis.org/analysis/cooperate-and-compete-getting-most-out-us-chinaeconomic-relations
141 Pivot to the Pacifc? The Obama Administration’s “Rebalancing” Toward Asia. Congressional Research Service.
(28 March 2012). https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42448.pdf
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Asian and Pacific Affairs, made the following statement before the US Senate
regarding the implementation of the policy, “the United States has been, we
are and we will remain a Pacific power.”142
The US and the PRC economically cooperate through trade and participation
in high-level informal and formal dialogue mechanisms. The best example is
the China – US Strategic and Economic Dialogue, an annual meeting where
the two countries discuss regional and global strategic and economic issues.143
In regards to trade, the PRC is the US’ second largest trading partner and its
largest source of imports, which contributes to economic growth in both
countries.144
The economic frustrations that exist between the US and the PRC are largely
based on the US government’s disapproval of the PRC’s economic and trade
practices. The PRC is in the process of restructuring its economy and selfdescribes as a socialist-market economy, allowing free market forces to
determine some areas of economic growth, while allowing the government
to play a major role in other areas.145 Many of the PRC’s leading companies
are state-owned and receive preferential treatment by the government over
non state-owned companies, including US companies doing business in and
with the PRC. The US views this intervention as an overreach by the PRC
government and a distortion to their economy because it restrains the US from
fully participating and benefitting in the world’s second largest economy.146
The US and the PRC also compete for economic influence and power in
East Asia. In addition to the PRC, three out of ten of the US’ primary trade
partners are in the region, including Japan, ROK and Hong Kong, which
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142 Opportunities and Challenges in the U.S.-Japan and U.S.-Republic of Korea Alliances. Testimony by Daniel R.
Russel, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacifc Affairs, Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
Official Website of the US Department of State.(4 March 2014).
https://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2014/03/222903.htm
143 U.S.-China Strategic & Economic Dialogue Outcomes of the Strategic Track. U.S. Department of State. (7 June
2016). https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2016/06/258146.htm
144 Wayne M. Morrison. China-U.S. Trade. Congressional Research Service. (4 January 2017).
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33536.pdf
145 Wayne M. Morrison. China’s Economic Rise: History, Trends, Challenges, and Implications for the United States.
Congressional Research Service. (21 October 2015).
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33534.pdf
146 Wayne M. Morrison. China-U.S. Trade. Congressional Research Service. p. 26. (4 January 2017).
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33536.pdf
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provide the US with substantial influence in East Asia.147 Further, Asia is the
fastest growing economic region in the world, and Southeast Asian countries
such as the Philippines and Vietnam are quickly increasing their role and
influence as important economic actors. The US fears that PRC economic
dominance will translate to fewer Asian economies depending on and
modelling their economic practices after the US, and instead looking to the
PRC.148 As a result, the US attempts to contain the PRC’s economic influence
by maintaining close ties with existing allies, such as with the ROK and Japan,
and building solid economic relationships with new allies.
Military Dynamics
The strategic military competition is seen most obviously in the PRC’s
attempt to claim most of the South China Sea and the strong opposition
from the US in response to the claim. The PRC’s legal interpretation of its
jurisdiction challenges the US’ current freedom of navigation and overflight
practices in what it views as international waters. Additionally, the PRC’s
maritime claim overrides the claims of US government allies in the region,
including Japan, Taiwan, Vietnam and the Philippines.149
The PRC has built airstrips and military bases on several atolls or islands
within the 9-Dash Line and, along with other claimants, has increased traffic
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147 Top U.S. Trade Partners. U.S. Department of Commerce, Census Bureau, Economic Indicators Division.
2015.
http://www.trade.gov/mas/ian/build/groups/public/@tg_ian/documents/webcontent/tg_
ian_003364.pdf
148 US President Barack Obama is quoted as stating, “[t]he fastest-growing markets, the most populous
markers, are going to be in Asia, and if we do not help to shape the rules so that our businesses and
our workers can compete in those markets, then China will set up the rules that advantage Chinese
workers and Chinese businesses.” Representative Dave G. Reichert (R-WA) stated, “[t]his is really about
a crossroads for America and its leadership for the world,”. “We set the tone, we set the path for the global
economy by being leaders. And if we don’t, other countries step in.”
Jonathan Weisman. At Global Economic Gathering, U.S. Primacy Is Seen as Ebbing. The New York Times. (18
April 2015).
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/18/business/international/at-global-economic-gatheringconcerns-that-us-is-ceding-its-leadership-role.html?_r=0; America’s Role in Asia. The Asia Foundation.
