Sunday, August 2, 2026

Dongsuk Kim - 실패한 비밀작전 * 2018년과 2019년... | Facebook


* 2018년과 2019년 남.북.미 정상들끼리의 직접 접촉이 이루어지면서, 워싱턴에서 분단국가 출신의 한 사람으로 정말 한동안 흥분에 가깝게 설레이는 마음을 주체하지 못했다. 분단세대가 가기전에 한반도에서의 냉전체제가 해결되지나 않을까... 하는 기대와 그리고 설레임이었다.
지나고나니, 그것은 순간의 환상도 못 되는것이었다. 그후로 부터 나는 남.북.미 관계의 변화를 더욱 냉정하고 더욱 냉혹한 관찰력을 갖게 되었다. 그래서 이러한 사건을 여러분들과 함께 진지하게 공유하고 싶다.
 
1. 칠흑 같은 북한 해안에서 무너진 극비작전
2019년 초 한겨울 밤, 미 해군의 핵추진 잠수함 한 척이 북한 해안 가까이 은밀하게 접근했다. 잠수함에서 분리된 두 대의 침투용 소형 잠수정에는 미군 최정예 특수부대인 해군특수전개발단, 이른바 SEAL 팀 스쿼드론 대원들이 타고 있었다. 오사마 빈 라덴 제거작전에 참가했던 바로 그 부대였다. 이들의 임무는 북한 지도부의 통신을 감청할 수 있는 전자장치를 해안에 설치하는 것이었다. 미국 정보기관은 폐쇄적인 북한 내부에 정보원을 침투시키거나 김정은의 통신을 감청하는 데 오랫동안 어려움을 겪었다. 새 장치를 설치할 수만 있다면 김정은의 의도와 협상전략을 파악하는 데 결정적인 정보가 확보될 수 있었다. 그러나 누군가 직접 북한 영토에 들어가 장치를 설치해야 했다.
대원들은 약 섭씨 4도, 화씨 40도 정도의 차가운 바닷물 속에서 두 시간 가까이 이동했다. 드론을 띄우면 북한 방공망에 발각될 수 있었고, 무선통신 한 번도 작전 전체를 노출할 위험이 있었다. 위성과 고고도 정찰기가 영상을 제공했지만 실시간이 아니었고, 얕은 해안은 감시의 사각지대였다. 대원들은 평소 특수작전에서 의존하던 실시간 영상과 지휘부의 판단 없이 사실상 눈과 귀가 막힌 상태로 움직여야 했다. 두 잠수정 가운데 한 척이 지정 지점을 지나쳐 되돌아오면서 서로 반대 방향을 보게 됐다. 잠수정의 위치를 바로잡는 과정에서 전기모터가 물살을 일으켰고, 열린 조종석에서 희미한 빛이 새어 나왔을 가능성도 있었다. 바로 그때 어둠 속에서 작은 북한 선박 한 척이 나타났다. 뱃머리의 손전등이 수면을 훑었고, 배에 있던 한 사람이 물속으로 들어갔다.
해안에 도착한 특수대원들에게 배는 자신들을 발견한 북한 경비정처럼 보였다. 하지만 통신이 끊겨 있었기 때문에 잠수정 조종사나 수 마일 밖의 작전지휘관과 상황을 확인할 수 없었다. 특수팀의 선임이 말없이 소총을 들어 발사하자 다른 대원들도 뒤따라 일제히 사격했다. 대원들이 배로 헤엄쳐 가 확인했을 때 총기나 군복은 없었다. 사망한 두세 명은 조개류를 채취하던 북한 민간인으로 보였다.
총성이 울린 이상 장치를 설치하는 것은 불가능해졌다. 대원들은 임무를 포기하고 조난신호를 보냈다. 지원용 핵잠수함은 발각 위험을 감수하고 얕은 해안 가까이 들어와 이들을 회수한 뒤 전속력으로 빠져나갔다. 미군 인명피해는 없었지만 도청장치는 설치되지 않았고, 비무장 주민들만 목숨을 잃었다. 작전의 정보목표는 전혀 달성되지 않았다.
< 뉴욕타임스의 2025년 9월5일자 보도 >
https://www.nytimes.com/.../navy-seal-north-korea-trump...