(2008).http://www.asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/AmericasRoleinAsia2008.pdf; Peter Apps. As
U.S. influence in Asia falters, allies increasingly look to themselves. Reuters.(31 July 2015).
http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2015/07/31/u-s-influence-in-asia-is-faltering/
149 Jeffrey Bader, Kenneth Lieberthal, and Michael McDevitt. Keeping the South China Sea in Perspective. The
Brookings Institution. (August 2014)
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2014/08/south-china-sea-perspectivebader-lieberthal-mcdevitt/south-china-sea-perspective-bader-lieberthal-mcdevitt.pdf
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of fishing boats, coastal patrols and naval ships in the contested waters.150 The
US response can be seen through the increase of naval and defence systems in
East Asia as well as “freedom of navigation” naval patrols which involve passing
closely by PRC - held islands.151 Much of the US activity is possible due to the
US policy shift to Asia and the transfer of military personnel and equipment
from the Middle East to the East Asia region.
The US military is also responding to the PRC’s maritime claims and military
growth by maintaining and expanding its presence throughout the East Asian
region. In 2015 and 2016, the US negotiated the re-opening of the US Subic
Bay Naval Base in the Philippines – a base which was closed by the Philippines
government in 1992 - and gained access to five other military bases in
the country.152 The US is also sending troops and combat aircraft to the
Philippines for “regular, more frequent rotations and will conduct more joint
sea and air patrols with Philippine forces in the South China Sea.”153 Further,
the US has made arrangements with Vietnam and Cambodia to stockpile US
military equipment in both countries due to the advantage of their geographic
location.154 The US is also increasing, or in the process of talks to increase, its
military personnel and equipment in Australia, Singapore, and Guam.155
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150 Yi-Hsuan Chen. South China Sea Tension on Fire: China’s Recent Moves on Building Artifcial Islands in Troubled
Waters and Their Implications on Maritime Law. Maritime Safety and Security Law Journal, 1, 8-9. (January
2015). http://www.marsafelawjournal.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/ 08/Issue1_Chen_Article.pdf;
China’s Maritime Disputes. Council on Foreign Relations. (2017).http://www.cfr.org/asia-and-pacific/ chinas-maritime-disputes/p31345#!/ p31345
151 Ben Blanchard. U.S. says its forces will keep operating in South China Sea. Reuters. (20 July 2016).
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-southchinasea-ruling-usa-idUSKCN1000PD
152 Philippines To Re-open Former US Military Base. Defense News. (16 July 2015). http://www.defensenews.
com/story/defense/international/asia-pacific/2015/07/16/philippines-re-open-former-us-militarybase/30273327/; Andrew Tilghman. The U.S. military is moving into these 5 bases in the Philippines. Military
Times. (21 March 2016). http://www.militarytimes.com/story/military/2016/03/21/us-plans-usefive-new-bases-philippines/82072138/
153 Joint Press Conference by Secretary Carter and Secretary Gazmin in Manila, Philippines. US Department
of Defense. (14 April 2016). https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript-View/
Article/721687/joint-press-conference-by-secretary-carter-and-secretary-gazmin-in-manila-phili
154 Dan Lamothe. These are the bases the U.S. will use near the South China Sea. China isn’t impressed. The Washington
Post. (21 March 2016). https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2016/03/21/
these-are-the-new-u-s-military-bases-near-the-south-china-sea-china-isnt-impressed/?utm_
term=.6a5101625661; Franz-Stefan Gady. Deterring China: US Army to Stockpile Equipment in Cambodia
and Vietnam. The Diplomat. (18 March 2016). http://thediplomat.com/2016/03/deterring-china-usarmy-to-stockpile-equipment-in-cambodia-and-vietnam/
155 U.S. enters talks with Australia on increasing military presence in northern Australia. Xinhua News. (9 March
2016). http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-03/09/c_135169537.htm; US to base four warships in
Singapore as China fexes military muscles. The Guardian. (18 February 2015). https://www.theguardian.
com/world/2015/feb/18/us-to-base-four-warships-in-singapore-as-china-flexes-military-muscles;
Anna Fifield. Some in Guam push for independence from U.S. as Marines prepare for buildup. The Washington
Post. (17 June 2016). https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/some-in-guam-pushfor-independence-from-us-as-marines-prepare-for-buildup/2016/06/16/e6152bd2-324b-11e6-ab9d1da2b0f24f93_story.html
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The maintenance of an American military presence can also be seen
throughout Northeast Asia as 50,000 military personnel remain in Japan and
Okinawa 70 years after the end of World War II, and 28,500 US military
personnel are stationed in the ROK 60 years after the end of the Korean
War.156 At this point, US military bases completely surround the PRC, as
shown in the map on the next page.
The US military presence in Northeast Asia has not come without
controversy. US troops in Japan and the ROK have been unpopular with
some of the immediate local population surrounding the bases in both
countries due to environmental degradation and poor behaviour displayed by
some American troops.157 There have been several demonstrations in Japan
against US bases and the attempt to build a new military seaport in Okinawa.
Similarly, South Korean protesters have denounced a new deal to expand and
relocate US military bases from central Seoul to Pyeongtaek, ROK.158 While
there has been pressure on the governments of Japan and the ROK from
some of these communities to annul existing military agreements or deny
new agreements for US troops and expanded bases, the majority of both
populations are, and have been, in support of a military alliance with the US
due to security concerns from the DPRK and the PRC.
156 Emma Chanlett-Avery and Ian Rinehart. The U.S. Military Presence in Okinawa and the Futenma Base Controversy
Congressional Research Service. (16 January 2016).
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42645.pdf; Defense Manpower Data Center. U.S.
Department of Defense. (30 September 2015). https://www.dmdc.osd.mil/appj/dwp/rest/
download?fileName=DRS_54601_309_Report_P1509.xlsx&groupName=milRegionCountry
157 Jon Mitchell. Contamination: Documents reveal hundreds of unreported environmental accidents at
three U.S. Marine Corps bases on Okinawa. The Japan Times. (19 November 2016).
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/11/19/national/contamination-documents-reveal-threeu-s-bases-okinawa-slow-disclose-environmental-accidents/#.WNHu7nR973A; Jonathan Taylor.
Environment and Security Conflicts: The U.S. Military in Okinawa. California State University – Fullerton.
http://www.gammathetaupsilon.org/the-geographical-bulletin/2000s/volume48-1/article1.pdf;
Andrew Yeo. (14 June 2010); Anti-Base Movements in South Korea: Comparative Perspective on the AsiaPacific. The Asia-Pacific Journal, 8 (24) 2. 4. (13 May 2006); Medea Benjamin. Pave Paradise, Put Up a
Naval Base: South Korean Activists’ Extraordinary Struggle to Save Jeju Island. The World Post.
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/medea-benjamin/jeju-island_b_7469736.html
158 Minami Funakoshi. Thousands in Japan rally against U.S. base on Okinawa. Reuters. (21 February 2016).
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-japan-politics-okinawa-idUSKCN0VU0BGl; Andrew Yeo. (14 June
2010); Anti-Base Movements in South Korea: Comparative Perspective on the Asia-Pacific. The Asia-Pacific
Journal, 8 (24) 2. 4; (13 May 2006). Thousands rally against U.S. base relocation plan. APArchive.
http://www.aparchive.com/metadata/youtube/f47b0b6cea40f2fd9d5f503e293dae53
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Results of a 2016 AP Poll demonstrated a rise in overall Japanese support
over the past six years for American military bases “as fears spread that
neighbouring China and North Korea are threats to peace.”159 Polls conducted
from 1997 to 2014 indicate a positive attitude by the majority of South Korean
citizens towards the US – ROK military alliance, reaching an all-time high in
2014.160 Polls also show that the majority of South Koreans believe it necessary
to maintain the military alliance even in the case of Korean reunification to
guard against threats posed by others in the region, likely the PRC.
The US military maintains that its presence in the ROK and Japan is due to
security concerns about the DPRK’s weapons development and testing, as
well as the PRC’s growing military strength and maritime claims. The US
both capitalises on this opportunity and amplifies actions by governments
in Pyongyang and Beijing in order to maintain its presence.161 As tensions
rise over the DPRK’s missile launches and nuclear tests, any demands for US
troops to leave the ROK and Japan become overwhelmed by the perceived
need for increased protection and closer cooperation with the US military.
The US - ROK agreement to deploy THAAD to the ROK is a prime example.
The deployment of THAAD contributes to the arms race in Northeast Asia
and gives the US military missile surveillance capabilities in the region,
nevertheless, it is proceeding after years of US pressure and as a response to
actions by the DPRK considered provocative.
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159 Malcolm Foster. Support for keeping US bases in Japan grows as China, N. Korea seen as threats. Associated
Press – GfK Poll. (5 September 2016).
http://ap-gfkpoll.com/featured/ap-gfk-poll-support-for-keeping-us-bases-in-japan-grows-as-chinankorea-seen-as-threats
160 Eric V. Larson, Norman D. Levin, Seonhae Baik and Bogdan Savych. Ambivalent Allies? A Study of South
Korean Attitudes Toward the U.S. Rand Corporation. (March 2004).