2. 정상회담을 지원하려던 정보전의 실패
이 작전은 트럼프 대통령이 김정은과 핵협상을 추진하던 시기에 준비됐다. 2018년 싱가포르 정상회담 이후 북·미 대화는 계속됐지만, 미국은 김정은이 실제로 비핵화할 의사가 있는지, 어느 정도의 제재 해제를 요구하는지 제대로 파악하지 못했다. 미국 정보기관이 개발한 감청장치는 이러한 ‘전략적 사각지대’를 해소하려는 수단이었다.
트럼프 대통령은 2018년 가을 작전 준비를 승인했고, 작전부대가 통신두절 구역에 들어가기 직전 최종 실행 승인도 내렸다는 것이 뉴욕타임스 보도의 내용이다. 다만 대통령의 목적이 하노이 정상회담에서 즉각적인 협상 우위를 얻는 것이었는지, 장기적인 대북 정보수집망을 구축하려는 것이었는지는 확인되지 않았다. 트럼프 대통령은 기사가 나온 뒤 자신은 이 작전에 대해 아는 것이 없다고 부인했다. ( ABC가 취재한 트럼프대통령의 답변 )
미국의 관점에서 보면 이것은 특수부대의 전술적 실패인 동시에 정보기관의 구조적 실패였다. 북한에 대한 정보 부족을 보완하기 위해 위험한 침투작전을 선택했지만, 정작 작전팀에는 해안 상황을 판단할 충분한 정보와 실시간 감시수단이 제공되지 않았다. 최신 장비와 최정예 병력을 투입하고도 작은 어선 한 척을 사전에 발견하지 못했고, 발견한 뒤에도 민간인인지 보안요원인지 식별할 방법이 없었다. 기술적 우위를 전제로 설계된 작전이 북한 해안에서는 소수 대원의 순간적 판단에 의존하는 작전으로 바뀐 것이다.
더 심각한 문제는 외교와 비밀군사작전 사이의 모순이었다. 지상에서는 트럼프 대통령이 김정은과 신뢰관계를 강조하고 있었지만, 수면 아래에서는 미군이 북한 영토에 침투하고 있었다. 발각됐다면 하노이 정상회담 결렬을 넘어 미군 인질사태나 북한의 군사적 보복, 경우에 따라서는 핵무장 국가 사이의 충돌로 확대될 수 있었다.
하노이 정상회담은 2019년 2월 말 합의 없이 끝났고 북한은 5월 미사일시험을 재개했다. 그러나 이 비밀작전이 회담 결렬의 직접적인 원인이었다는 증거는 없다. 북한이 사건의 전모와 미국의 책임을 당시 얼마나 파악했는지도 불분명하다. 하노이 회담의 공개적인 결렬 원인은 비핵화의 범위와 제재 해제 수준을 둘러싼 양측의 차이였다.
정상회담을 지원하거나 미국의 협상력을 높이려 했던 정보작전은 완전히 실패했으며, 외교적 돌파구를 만들려던 트럼프의 대북정책도 결국 성과를 내지 못했다. 두 실패는 같은 시기에 진행된 미국 대북전략의 상반된 두 얼굴이다
 