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/technical_reports/2005/RAND_TR141.pdf; Kyutoi Moon. South Korean Public Opinion Trends and Effects on the ROK-U.S. Alliance. Center for U.S.-Korea
Policy. (February 2011).https://asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/MoonPubilcOpinion.pdf; South
Korean Attitudes on the Korea-US Alliance and Northeast Asia. The ASAN Institute for Policy Studies. (24
April 2014).
http://en.asaninst.org/contents/asan-report-south-korean-attitudes-on-the-korea-us-alliance-andnortheast-asia/
161 Leo Shane III. Incoming Joint Chiefs chairman calls Russia, China top threats. Military Times. (9 July 2015).
http://www.militarytimes.com/story/military/capitol-hill/2015/07/09/dunford-confirmationhearing-russia-china-top-threats-joint-chiefs-of-staff-chairman/29912233/
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The US government’s primary concern in Northeast Asia is to maintain
influence against a rising PRC. The PRC, on the other hand, recognises that
US presence on its Eastern border is a possible threat to its security.162 With
the US and other Northeast Asian states acting out of fear of a possible DPRK
nuclear or missile attack, the US is able to maintain and justify a significant
military presence throughout the region. These cycles of competition, both
military and economic, between the US and the PRC do affect the Korean
Peninsula Conflict and, in some cases, prolong it.
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162 An article by The People’s Daily China states: “The goal of the US pivot’s redeployment of 50 to 60
percent of the US Navy’s fleet by 2020 to contain China and sever what China calls the “Maritime Silk
Road,” is now at risk.” China’s economic lure outshines US military bases in Asia. The People’s Daily. (11
November 2016).
http://en.people.cn/n3/2016/1111/c90000-9140296.html
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LEVERAGE POINTS
This section attempts to identify elements of the conflict dynamics from
this analysis that can be leveraged to influence the conflict and transform
current tensions. In order for transformation to occur, one of the conflict
parties will have to take the first step to break the cycle of provocation
and demonstrate a commitment to peace. Both the DPRK and the US
are positioned to transform the conflict towards peaceful and productive
relationships. However, there is an imbalance between the US and the DPRK
in terms of political and economic influence as well as military capacity and
size.163 The US is the more powerful and influential country, and with power
and influence comes responsibility. As such, this section will emphasise
actions the US can take.
The structure of the leverage points places the responsibility to act first
with the US, while acknowledging the necessity for equal and cooperative
responses from the DPRK.
The leverage points are as follows:
1. Engage with the government of the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea and address disputes through dialogue and negotiation.
2. Adopt long-term perspectives and realistic expectations for progress
and change in the confict.
3. Elevate and listen to alternative narratives to understand the
complexities of the confict and humanize North Koreans.
4. Understand and acknowledge the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea’s national priorities and perspectives while engaging with
them.
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163 World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 2015. U.S. Department of State. (December 2015).
http://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/rpt/wmeat/2015/; World Economic Outlook (WEO) Update,
A Shifting Global Economic Landscape. International Monetary Fund. (January 2017).
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2017/update/01/index.htm;
Joseph S. Nye Jr. Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics. (27 April 2005).
http://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/files/joe_nye_wielding_soft_power.pdf
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5. Approach all parties to the confict with impartiality by responding
to contributions to the cycle of provocations in an equal and balanced
way.
6. Engage in diplomatic activities with the government of the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to build the confdence
required to establish sustainable diplomatic relationships with the
country.
6. Integrate the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s economy into
the global economy to infuence the government and the people,
improve the quality of life for North Korean people, and gain leverage
for negotiation.
7. Acknowledge the merging of the disputes between the United States
and the People’s Republic of China with the confict between the
United States and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and
make a conscious decision to separate them.
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1. Engage with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
and address disputes through dialogue and negotiation.
The first step to determine the best way to approach this conflict is to begin
by defining the long-term desired scenario.164 This section will define the
long-term desired scenario and divide it into three time frames for clarity.
It will then proceed to review the three possible options that can be taken
going forward. The way to determine the best path forward will be at the
intersection of one of the options with the desired long-term scenario.
The first time frame is based on what could reasonably be achieved within the
next twelve months. It is reasonable to assume that some military provocations
between the conflicting parties could be halted, for example, cancelling US
- ROK joint military exercises geared towards the DPRK, in exchange for a
freeze of the DPRK’s nuclear programme. Additionally, the easing of some
punitive economic measures could occur, especially those not directly related
to the DPRK’s nuclear programme.
The second time frame is what could occur over the next five to ten years.
This time frame would include the continued easing of military and economic
measures and provocations, as well as diplomatic dialogue to achieve
peaceful relations. This transition should be non-violent in nature and focus
on discussing ways to move into long-term peaceful relations between the
conflict parties.
The long-term scenario would occur over the next 15 to 20 years, and
involves establishing stable and functional diplomatic relations and economic
cooperation between all four parties to the conflict. This, in turn, would
lead to free flow of travel for all Koreans across the peninsula and begin
the process of establishing a nuclear-free Korean peninsula. The DPRK has
stated that it will not dismantle its nuclear programme as long as they see
---
164 The focus on a long-term desired scenario is based on the CDA Collaborative Analysis on the Syrian
Conflict and has been adapted for this analysis on the Korean Peninsula Conflict. The Syrian confict: A
system confict analysis. CDA Collaborative. (February 2016).
http://cdacollaborative.org/publication/the-syrian-conflict-a-systems-conflict-analysis/
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any direct or indirect threats from another nuclear capable state. However,
it is possible that following 15 to 20 years of trust and relationship building
between the US and the DPRK, the leadership may feel sufficiently secure to
begin denuclearisation.
The next step is to determine how to achieve the long-term time frame by
reviewing three options for going forward. The first option is to maintain the
status quo – to continue to place economic, political, and military pressure,
and punitive measures on the DPRK and wait for the government to alter
their policies or collapse. This option does not resolve any of the problems
affecting Korean, American, or Chinese people or governments party to
the conflict. It merely prolongs the conflict and exacerbates tension that
risks a nuclear conflict. There has been an assumption by recent US and
ROK administrations that the DPRK leadership will eventually concede and
meet their requests if sufficient sanctions and pressure are placed on the
government. However, history has demonstrated that sanctions only provoke
and further isolate the DPRK. Also, the DPRK has adapted and survived
under trying and difficult circumstances, and has developed methods to
circumvent sanctions to ensure, at the very least, that the elite in society
remain unaffected.165 Furthermore, depending on a collapse of a government
as a strategy carries an inherent risk, as any collapse would result in unknown
and unforeseen consequences, such as violence and regional instability.
As the status quo maintains the current, unacceptable conditions of the conflict,
a second option can be reviewed. This would involve military intervention
to resolve the conflict, forcing the capitulation of one government. Military
intervention entails violent actions, therefore, this option is also unacceptable
as it does not peacefully resolve the Korean Peninsula Conflict. Any resort
to military force can only result in the loss of human lives and sentiments of
anger instead of building positive and functional relationships. The desired,
long-term scenario involves a peaceful transition, thus military action does
not converge with this scenario.
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165 The famine in the DPRK from 1995-1999 resulted in the deaths of approximately one million people.
The legitimacy of the government did not waiver during the famine or in the aftermath. Stephan Haggard
and Marcus Noland. Famine in North Korea: Markets, Aid, and Reform. Columbia University Press. (2007).
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The third and final option is to engage with the DPRK government and
resolve on-going disputes through dialogue and negotiation. This is the only
option that does not intensify or prolong the state of the conflict, or risk
shifting it into a violent conflict. If a constant communication channel can
be kept open and both sides work towards understanding the other, then
misunderstandings are less likely and progress towards functional diplomatic
relations is more likely. Based on the long-term desired outcome for the
conflict, engagement with the DPRK is the only way forward.
The argument has been made that engagement has already been attempted in
the past but has always failed because one party did not keep up their side of
the agreement. To break the cycle of provocation in this conflict, one party
will have to lead and demonstrate an unwavering commitment to peace no
matter the perceived provocation from the other side. To reach the desired,
positive scenario, each party cannot become preoccupied with short-term
goals or saving face, but must develop and maintain a long-term vision of
peace for the Korean peninsula and the sustainable diplomatic relations
between its governments.
Additionally, there is historical precedent, as well as recent requests from
the DPRK, indicating that attempts at engagement with the DPRK have the
potential to be successful.166 The DPRK also has political, economic, and
security incentives to normalise diplomatic relations with the US, which
should be taken into consideration. The only way for the US and other
external actors to strengthen their understanding of the DPRK’s perspective
in order to address the on-going conflict is to engage with DPRK government
officials.
166 See Annex 1
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2. Adopt long-term perspectives and realistic expectations
for progress and change in the conflict.
All parties to the conflict should adopt long-term perspectives, keeping in
mind the desired scenario for transforming the conflict over 20 years, when
determining ways to move forward. For example, the US government has
stated that it cannot accept the DPRK as a nuclear power. However, the
Obama administration’s practice of “strategic patience” has also resulted in
the DPRK maintaining its nuclear capability. Shifting from the decision that
the DPRK must immediately denuclearise before negotiations can begin to
the decision to talk due to an agreement to freeze their nuclear programme
does not accept the DPRK as a nuclear power, yet adheres to the long-term
vision. Initially, relationships and trust need to be established before such
change can be expected.