3. 총성이 있었지만 6년 동안 드러나지 않은 작전
사건 직후 미국 정찰위성은 해당 지역에서 북한군의 활동이 급증한 것을 포착했다. 북한이 총성이나 실종된 주민들을 알아차렸을 가능성은 있다. 그러나 북한은 사건을 공식 발표하지 않았고, 미국 관리들도 북한 지도부가 미국 특수부대의 침투였다는 사실까지 파악했는지 확인하지 못했다. 보도가 나온 뒤에도 북한은 즉각적인 공식 반응을 내놓지 않았다. ( 연합뉴스의 북한 반응 보도 )
https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20250906003300315
작전이 오랫동안 공개되지 않은 데에는 여러 겹의 비밀장치가 있었다. 작전 자체가 최고 수준으로 기밀화됐고, 트럼프 행정부 시절 실시된 군 내부 검토도 비공개로 남았다. 당시 조사는 대원들의 사격이 교전수칙상 정당했으며 작전 실패는 예측하기 어려운 불행한 사건들이 겹친 결과라고 판단한 것으로 전해졌다. 작전 참가자 중 상당수는 이후 승진했다.
트럼프 행정부는 군사·정보활동을 감독하는 의회 주요 위원회 지도부에 작전과 결과를 보고하지 않은 것으로 보도됐다. 중요한 비밀작전에 대한 의회 통보 의무를 위반했을 가능성이 있다는 지적도 나왔다. 바이든 행정부가 출범한 뒤 '로이드 오스틴'국방장관은 육군 장성에게 독립조사를 지시했고, 2021년에야 주요 의원들이 결과를 보고받았다. 그러나 이 조사 역시 기밀로 유지됐다.
언론보도의 출발점은 2023년 무렵이었다. 매튜 콜 기자는 이 작전에 관한 단서를 입수했지만 민감성을 고려해 곧바로 취재에 나서지 않고 수개월을 기다렸다고 밝혔다. 이후 데이브 필립스 기자와 함께 현·전직 군인, 정보 관계자, 트럼프 1기 행정부 인사 등 24명을 인터뷰해 서로의 증언을 대조했다. 일부 취재원들은 빈 라덴 제거 같은 성공은 대대적으로 알려지는 반면 실패한 특수작전은 기밀이라는 장막 뒤에 묻히는 현실을 우려해 입을 열었다. 2021년 의회 보고로 작전을 알고 있는 사람의 범위가 넓어진 것도 취재가 가능해진 배경으로 볼 수 있다. 뉴욕타임스는 미래 작전에 영향을 줄 수 있는 일부 기술적 세부사항은 보도하지 않았다고 밝혔다.
이 사건은 한 번의 폭로나 문건 유출로 세상에 나온 것이 아니다. 6년에 걸쳐 여러 기관과 관계자에게 흩어진 기억과 정보를 두 기자( Dave Philipps, Matthew Cole )가 장기간 교차 확인함으로써 서서히 복원한 탐사보도의 결과였다. 총성이 울린 순간 현장 차원의 은폐작전은 이미 실패했지만, 그것이 ‘미국의 침투작전’이었다는 전략적 사실은 북한의 침묵과 미국의 기밀유지 속에 2025년까지 공개되지 않았다.

4. FBI의 취재원 추적과 법원이 제기하는 문제
https://www.nytimes.com/.../times-subpoena-reporter-trump...
오늘 아침(2026년 8월 1일) 뉴욕타임스는 'FBI는 지난 2월 매튜 콜 기자의 뉴욕 자택을 찾아가 대배심 소환장을 송달하려 했다. 소환장은 버지니아주 뉴포트뉴스의 연방검찰이 발부한 것으로, 수사기관은 약 2년에 걸친 콜 기자의 접촉과 대화에 관한 증언을 요구하고 있다. 목적은 북한작전 기사의 익명 취재원이 누구인지 찾아내는 것이다' 라고 보도했다.
공동취재자인 데이브 필립스 기자에게는 소환장이 발부되지 않은 것으로 알려졌다. 전화·이메일 기록까지 별도로 요구했는지는 확인되지 않았지만 중요한 점은 현재 알려진 수사목표가 기사를 쓴 행위 자체를 처벌하는 것이 아니라 기밀정보를 제공한 정부·군 관계자를 찾아내는 데 있다는 것이다.
5.
이 사건은 실패한 군사작전만을 둘러싼 논쟁이 아니다. 국민의 알 권리와 국가안보, 취재원 보호와 기밀유지, 군의 책임성과 비밀작전의 필요성이 정면으로 충돌하는 사건이다. 작전의 실패가 6년 동안 비밀로 남을 수 있었다는 사실과, 그 사실을 공개한 기자의 취재원을 정부가 다시 추적한다는 사실은 미국 민주주의에서 비밀과 책임의 경계를 누가 결정해야 하는지를 묻고 있다.