3. Elevate and listen to alternative narratives to understand
the complexities of the conflict and humanize North
Koreans.
Alternative perspectives, including unheard and less heard voices, should be
elevated to deepen understanding of the conflict and those affected by the
conflict. All conflict parties have the opportunity to practice empathy, listen
to the opposing argument, and allow for additional voices to be heard.
There are North Korean voices missing in the current narrative. The US and
ROK governments and media are elevating voices of North Koreans who
emigrated from the DPRK after experiencing harsh and unusual punishment by
the government. These stories are crucial to understanding the experience of
those North Koreans who have suffered maltreatment under the government
and their voices should continue to be elevated and understood.
These voices are not, however, replacements for people currently living in the
DPRK or for economic migrants who have left the country. There are North
Koreans who are aware of economic progress and other forms of governance
around the world and remain proud of their society’s accomplishments and
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prefer to live in the DPRK.167 There are also North Koreans who used to
live in the DPRK and left to seek an improvement in living standards but
not to defect from the government. To ignore, suppress, or deny validity to
these voices is problematic and creates a singular narrative. It is necessary to
acknowledge and provide dignity to the North Korean people who have not
and do not wish to leave their country.
Additionally, the DPRK government does provide some services to their
people and the overall standard of living is improving, particularly in
Pyongyang.168 The DPRK provides universal healthcare and the physician-topatient ratio is on par with high-income countries at 33 physicians per 10,000
persons.169 Malnutrition has declined and food production has advanced. The
economy is growing slowly but steadily and access to information and foreign
media has improved. Additionally, Pyongyang residents are increasingly able
to afford consumer goods, such as televisions and cell phones.170
4. Understand and acknowledge the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea’s national priorities and perspectives
while engaging with them.
One of the obstacles in the DPRK’s relationship with the US and the ROK
are the human rights structures within their own countries and the mandates
that have been created within the UN system to monitor human rights in the
DPRK. The UN structures created to focus on these issues are the Office of
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167 A 2017 Study by Beyond Parallel reported that 91.6 percent of North Koreans they interacted with have
access to foreign media at least once per month. Information and Its Consequences in North Korea. Beyond
Parallel. Center for Strategic and International Studies. (12 January 2017). http://beyondparallel.csis.
org/information-and-its-consequences-in-north-korea/; Based on conversations CPCS held with peace
specialists who work with DPRK officials abroad and those who oversee programs inside the DPRK, the
North Korean citizens they spoke with are aware of the advanced economic status and democratic political
systems in the ROK, US and other countries, and prefer to remain living in their home country.
168 A North Korea Primer for 2017 U.S. Policy Makers 3rd Edition. National Committee on North Korea. (March
2017). http://www.ncnk.org/resources/publications/NCNK_NK_Primer_Mar2017_FINAL.pdf
169 Physicians per 1,000 People. World Health Organization’s Global Health Workforce Statistics, OECD,
supplemented by country data. The World Bank. 2011. http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.MED.
PHYS.ZS
170 A North Korea Primer for 2017 Policy Makers. The National Committee on North Korea. (15 September
2015). http://www.ncnk.org/resources/News-archive/2016-news-archive/a-north-korea-primerfor-2017-policy-makers; Yoon Ja-young. One out of 10 North Koreans using mobile phones. The Korea Times.
(15 December 2015). http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/biz/2015/12/488_193240.html;
Statistics Korea. http://kostat.go.kr/portal/eng/index.action
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the High Commissioner on Human Rights (OHCHR) with offices in Geneva
and Seoul, the Special Rapporteur for Human Rights in the DPRK and two
independent experts on accountability which have been appointed to assist
the Special Rapporteur.171
These UN bodies cite human rights violations of individuals who used to live
in the DPRK. Their mandate is to simultaneously assign accountability for the
alleged violations and engage with the DPRK leadership to advise them on
improving conditions.172 The DPRK has rejected the validity of these bodies
and has so far refused to allow them entry into the country stating that they
fundamentally disagree with their purpose and approach.173
The DPRK claims that these human rights bodies attempt to infringe upon
their sovereignty and impose values on them and their citizens which are not
their own. As identified in this analysis, the highest priorities of the DPRK
are maintenance of sovereignty and national security. From the DPRK’s
perspective, this approach would be seen as a violation of their primary
interests.
The DPRK claims that they fully guarantee basic human rights based on their
way of governance involving socialist and Juche values, and the Asian concept
of human rights.174 The declared human rights focus in the DPRK is on the
community, and for the whole of the nation to progress economically, rather
than a focus on civil and political rights as defined by the US, the UN and
other countries.
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171 Democratic People´s Republic of Korea Homepage. United Nations Human Rights. Office of the High
Commissioner. (2017).
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Countries/AsiaRegion/Pages/KPIndex.aspx
172 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.
United Nations Human Rights Council. (22 February 2017).
173 Statement by H.E. Mr. Ri Yong Ho, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Democratic People’s Republic of Korea at the United
Nations General Assembly. United Nations Official Website. (23 September 2016).
https://gadebate.un.org/en/71/democratic-peoples-republic-korea
174 Grace Kim. Questioning the Universal Declaration: North Korea’s case. Asia Times. (4 February 2017).
http://www.atimes.com/questioning-universal-document-case-north-korea/
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It is not necessary for the US, the ROK, or UN human rights groups or other
parties attempting to engage with the DPRK to agree with their perspective
on human rights. However, as the situation has become stalled, it would be
constructive to engage with the DPRK by acknowledging and understanding
their point of view. Within this space, the DPRK will need to engage with the
US, the ROK and UN human rights groups understanding their perspective
on human rights as well.
Another reason progress cannot be made between these parties on this issue
is because human rights issues in the DPRK is not a singular issue separate
from the other factors of the conflict. Neither is it a root cause of the conflict.
Rather, it is a consequence of those causes and factors that fuel the conflict.
For example, part of the reason the DPRK restricts the freedom of its people
is out of the concern and fear that has built up within the leadership since the
division of Korea. The root causes of the conflict should be addressed so that
human rights issues in the DPRK may also be addressed.
5. Approach all parties to the conflict with impartiality by
responding to contributions to the cycle of provocations
with an equal and balanced response.
Based on this analysis, both sides of the conflict are contributing to the cycle
of provocation. Therefore, international bodies such at the United Nations
are in a position to react to both sides of the conflict in a balanced manner.
All conflict parties should be approached with the same method - either with
punitive measures or diplomatic engagement to convince them to withdraw
or alter their contributions to the conflict.
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6. Engage in diplomatic activities with the government of
the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to build the
confidence required to establish sustainable diplomatic
relationships with the country.
As a first step, the US government can begin by engaging in diplomatic
activities such as government funded people-to-people exchanges between
the US and the DPRK.175 This option would not require any major changes
to existing policy or sanctions and can be included in the US North Korean
Human Rights Act. In this way, “diplomats and officials can go through lowstakes ‘dry-runs’ of cooperation” and “elevate these diplomatic capacities to
higher-level dialogues when the time comes.” 176
People-to-people sports and cultural exchange projects should be encouraged
to help to humanize North Koreans to the rest of the world, and vice versa. The
path to normalised relations with Myanmar, Cuba, Iran, the PRC, and Russia
were all preceded by government-sponsored people-to-people exchanges.177
These exchanges are not presently being conducted with the DPRK but can
deepen understanding between the people of these two nations.
On June 23, 2016, US Representatives Charles Rangel (D-NY), John Conyers
(D-MI), and Sam Johnson (R-TX) introduced House Resolution 799, calling
for the US government to resume talks with the DPRK to recover thousands
of US service members who remained unaccounted for at the end of the
Korean War.178 Earlier that month, Senator Mark Kirk (R-IL) introduced a
resolution encouraging reunions of Korean-Americans with their family
members in the DPRK, which would “constitute a positive humanitarian
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175 One example of this type of opportunity is the US government’s International Visitor Leadership
Program (IVLP) as pointed to by the American Friends Service Committee. Daniel Jasper. Engaging North
Korea Building toward dialogue with U.S. government-sponsored people-to-people exchange programs. American
Friends Service Committee. (June 2016). https://www.afsc.org/sites/afsc.civicactions.net/files/
documents/Engaging%20North%20Korea_WEB.pdf
176 Daniel Jasper. “Engagement Games:” Obama’s Last Chance with North Korea. Zoom in Korea. (9 September
2016). http://www.zoominkorea.org/engagement-games-obamas-last-chance-with-north-korea/
177 Daniel Jasper. Engaging North Korea Building toward dialogue with U.S. government-sponsored people-to-people
exchange programs. American Friends Service Committee. (June 2016).
https://www.afsc.org/sites/afsc.civicactions.net/files/documents/Engaging%20North%20Korea_
WEB.pdf
178 Recent Legislation on North Korea. The National Committee on North Korea.(30 June 2016).
http://www.ncnk.org/
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gesture by North Korea and contribute to the long-term goal of peace on the
Korean peninsula shared by the governments of North Korea, South Korea,
and the United States.”179
7. Integrate the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
economy into the global economy to influence the
government and the people, improve the quality of life for
North Korean people, and gain leverage for negotiation.