< 사진설명
1. 2019년 2월 김정은/트럼프, 하노이회담
2. 네이비씰 특수대원을 북한으로 수송한 핵 추진 유도 미사일 잠수함
3. 북한 해안의 작은 어선들
4. 잠수함에서 훈련중인 네이비씰 특수대원.
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·
by author

대표님 좋은 글 감사합니다. 이 사건의 여진이 이렇게 계속되고 있군요, 공유합니다.

Roy Hong
·


지적 하신데로, 입만 열면 거짓말인 트럼프가 자기는 전혀 모르는 일이라고 하는데요. 북측이 과연 앞으로 트럼프/미국과 대화를 할런지... 희박해 보입니다.

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President Trump and the North Korean leader, Kim Jong-un, had an erratic relationship. They met on Sentosa Island in Singapore in 2018.Credit...Doug Mills/The New York Times

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How a Top Secret SEAL Team 6 Mission Into North Korea Fell Apart


The 2019 operation, greenlit by President Trump, sought a strategic edge. It left unarmed North Koreans dead.

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By Dave Philipps and Matthew Cole


Dave Philipps is a national correspondent for The New York Times, and Matthew Cole is a freelance journalist. Both have covered the military for more than 15 years.
Sept. 5, 2025
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A group of Navy SEALs emerged from the ink-black ocean on a winter night in early 2019 and crept to a rocky shore in North Korea. They were on a top secret mission so complex and consequential that everything had to go exactly right.

The objective was to plant an electronic device that would let the United States intercept the communications of North Korea’s reclusive leader, Kim Jong-un, amid high-level nuclear talks with President Trump.

The mission had the potential to provide the United States with a stream of valuable intelligence. But it meant putting American commandos on North Korean soil — a move that, if detected, not only could sink negotiations but also could lead to a hostage crisis or an escalating conflict with a nuclear-armed foe.

It was so risky that it required the president’s direct approval.

For the operation, the military chose SEAL Team 6’s Red Squadron — the same unit that killed Osama bin Laden. The SEALs rehearsed for months, aware that every move needed to be perfect. But when they reached what they thought was a deserted shore that night, wearing black wet suits and night-vision goggles, the mission swiftly unraveled.


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A North Korean boat appeared out of the dark. Flashlights from the bow swept over the water. Fearing that they had been spotted, the SEALs opened fire. Within seconds, everyone on the North Korean boat was dead.

The SEALs retreated into the sea without planting the listening device.

The 2019 operation has never been publicly acknowledged, or even hinted at, by the United States or North Korea. The details remain classified and are being reported here for the first time. The Trump administration did not notify key members of Congress who oversee intelligence operations, before or after the mission. The lack of notification may have violated the law.

The White House declined to comment.

This account is based on interviews with two dozen people, including civilian government officials, members of the first Trump administration and current and former military personnel with knowledge of the mission. All of them spoke on the condition of anonymity because of the mission’s classified status.

Several of those people said they were discussing details about the mission because they were concerned that Special Operations failures are often hidden by government secrecy. If the public and policymakers become aware only of high-profile successes, such as the raid that killed bin Laden in Pakistan, they may underestimate the extreme risks that American forces undertake.

The military operation on North Korean soil, close to American military bases in South Korea and the Pacific region, also risked setting off a broader conflict with a hostile, nuclear-armed and highly militarized adversary.