After national sovereignty and security, DPRK Leader Kim Jong Un defined
the country’s next priority as growing its economy. This is an opportunity to
work with the government and improve the quality of life for North Korean
people. The DPRK economy has steadily grown since 2000.180 In order to
decrease the implications of isolation and improve the quality of life in the
DPRK, the economy will need to be supported. By incrementally lifting
sanctions on the economy, especially those that are not directly related to the
DPRK’s weapons development programmes, international trade can begin
with the US and other important international trade partners, and improve
the standard of living. It is also beneficial to integrate the DPRK economy into
the global economy so that there can be healthy negotiation based on trade
between the DPRK and other nations. The incremental lifting of US sanctions
would also work towards diminishing the hostile atmosphere between the
two countries and better allow for dialogue and progress to be made.181
The US has already begun lifting sanctions and normalising relations with
several other countries after they proved to be ineffective and harmful.
This includes Cuba in 2014, and Iran and Myanmar in 2016. The US has the
opportunity to take the same approach towards the DPRK. In December 2014,
in relation to US – Cuba relations, President Obama stated, “[t]hese 50 years
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179 S. RES. 190: Encouraging reunions of Korean Americans who were divided by the Korean War from relatives in North
Korea. US Congress. (3 June 2015).
http://www.ncnk.org/resources/publications/BILLS-114sres190is.pdf
180 Gross Domestic Product Estimates for North Korea in 2015. The Bank of Korea. (23 July 2016).
http://www.nkeconwatch.com/nk-uploads/GDP_of_North_Korea_in_2015_ff.pdf
181 North Korea Sanctions Program, E.O. 13722. Office of Foreign Assets Control. US Department of the
Treasury. (2 November 2016).
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/nkorea.pdf
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have shown that isolation has not worked. It’s time for a new approach.”182
Equally, these 66 years of isolation and sanctions against the DPRK have not
worked, and a different approach, consisting of dialogue and engagement, is
needed instead.
As the President of the US-ASEAN Council, Ernest Bower has explained:
The presence of U.S. companies abroad helps to promote the values
we as a nation espouse, including human rights and fair labor standards.
They promote democratic values, set a positive example, and improve
the general quality of life by providing fair pay, safe working conditions,
and health and education benefits.
President Bower also gave the example of foreign investment in Myanmar as
an extremely effective means of advancing economic and social development,
which shouldn’t be abandoned in favour of measures such as sanctions, which
are not likely to succeed.183
8. Acknowledge the merging of the disputes between the
United States and the People’s Republic of China with the
conflict between the United States and the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea and make a conscious decision
to separate them.
On April 6, 2017, US President Donald Trump and PRC President Xi Jinping
met for the first time in the US. Government and media reports from both
countries have been optimistic that the meeting was positive and would
improve diplomatic relations between the two countries.184 President Trump
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182 Obama moves to normalize relations with Cuba as American is released by Havana. The Washington Post. (17
December 2014). https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/report-cuba-freesamerican-alan-gross-after-5-years-detention-on-spy-charges/2014/12/17/a2840518-85f5-11e4-a702-
fa31ff4ae98e_story.html
183 Ernest Z. Bower, President, U.S.-ASEAN Council for Business and Technology Inc. Statement before the
Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs. (22 May 1996). 184 Remarks by President Trump After Meeting with President Xi of China. The White House. Office of the Press
Secretary. (7 April 2017).
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/04/07/remarks-president-trump-aftermeeting-president-xi-china; An Baijie and Chen Weihua. Xi’s visit to US called constructive. China Daily.
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2017-04/10/content_28857384.htm
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and President Xi now have an opportunity to use this new relationship to have
an explicit discussion acknowledging that although competing economic and
military interests between the US and the PRC had, in the past, affected the
dynamics of the Korean Peninsula Conflict, it is important to establish that
those competing interests are separate to the unresolved Korean Peninsula
Conflict. By choosing to acknowledge that these interests and tensions are
separate, both the US and the PRC can clarify and set aside the extent and
existence of their competing interests in regards to the Korean peninsula
and begin to work together for a diplomatic solution to the conflict.
As two of the most influential and powerful countries in the world, the US and
the PRC are in a position to acknowledge that any dispute they are involved in
can merge with disputes elsewhere and affect conflict dynamics. The option,
instead, to work together in order to develop an approach to resolve the
Korean Peninsula Conflict does exist should either country make it a priority.
As the US recalibrates and reformulates its foreign policy towards East Asia
under a new presidential administration, choosing to separate, rather than
conflate, competing interests with the PRC on the Korean peninsula can
positively influence dynamics within the Korean Peninsula Conflict.
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