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The New York Times proceeds cautiously when reporting on classified military operations. The Times has withheld some sensitive information on the North Korea mission that could affect future Special Operations and intelligence-gathering missions.

It is unclear how much North Korea was able to discover about the mission. But the SEAL operation is one chapter in a decades-long effort by U.S. administrations to engage North Korea and constrain its nuclear weapons programs. Almost nothing the United States has tried — neither promises of closer relations nor the pressure of sanctions — has worked.

In 2019, Mr. Trump was making a personalized overture to Mr. Kim, in search of a breakthrough that had eluded prior presidents. But those talks collapsed, and North Korea’s nuclear program accelerated. The U.S. government estimates that North Korea now has roughly 50 nuclear weapons and missiles that can reach the West Coast. Mr. Kim has pledged to keep expanding his nuclear program “exponentially” to deter what he calls U.S. provocations.
Blind Spots

The SEAL mission was intended to fix a strategic blind spot. For years, U.S. intelligence agencies had found it nearly impossible to recruit human sources and tap communications in North Korea’s insular authoritarian state.

Gaining insight into Mr. Kim’s thinking became a high priority when Mr. Trump first took office. The North Korean leader seemed increasingly unpredictable and dangerous, and his relationship with Mr. Trump had lurched erratically between letters of friendship and public threats of nuclear war.


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In 2018, relations seemed to be moving toward peace. North Korea suspended nuclear and missile tests, and the two countries opened negotiations, but the United States still had little insight into Mr. Kim’s intentions.

Amid the uncertainty, U.S. intelligence agencies revealed to the White House that they had a fix for the intelligence problem: a newly developed electronic device that could intercept Mr. Kim’s communications.

The catch was that someone had to sneak in and plant it.

ImageMr. Trump and Mr. Kim met at the Metropole Hotel in Hanoi, Vietnam, in February 2019. Credit...Doug Mills/The New York Times


The job was given to SEAL Team 6 in 2018, military officials said.

Even for Team 6, the mission would be extraordinarily difficult. SEALs who were more used to quick raids in places like Afghanistan and Iraq would have to survive for hours in frigid seas, slip past security forces on land, perform a precise technical installation and then get out undetected.

Getting out undetected was vital. In Mr. Trump’s first term, top leaders in the Pentagon believed that even a small military action against North Korea could provoke catastrophic retaliation from an adversary with roughly 8,000 artillery pieces and rocket launchers aimed at the approximately 28,000 American troops in South Korea, and nuclear-capable missiles that could reach the United States.


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But the SEALs believed they could pull off the mission because they had done something like it before.

In 2005, SEALs used a mini-sub to go ashore in North Korea and leave unnoticed, according to people familiar with the mission. The 2005 operation, carried out during the presidency of George W. Bush, has never before been reported publicly.

The SEALs were proposing to do it again. In the fall of 2018, while high-level talks with North Korea were underway, Joint Special Operations Command, which oversees Team 6, received approval from Mr. Trump to start preparing, military officials said. It is unclear whether Mr. Trump’s intent was to gain an immediate advantage during negotiations or if the focus was broader.

Joint Special Operations Command declined to comment.

The plan called for the Navy to sneak a nuclear-powered submarine, nearly two football fields long, into the waters off North Korea and then deploy a small team of SEALs in two mini-subs, each about the size of a killer whale, that would motor silently to the shore.


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The mini-subs were wet subs, which meant the SEALs would ride immersed in 40-degree ocean water for about two hours to reach the shore, using scuba gear and heated suits to survive.

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A U.S. nuclear-powered guided missile submarine takes part in exercises near Okinawa, Japan, in 2021. A similar submarine transported a Navy SEAL team to waters off North Korea in 2019. Credit...U.S. Marine Corps, via Department of Defense


Near the beach, the mini-subs would release a group of about eight SEALs who would swim to the target, install the device and then slip back into the sea.

But the team faced a serious limitation: It would be going in almost blind.

Typically, Special Operations forces have drones overhead during a mission, streaming high-definition video of the target, which SEALs on the ground and senior leaders in far-off command centers can use to direct the strike in real time. Often, they can even listen in on enemy communications.

But in North Korea, any drone would be spotted. The mission would have to rely on satellites in orbit and high-altitude spy planes in international airspace miles away that could provide only relatively low-definition still images, officials said.

Those images would arrive not in real time, but after a delay of several minutes at best. Even then, they could not be relayed to the mini-subs because a single encrypted transmission might give the mission away. Everything had to be done under a near blackout of communications.


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If anything awaited the SEALs on shore, they might not know until it was too late.
The Operation Unravels

SEAL Team 6 practiced for months in U.S. waters and continued preparations into the first weeks of 2019. That February, Mr. Trump announced that he would meet Mr. Kim for a nuclear summit in Vietnam at the end of the month.

For the mission, SEAL Team 6 partnered with the Navy’s premier underwater team, SEAL Delivery Vehicle Team 1, which had been doing mini-sub espionage for years. The SEALs boarded the nuclear-powered submarine and headed for North Korea. When the submarine was in the open ocean, and about to enter a communications blackout, Mr. Trump gave the final go-ahead.


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It is unclear what factors Mr. Trump weighed when approving the SEAL mission. Two of his top national security officials at that time — his national security adviser, John Bolton, and the acting defense secretary, Patrick M. Shanahan — declined to comment for this article.

The submarine neared the North Korean coast and launched two mini-subs, which motored to a spot about 100 yards from shore, in clear shallow water.

Mission planners had tried to compensate for having no live overhead video by spending months watching how people came and went in the area. They studied fishing patterns and chose a time when boat traffic would be scant. The intelligence suggested that if SEALs arrived silently in the right location in the dead of night in winter, they would be unlikely to encounter anyone.


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Image
The coast of North Korea, pictured in 2018, is frequented by small fishing boats.Credit...Ed Jones/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images


The night was still and the sea was calm. As the mini-subs glided toward the target, their sensors suggested that the intelligence was correct. The shore appeared to be empty.

The mini-subs reached the spot where they were supposed to park on the sea floor. There, the team made what may have been the first of three small mistakes that seemed inconsequential at the time but may have doomed the mission.

In the darkness, the first mini-sub settled on the sea floor as planned, but the second overshot the mark and had to do a U-turn, officials said.

The plan called for the mini-subs to park facing the same way, but after the second sub doubled back, they were pointing in opposite directions. Time was limited, so the group decided to release the shore team and correct the parking issue later.


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Sliding doors on the subs opened, and the SEALs — all gripping untraceable weapons loaded with untraceable ammunition — swam silently underwater to shore with the listening device.

Every few yards, the SEALs peeked above the black water to scan their surroundings. Everything seemed clear.

That might have been a second mistake. Bobbing in the darkness was a small boat. On board was a crew of North Koreans who were easy to miss because the sensors in the SEALs’ night-vision goggles were designed in part to detect heat, and the wet suits the Koreans wore were chilled by the cold seawater.

The SEALs reached shore thinking they were alone, and started to remove their diving gear. The target was only a few hundred yards away.

Back at the mini-subs, the pilots repositioned the sub that was facing the wrong way. With the sliding cockpit doors open for visibility and communication, a pilot revved the electric motor and brought the sub around.


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That was probably a third mistake. Some SEALs speculated afterward in briefings that the motor’s wake might have caught the attention of the North Korean boat. And if the boat crew heard a splash and turned to look, they might have seen light from the subs’ open cockpits glowing in the dark water.

The boat started moving toward the mini-subs. The North Koreans were shining flashlights and talking as if they had noticed something.

Some of the mini-sub pilots told officials in debriefings afterward that from their vantage point, looking up through the clear water, the boat still seemed to be a safe distance away and they had doubted that the mini-subs had been spotted. But the SEALs at the shore saw it differently. In the dark, featureless sea, the boat to them seemed to be practically on top of the mini-subs.

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A Navy mini-sub, known as a SEAL Delivery Vehicle, during a training exercise in 2007. Similar vehicles were used in the 2019 mission.Credit...U.S. Navy, via Department of Defense


With communications blacked out, there was no way for the shore team to confer with the mini-subs. Lights from the boat swept over the water. The SEALs didn’t know if they were seeing a security patrol on the hunt for them or a simple fishing crew oblivious to the high-stakes mission unfolding around them.


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A man from the North Korean boat splashed into the sea.

If the shore team got into trouble, the nuclear-powered sub had a group of SEAL reinforcements standing by with inflatable speedboats. Farther offshore, stealth rotary aircraft were positioned on U.S. Navy ships with even more Special Operations troops, ready to sweep in if needed.

The SEALs faced a critical decision, but there was no way to discuss the next move. The mission commander was miles away on the big submarine. With no drones and a communications blackout, many of the technological advantages that the SEALs normally relied on had been stripped away, leaving a handful of men in wet neoprene, unsure of what to do.

As the shore team watched the North Korean in the water, the senior enlisted SEAL at the shore chose a course of action. He wordlessly centered his rifle and fired. The other SEALs instinctively did the same.
Compromise and Escape

If the SEALs were unsure whether the mission had been compromised before they fired, they had no doubt afterward. The plan required the SEALs to abort immediately if they encountered anyone. North Korean security forces could be coming. There was no time to plant the device.

The shore team swam to the boat to make sure that all of the North Koreans were dead. They found no guns or uniforms. Evidence suggested that the crew, which people briefed on the mission said numbered two or three people, had been civilians diving for shellfish. All were dead, including the man in the water.


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Officials familiar with the mission said the SEALs pulled the bodies into the water to hide them from the North Korean authorities. One added that the SEALs punctured the boat crew’s lungs with knives to make sure their bodies would sink.

The SEALs swam back to the mini-subs and sent a distress signal. Believing the SEALs were in imminent danger of capture, the big nuclear submarine maneuvered into shallow water close to the shore, taking a significant risk to pick them up. It then sped toward the open ocean.

All the U.S. military personnel escaped unharmed.

Immediately afterward, U.S. spy satellites detected a surge of North Korean military activity in the area, U.S. officials said. North Korea did not make any public statements about the deaths, and U.S. officials said it was unclear whether the North Koreans ever pieced together what had happened and who was responsible.

The nuclear summit in Vietnam went ahead as planned at the end of February 2019, but the talks quickly ended with no deal.

By May, North Korea had resumed missile tests.

Mr. Trump and Mr. Kim met once more that June in the Demilitarized Zone between North and South Korea. It made for dramatic television, with Mr. Trump even stepping across into North Korea. But the brief meeting yielded little more than a handshake.


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In the months that followed, North Korea fired more missiles than in any previous year, including some capable of reaching the United States. Since then, the United States estimates, North Korea has amassed 50 nuclear warheads and material to produce about 40 more.
Uneven Track Record

The aborted SEAL mission prompted a series of military reviews during Mr. Trump’s first term. They found that the killing of civilians was justified under the rules of engagement, and that the mission was undone by a collision of unfortunate occurrences that could not have been foreseen or avoided. The findings were classified.

The Trump administration never told leaders of key committees in Congress that oversee military and intelligence activities about the operation or the findings, government officials said. In doing so, the Trump administration may have violated federal law, said Matthew Waxman, a law professor at Columbia University who served in national security positions under former President George W. Bush.

Mr. Waxman said the law has gray areas that give presidents some leeway on what they tell Congress. But on more consequential missions, the burden leans more toward notification.

“The point is to ensure that Congress isn’t kept in the dark when major stuff is going on,” Mr. Waxman said. “This is exactly the kind of thing that would normally be briefed to the committees and something the committees would expect to be told about.”


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Many of the people involved in the mission were later promoted.

But the episode worried some experienced military officials with knowledge of the mission, because the SEALs have an uneven track record that for decades has largely been concealed by secrecy.

Elite Special Operations units are regularly assigned some of the most difficult and dangerous tasks. Over the years, the SEALs have had a number of major successes, including hits on terrorist leaders, high-profile rescues of hostages and the takedown of bin Laden, that have built an almost superhuman public image.

But among some in the military who have worked with them, the SEALs have a reputation for devising overly bold and complex missions that go badly. Team 6’s debut mission, which was part of the U.S. invasion of Grenada in 1983, is a case in point.

The plan was to parachute into the sea, race to the coast in speedboats and plant beacons to guide assault forces to the island’s airport. But the SEALs’ plane took off late; they jumped at night and landed in stormy conditions, weighed down by heavy gear. Four SEALs drowned, and the rest swamped their speedboats.

The airfield was later seized by Army Rangers who parachuted directly onto the airfield.

Image
U.S. troops monitoring the Point Salines airfield after the invasion of Grenada in 1983. SEAL Team 6’s debut mission, directed at the island’s main airport, went badly awry.Credit...Associated Press


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Since then, SEALs have mounted other complex and daring missions that unraveled, in Panama, Afghanistan, Yemen and Somalia. During a rescue mission in Afghanistan in 2010, Team 6 SEALs accidentally killed a hostage they were trying to rescue with a grenade and then misled superiors about how she had died.

In part because of this track record, President Barack Obama curtailed Special Operations missions late in his second term and increased oversight, reserving complex commando raids for extraordinary situations like hostage rescues.

The first Trump administration reversed many of those restrictions and cut the amount of high-level deliberation for sensitive missions. A few days after taking office in 2017, Mr. Trump skipped over much of the established deliberative process to greenlight a Team 6 raid on a village in Yemen. That mission left 30 villagers and a SEAL dead and destroyed a $75 million aircraft.

When President Joseph R. Biden Jr. succeeded Mr. Trump, the gravity of the North Korea mission attracted renewed scrutiny. Mr. Biden’s defense secretary, Lloyd J. Austin III, ordered an independent investigation, conducted by the lieutenant general in charge of the Army inspector general’s office.

In 2021, the Biden administration briefed key members of Congress on the findings, a former government official said.

Those findings remain classified.

Julian E. Barnes, Adam Entous and Eric Schmitt contributed reporting.


Dave Philipps writes about war, the military and veterans and covers The Pentagon.
A version of this article appears in print on Sept. 7, 2025, Section A, Page 1 of the New York edition with the headline: How SEAL Team 6’s Daring Mission Went Awry in North Korea. Order Reprints | Today’s Paper | Subscribe
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N. Korea remains silent on NYT report of 2019 secret U.S. SEAL mission against its regime

Park Boram

All News 19:52 September 06, 2025
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SEOUL, Sept. 6 (Yonhap) -- North Korea on Saturday remained silent on a recent report that United States Navy special operations forces infiltrated North Korea in early 2019 to install a device aimed at intercepting leader Kim Jong-un's communications.

A day earlier, the New York Times reported that the classified mission by Sea, Air and Land (SEAL) Team 6 -- the same unit that killed Osama bin Laden -- took place while Pyongyang was engaging in high-level nuclear talks with the Donald Trump administration during its first term.

The report said the mission was unsuccessful after U.S. forces encountered North Koreans aboard a civilian boat, whom they reportedly killed.

As of 6 p.m. on Saturday, about a day after the report, neither North Korean state media nor the country's foreign ministry had issued a response to the news.

Experts said acknowledgement by North Korea of the U.S. infiltration would be tantamount to admitting failures in border security and protection of nationals, suggesting this could explain the regime's silence.




This photo showing a drill of Sea, Air and Land (SEAL) Team 6, provided by the U.S. Department of Defense, is not directly related with the story. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

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